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1.  Introduction 
The trade policy of the European Union is facing tremendous challenges. In 
1995 the founding of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was widely 
considered a milestone for world trade policy. Yet not long after its 
inception, the WTO’s multilateral liberalisation has begun to slow down. 
One contributing factor is that, over the past few years, regional and 
bilateral trade agreements have been mushrooming, prompting the query 
of whether the WTO is being sidelined.  
The EU is heavily dependant on open markets. Thus, enhanced access 
to third countries is an important element for growth and more jobs. This 
situation makes the question of which long-term trade policy strategy the 
EU should follow a key issue for European competitiveness. Should the EU 
give top priority to the WTO, rely on both multilateral and bilateral 
liberalisation or should it mainly pursue bilateral and regional agreements? 
These questions cannot be answered without an in-depth theoretical and 
empirical analysis of the trade policy options the EU has at its disposal. 
This study provides such an analysis and makes recommendations for EU 
trade policy. 
Despite the EU’s commitment to the multilateral system, the 
negotiations within the WTO are dragging on. To a large extent, this is 
caused by an intensified clash of interests between industrial and 
developing nations. Today, poorer countries represent the majority of WTO 
member states, and further, they are acting in a more self-confident 
manner. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve 
agreement within the WTO framework, which requires unanimity. The 
fundamental conflicts have twice culminated in a collapse of WTO 
ministerial conferences, in Seattle in 1999 as well as in Cancun in 2003. Of 
course, the ongoing Doha Development Round that began in 2001 
overcame a major obstacle in mid-2004, but further negotiations can be 
expected to remain sluggish and to achieve rather modest results. The EU is 2 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
an important and constructive player within the WTO context. But there is 
no guarantee that its own constructive stance and concessions will drive 
the negotiations forward.  
By contrast, there is strong momentum driving the conclusion of 
regional trade agreements. The most remarkable regional association is the 
EU itself. But the NAFTA in North America or ASEAN in Asia are also well 
known and are increasingly important. Approximately 50% of the 200 
agreements that were in force in mid-2004 and reported to the WTO were 
concluded after 1995. Japan is representative of this trend. The country 
exclusively relied on the multilateral trade order up to a certain point, but 
not long ago underwent a paradigm shift and is now actively promoting 
the expansion of its bilateral trade agreements. Also, the US discerns a need 
to catch up with the EU1 (which had already concluded many alliances 
predominantly with neighbouring countries) and is now increasingly 
playing the regional – and in particular the bilateral – card.  
With the launch of the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations in 
2001, the EU adopted the so-called ‘Lamy doctrine’: the highest priority is 
given to the WTO negotiations and these are complemented with a 
moratorium on entering new negotiations on bilateral deals. The longer the 
Doha Round is dragging on and the more regional integration proliferates 
around the world, the more urgent it becomes to question the risks 
associated with such a strategy.  
What effects will the growing regionalisation have on EU 
competitiveness? Do EU companies run the risk of losing their competitive 
edge in the dynamic emerging markets in Asia? Is there perhaps a danger 
of large trade blocs forming that face each other in a hostile and 
protectionist manner (Sapir, 2000)? Does the intensive activity in 
concluding a large number of bilateral trade agreements pose a distraction 
from the multilateral approach? In order to answer these questions, a 
thorough analysis of the implications of regionalism is required.  
Chapter 2 begins by examining the current status and the 
development of regional trade agreements, particularly bilateral ones. The 
discussion reveals the way in which the current phase of regionalism sets 
itself apart from earlier phases. Chapter 3 assesses the advantages and 
                                                      
1 Strictly speaking, one would have to refer to the European Communities (EC), 
because the EC is the actor in the context of trade policy. Nevertheless, the term 
‘EU’ is used throughout this study. MULTILATERALISM OR REGIONALISM? | 3 
 
disadvantages of this development. In order to evaluate them, first the 
variety of motives for regional trade agreements are identified from the 
point of view of an individual country, and then which of these motives 
represent important determinants for the current phase of regionalism. The 
focus then shifts to a detailed study of the theoretical and empirical welfare 
effects of regional trade agreements as discussed in academic literature. 
The study next examines the question of whether the multitude of regional 
trade initiatives interferes with or promotes the multilateral dynamics of 
liberalisation. Finally, there is a discussion of whether the developing 
countries belong to the winners or losers of regionalism, and what 
opportunities regional associations offer with respect to new trade issues 
such as investment and competition. 
On the basis of these findings, chapter 4 examines the EU’s policy 
options from the perspective of self-interest. To this end, the specific 
options that are available to the EU are studied and evaluated. Alongside 
multilateral and bilateral liberalisation, it is possible to proceed either 
unilaterally or in larger groups (plurilaterally), in which case one must 
differentiate between the traditional dismantling of tariffs and new trade 
issues. The study also explores the responsibilities the EU should assume 
from a more general view of global trade policy. Based on these 
considerations, chapter 4 derives specific recommendations for EU trade 
policy. Chapter 5 summarises the results of the study.  
4 | 
 
 
2.  Definitions and Status Quo  
In international trade policy, ‘regionalism’ is used to refer to economic 
integration between two or more countries based on formal agreements 
(Siebert, 1997, p. 161; WTO, 2004; Kaiser, 2003, p. 25 et seq.). The trading 
partners concerned grant each other conditions that are preferential in 
comparison with other countries. In this context, the concept ‘regional’ 
refers to a limited number of countries and is used to set it apart from 
multilateral liberalisation, which includes all member states of the WTO. At 
the same time, this also means that non-members of the agreements are 
placed at a disadvantage with respect to members. Further, regionalism 
does not necessarily refer to unions of countries in specific regions (for 
instance, in Western Europe or in North America), although this is often the 
case, but also to trade agreements among countries on different continents.  
Different levels of integration can be distinguished: 1 
•  In a preferential trade zone, countries do not entirely abolish trade 
barriers vis-à-vis their partner countries. Essential product groups can 
also be excluded from trade liberalisation. Many agreements among 
developing countries belong in this category. 
•  By contrast, in a free trade area, internal tariffs and quantitative trade 
barriers such as import quotas are completely or almost totally 
abolished (for example, in the EU–South Africa case).  
•  This step also applies to customs unions, in which member countries 
additionally align their external tariffs with respect to third-party 
countries (as with the EU–Turkey example). 
                                                      
1 See Siebert (1997, p. 199 et seq.), Kaiser (2003, p. 28 et seq.) and von Carlowitz 
(2003, p. 22 et seq.). MULTILATERALISM OR REGIONALISM? | 5 
 
•  With  common economic areas, rules and technical standards are 
partially aligned (as in the European Economic Area, comprising the 
EU, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein).  
•  A common market means that not only goods, but also the production 
factors of labour and capital can move freely across internal borders. 
A certain degree of coordination of economic policy, for instance 
regarding financial or competition policy, is required (as seen in the 
concept of the EU internal market).  
•  In a monetary union, monetary and exchange rate policy is 
harmonised; in addition, an economic union standardises elements of 
economic policy with the objective of creating a uniform domestic 
market (such as the EU and particularly the EMU).  
•  Finally, in a political union, the competence for political decision-
making is to a great extent centralised at the supranational level.  
In practice, however, elements of these different integration levels 
often intermingle. Thus, a free trade area within narrow limits may exclude 
certain product groups (for example, agriculture) from liberalisation; but in 
other areas, it may go beyond the pure dismantling of tariffs, for instance 
regarding harmonisation of specific product standards, services or 
investment. It should be noted that liberalisation can take 10 years or more. 
Now and again, problems in implementation appear. In some cases, trade 
barriers are not lowered as planned and are sometimes even raised again.  
Regional trade agreements – used here as a general term for different 
integration levels2 – are seen to carry substantial weight in international 
trade policy. On 1 May 2004, 208 regional trade agreements were in force 
and registered with the WTO.3 This figure does not yet include the 
enlargement of the EU. On top of this, approximately 60 to 80 additional 
agreements have been concluded, but are not yet registered with the WTO, 
a further 60 are in the negotiations phase and at least 30 more have been 
suggested (Schott, 2003; WTO, 2003a). Yet, these figures may not simply be 
summed up, because some regional trade agreements may render earlier 
agreements obsolete. For instance, EU enlargement has invalidated more 
than 60 agreements. Therefore, as of 18 November 2004, the WTO reports 
only 150 regional trade agreements. The following discussions in this study 
                                                      
2 For brevity, occasionally the terms ‘associations’ or ‘agreements’ are used. 
3 Out of 124 agreements reported by 1995, only 48 are still in force. 6 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
are based on WTO data from May 2004, since the large number of 
agreements that in the meantime have become obsolete substantially 
characterised the overall situation, in particular with regard to Europe since 
the 1990s. This way, Europe’s strong role as a pioneer of the new phase of 
regionalisation since the beginning of the 1990s remains visible.  
All WTO member states with the exception of Mongolia are involved 
in at least one regional trade agreement. The WTO estimates that in 2005, 
approximately half of global trade has taken place within such associations 
(WTO, 2003b, p. 51). A series of important regional trade agreements and 
the relevance of these groupings’ intra-exports for global trade are shown 
in Table 2.1, although it should be borne in mind that individual countries 
can be a member of more than one association.  
Arranged by type of integration, two out of three reported 
associations represent free trade agreements concerning goods (66%) and 
15% concern service agreements. The remaining nearly 20% are more or 
less evenly spread across customs unions, preferential agreements among 
developing countries and accessions to existing agreements.  
With a view to the number of countries involved in the reported 
associations, bilateral agreements (preferential agreements, free trade 
agreements or service agreements) clearly form the overwhelming 
majority, with a share of around 80% of reported agreements. Most of these 
trade zones lie in Europe and Central Asia. Among the associations that are 
still in negotiation or have been suggested, the share of bilateral 
agreements is higher still. Plurilateral agreements between more than two 
countries represent a share of only about 13% of the agreements reported 
by May 2004.4 
The strong increase of regional agreements since the middle of the 
1990s is particularly noteworthy. Between 1995 and May 2004, about 50% of 
these agreements came into force, although this period represents less than 
one-fifth of the time since 1948 (see Figure 2.1).5  
 
                                                      
4 Four plurilateral service agreements that were concluded in addition to existing 
agreements concerning trade in goods are not included here. 
5 This figure also includes earlier agreements that are no longer in force. If one 
considers only those agreements that are still in force, this figure is about 70%. 
These specifications are qualified to a certain extent by the fact that WTO 
membership and reporting obligations have increased since the mid-1990s (WTO, 
2003a).  
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Table 2.1 Selected regional trade agreements (in 2002) 
Abbreviation Name 
 
Share of trade bloc’s 
exports of world exports 
(in %)  
Share of intra-exports of 
trade bloc’s entire exports 
(in %) 
EU-15  European Union – 15 member states  37.9  60.6 
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Area  17.2  56.7 
Andean Andean  Group  0.8  9.5 
CACM  Central American Common Market  0.4  11.1 
CARICOM Caribbean  Community  and Common Market  0.2  12.5 
MERCOSUR  Southern Cone Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur)  1.4  11.6 
CEMAC  Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa  0.1  1.5 
COMESA  Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa  0.4  6.4 
SADC  South Africa Development Community  0.7  9.3 
UEMOA  West African Economic and Monetary Union  0.1  12.3 
ASEAN  Association of South-East Asian Nations  6.3  23.7 
Notes:    EU – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK 
NAFTA – Canada, Mexico, the US 
Andean Group – Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela 
CACM – Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
CARICOM – Antigua, Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad, Tobago 
MERCOSUR – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
CEMAC – Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda 
COMESA – Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, the Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia 
SADC – Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
UEMOA – Benin, Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo 
ASEAN – Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, People’s Democratic Republic of Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
Source: World Bank (2004, pp. 318-320). 8 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
Figure 2.1 Reported regional trade agreements that are in force, by year of coming 
 into force – Annual averages 
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Notes:  Status as of 1 May 2004; the data shown still contain all trade agreements by the EU 
accession countries that have lapsed owing to the EU’s eastern enlargement. If these 
are not taken into consideration, the number of the reported regional trade 
agreements that are in force decreases from 208 to 150 (as of 18 November 2004). For 
the 1990-94 period, the annual average referred to here decreases to 4.6, and to 6.6 for 
the 1995-99 period.  
Sources: WTO (retrieved from www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm, 23 
May and 28 November 2004) and authors’ calculations. 
 
Initially, after European integration in the 1960s and 1970s, the first 
smaller wave of trade agreements occurred mainly among developing 
countries, but they generally did not achieve their sometimes ambitious 
objectives (which included economic and monetary unions) or remained 
unimportant (Krueger, 1999; Kaiser, 2003, p. 45 et seq.). In the 1980s, the 
activity then abated noticeably, before rising to hitherto unknown levels 
during the 1990s.  MULTILATERALISM OR REGIONALISM? | 9 
 
In qualitative terms, an old and a new wave6 of regional integration 
can be distinguished over the last several decades as discussed below: 7 
•  Nine out of ten of the reported agreements between 1995 and May 
2004 were bilateral in nature, while of those associations that were in 
force prior to 1985, only around half were concluded between just 
two countries. In recent times, the first bilateral agreements have 
begun to emerge between plurilateral associations (for example, the 
EC–MERCOSUR (still under negotiation) and the CARICOM–CACM 
agreements). 
•  The associations that include developing countries are less 
characterised by protectionism and policies of import substitution 
than in the past. Rather, numerous developing countries use North-
South agreements to better secure (lock-in) their reforms of 
international trade and partly bolster their general economic policy 
(see chapter 3, section 3.5).  
•  No longer is trade in goods alone covered in the striving towards 
traditional, step-by-step integration beyond a free trade area up to a 
customs union and beyond. Increasingly, they also include issues 
such as services, investment, competition, standards or 
environmental and social norms.8 
•  The number of active individual participants that are spinning a web 
of bilateral agreements has risen sharply; figuratively speaking, they 
are becoming hubs surrounded by spokes. Since the mid-1990s, more 
                                                      
6  Here the use of the word ‘new’ is to be understood in a broader and less 
conceptual sense than in the term ‘New Regionalism’ coined by Ethier (1998). As 
an advocate of regional trade agreements, Ethier views regionalism as the result of 
the multilateral liberalisation of trade, which leads to a strengthening of trade 
integration among countries that are near each other geographically. Associations 
among these countries would lead to fewer trade diversion problems (see chapter 
3, section 3.2) and agreements between industrial and developing countries in 
particular should tend to have additional advantages. 
7 On this point, see Ethier (1998), Krueger (1999), Langhammer & Wößmann (2002), 
Lloyd (2002), Kaiser (2003, p. 29 et seq.), WTO (2003a) and Schiff & Winters (2003, 
p. 1 et seq.). 
8 In this context, the World Bank (World Bank, 2004, p. 35) provides a fairly 
comprehensive overview regarding important regional trade agreements. 10 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
and more countries have pursued this aim and have considerably 
strengthened their activities during the current decade.9  
o  Primarily, this includes the US (Hilaire & Yang, 2003; Schott, 
2004). After they had previously followed the multilateral path 
exclusively and had actively promoted it, they joined their first 
bilateral associations in the 1980s and the early 1990s. They did 
this without an explicit strategy and rather reactively (Feinberg, 
2003). Since the Trade Promotion Authority was passed by 
Congress in 2002, however, in parallel to the new round of 
global trade negotiations the US administration has 
energetically focused on the conclusion of bilateral trade 
agreements with countries in Africa, the Middle and the Far 
East. They are also pursuing this strategy on the American 
continent (including the Caribbean), but with the medium-term 
objective of establishing a Pan-American free trade zone (Free 
Trade Area of the Americas or FTAA). All of this has been 
embedded in a strategy of ‘competitive liberalisation’, whereby 
multilateral, regional and bilateral negotiations should compete 
with and reinforce each other (USTR, 2004).  
o  In addition, a number of emerging countries such as Mexico, 
Chile, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand are surrounding 
themselves with a network of bilateral contracts.  
o  In Eastern Asia, for some years there has also been lively 
activity regarding the conclusion, and above all, the planning of 
bilateral associations (Lloyd, 2002). ASEAN is especially trying 
to become a hub in the area by announcing several bilateral 
associations with Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, 
India and China. It is noteworthy that until the late 1990s, Asia 
(including Japan, Australia and New Zealand) largely 
subscribed to a multilateral strategy, but is now giving the 
impression that it intends to rapidly catch up in concluding 
bilateral associations (for further examples, see Lloyd & 
MacLaren, 2003 and Dieter, 2003, p. 14 et seq.).  
 
                                                      
9 The large number of associations among former Eastern bloc countries can barely 
be considered to constitute new regionalism, given that earlier trade agreements 
within the scope of COMECON were replaced. MULTILATERALISM OR REGIONALISM? | 11 
 
o  Until the 1980s, the European Communities (and the European 
Free Trade Area or EFTA) were forerunners of bilateral 
associations. After the fall of the iron curtain, this trend 
intensified. The EU concluded numerous bilateral agreements 
with Central and Eastern European countries as well as with 
Turkey (a customs union), which in the majority of cases led to 
or will lead to EU accession. In the second half of the 1990s and 
beyond, this trend continued, for example leading to 
agreements with Mexico, Chile and South Africa. In addition, 
the majority of the remaining south-eastern European countries 
were and will be included to the same extent as the 
Mediterranean countries of Northern Africa and the Middle 
East, with whom mostly bilateral trade agreements have existed 
for some time, albeit less comprehensively. After all, the EU 
also wants to develop the one-sided preferences vis-à-vis the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries into reciprocal 
bilateral agreements. It is remarkable, however, that the EU 
announced a moratorium at the beginning of this decade (and 
of the new world trade round), and has since taken up no more 
new negotiations. Those association negotiations that had been 
decided upon previously are being continued (for instance with 
MERCOSUR). But after the conclusion of the Doha Round, EU 
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson has already signalled 
that he is not likely to disfavour new bilateral associations.  
•  The result is an increasingly complicated network of often 
overlapping associations (‘spaghetti bowl phenomenon’).  
•  A certain tendency can be discerned towards forming regional blocs: 
in Europe with EU enlargement and the connections with the EFTA 
and numerous Mediterranean countries; in America with the planned 
Pan-American FTAA; in Asia with the activities of ASEAN and other 
countries in the region; in the Middle East the pan-Arabian free trade 
zone (planned by 2007); and in Africa with an as yet rather vague 
African economic community (WTO, 2003a). The EU for instance 
promotes this tendency among the ACP countries by preferring to 
negotiate with countries that have previously formed regional trade 
agreements.  
 12 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
•  Indeed, regional integration on the respective continents is put into 
perspective by the fact that in recent times, associations are 
increasingly formed that span continents. This trend for instance 
includes agreements between the EU and Chile, Mexico or South 
Africa as well as those between the US and Singapore or Australia, or 
between South Korea and Chile. Furthermore, the Asian-Pacific 
region is connected by the – albeit rather ineffectual – Asian-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC). Yet associations between Western 
Europe and East Asia exist just as little nowadays as do associations 
between the US and Europe.10 Currently, there is no sign that the 
trade blocs that are slowly developing confront each other in a hostile 
manner, a fear that is occasionally expressed by some researchers 
(Sapir, 2000). Rather, the integration of trade especially between the 
EU and the US (reinforced by close investment ties) as well as 
between East Asia and the US is so dense that such a protectionist 
scenario does not appear very likely.  
•  To some degree, a certain simplification occurs because individual 
agreements lapse, as can be seen for example in the EU’s eastern 
enlargement or in the agreement between Mexico and CACM as an 
entire association, rather than (as before) an agreement between 
Mexico and every individual CACM member.  
                                                      
10 The trade relations between the EU and the ACP countries as well as the non-
reciprocal agreements between industrial and developing countries within the 
scope of the Generalised System of Preferences are not taken into account here.  
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3.  Pros and Cons of Regionalism 
The dynamic and diverse development of trade agreements raises the 
question of how the latest wave of regionalism and bilateralism should be 
assessed from an economic perspective. In the academic debate, however, 
there is no consensus (see for instance Matthes, 2001, pp. 27-31), because 
there is a range of potential advantages as well as numerous possible 
disadvantages whose relative weight can hardly be objectively assessed. 
Hence, it is not surprising that among eminent economists there are 
researchers who tend to be advocates of certain forms of regionalism (for 
example, Wilfried Ethier, Lawrence Summers, Robert Lawrence and Fred 
Bergsten) as well as opponents (such as Jagdish Bhagwati, Arvind 
Panagariya, Paul Krugman and Anne O. Krueger) who are more or less 
clearly against this tendency in global trade. In this chapter the pros and 
cons of regionalism presented by these and other economists are 
considered in greater detail and in different perspectives.  
3.1  Causes of increased regionalism  
A first question concerns the driving forces behind the dynamism in 
concluding regional trade agreements in recent times. In this section the 
basic motives for such associations are considered from the perspective of 
an individual country as stated in the literature.1 
Starting with the non-economic reasons, first geopolitical and 
diplomatic motives should be mentioned, although they cannot necessarily 
be regarded as new as elaborated below:  
                                                      
1  This section draws upon Baldwin (1997), Ethier (1998), Krueger (1999), 
Panagariya (1999), Schiff & Winters (2003, p. 6 et seq., p. 101 et seq. and p. 187 et 
seq.), WTO (2003b, p. 49 et seq.), Kaiser (2003, p. 152 et seq.), von Carlowitz (2003, 
p. 25 et seq. and p. 74 et seq.) and World Bank (2004, p. 35 et seq.). 14 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
•  For the purposes of classical diplomacy, these agreements can 
represent instruments to intensify relations with certain countries in 
an entirely general sense, to promote political stability, to protect 
peace or possibly to fight terrorism and the cultivation of drugs. 
European integration up to the EU’s eastern enlargement is an 
example of an association that is to a large extent politically 
motivated. Economic integration, through economic policy bodies, 
served to overcome former political antagonisms. Further, the recent 
US initiatives concerning bilateral agreements, mainly with countries 
in the Middle East or with some countries in Latin America in which 
drugs are cultivated, are at least partially politically motivated. The 
aim of peacekeeping is also mentioned in the context of MERCOSUR 
and ASEAN.  
•  The establishment of regional trade agreements can serve to enhance 
negotiating power (for example, MERCOSUR vis-à-vis the US or 
ASEAN  vis-à-vis the larger trading partners in the Asian region). 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that as a general rule regional 
associations at the multilateral level do not appear as a group, with 
the exception of the EU (for example, MERCOSUR, CACM and 
CARICOM).  
•  It is possible that – once established – a bureaucracy fears that it 
might be scaled down in the medium term if it is needed to a lesser 
degree for the purpose of multilateral negotiations. Regional trade 
agreements could then serve to provide added fields of activity and 
justification for their continued existence.  
Additionally, there is a range of economic reasons for countries to 
conclude regional trade agreements.2 Hidden protectionist intentions can 
play a role when access to the market of the partner country is improved to 
the advantage of one’s own industry and at the expense of competition 
from outside the association. This approach played an important role in 
                                                      
2 To the extent that the objective is to substitute ineffective domestic production 
with more efficient foreign production and to intensify competition domestically, 
unilateral or multilateral liberalisation is to be preferred to the regional approach. 
For a detailed analysis of the economic and welfare-theoretical effects of regional 
trade agreements, see section 3.2. This includes the motivation to use regionalism 
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many early agreements among developing countries. During the past few 
years protectionist tendencies have evidently faded into the background.  
Anyhow, a regional trade agreement means that third countries are 
placed at a relative disadvantage. This prompts a defensive reaction to 
conclude regional trade agreements or to join them so as not to be 
excluded. On the basis of this idea, Richard E. Baldwin (1997) constructs his 
domino theory, according to which a new agreement or the extension of an 
existing agreement leads to added associations or accessions. As examples 
he primarily points to the consequent effect of the EU’s Single Market 
programme in the form of accession requests by numerous countries that 
were members of European Free Trade Area (EFTA) at that time (among 
others, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland) as well as a number of 
agreements among Latin-American countries as a result of the rejection of 
their request for accession to the NAFTA (among others, MERCOSUR).3  
On the basis of the realisation that regional agreements place non-
members at a disadvantage, there are presently indications of a rivalry 
between the EU and the US regarding attractive markets for their 
respective export industries. The US has seen the need to catch up with the 
EU’s large number of regional associations, and has likewise begun to 
weave a network of bilateral agreements with some markets that are 
important for them. By contrast, the EU has tried to not fall behind with 
respect to the US with emerging countries that are economically important 
such as Mexico, Chile and the MERCOSUR countries, and for that purpose 
                                                      
3 The political-economic model of Baldwin has some weaknesses (von Carlowitz, 
2003, p. 92 et seq.; Kaiser, 2003, p. 176 et seq.). For instance, it does not consider the 
possibility of a request for accession being refused. In addition, the assumption 
regarding the political-economic process in the rejected country have been called 
into question. In such a case, the export industry in the country – being put at a 
disadvantage by the association of other countries – is assumed to intensify its 
lobbying efforts in order to regain its market access. On the other hand, the import-
substitution industry (which as a rule would be affected negatively by 
liberalisation) does not oppose this tendency in Baldwin’s model, as one might 
expect. Cases are conceivable, however, in which Baldwin’s assumption is not 
unrealistic. Such cases could include those where the partner of an industrial 
country is an emerging country with little influence on trade policy and which 
demands no equivalent quid pro quo by the industrial country; where vulnerable 
sectors are excluded from the outset (for example, agriculture); or where owing to 
an agreement, there is an increase in intensive intra-industrial trade export 
opportunities for an industry that competes with imports. 16 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
has been concluding associations that span continents. This development 
has for the time being slowed down owing to the EU moratorium 
previously noted. Nevertheless, in recent times it has become apparent that 
the EU might also conclude free trade agreements in the Asian region in 
order to avoid trade-diverting effects with respect to other emerging 
countries, but primarily to the US and Japan.  
Most of the more recent regional trade agreements have been 
concluded between large industrialised countries as well as developing or 
emerging countries (or both) in their geographical neighbourhood. For the 
EU this concerns above all Central and Eastern Europe, but also the 
Mediterranean area; in the US, it primarily relates to Mexico, but also the 
Caribbean and other Latin American countries. From the perspective of the 
developing and emerging countries, this represents an attempt – which is 
not fundamentally new – to improve access to a large market that is of 
great importance to them (see section 3.5). This trend is also associated with 
the hope of protecting oneself against protectionist backlashes, for instance 
in the form of anti-dumping measures by important trading partners. For 
example, in 2002 Mexico was excluded from US safeguard duties on steel 
products, and within the EU anti-dumping-measures have been abolished 
among member countries. Often, by generally liberalising to a greater 
extent than the larger partner, developing countries pay a kind of premium 
for the protection of market access (for references, see Kaiser, 2003, p. 164 et 
seq.).4  
New aspects in this development principally concern the effects of 
intensified globalisation on the incentive to conclude regional trade 
agreements among neighbouring industrialised and developing or 
emerging countries. Falling barriers to trade, lower communication costs 
and increasingly mobile capital, knowledge and technologies facilitate the 
fragmentation of production processes in different locations. From the 
perspective of the companies in industrialised countries, the opportunity 
thus lies at their doorstep to outsource labour-intensive processes and to 
realise considerable cost advantages. In this way, developing and emerging 
                                                      
4 In addition, the industrial nations use their individual bargaining power, which is 
larger than that within the multilateral framework, to impose environmental and 
social standards as well as – in the case of the US – rules for the protection of 
intellectual property rights and a ban on restrictions on the movement of capital 
(Hilaire & Yang, 2003) (see section 3.5). This is a new development in that for the 
most part these issues have only arisen in the recent past. MULTILATERALISM OR REGIONALISM? | 17 
 
countries benefit in the form of higher exports and increased economic 
growth. In addition, they attract more foreign direct investment from large 
neighbouring countries and hope to thereby noticeably improve their 
growth prospects. Mexico and the Eastern European EU-accession 
countries are prime examples of this.  
The advantages of this strategy can be further increased if the smaller 
countries have adopted a free-market economic policy and thus improved 
the investment climate. Here another rather new aspect of regionalism 
comes into play. Such an about-turn in reform policy is a phenomenon of 
the later 1980s and especially the 1990s. In this regard, regional trade 
agreements can have an additional advantage for developing countries. 
Such an about-turn only leads to more economic activity if it is credible. Yet 
in those countries in which reforms were in the past conducted half-
heartedly or were even rescinded, politics lack credibility. In such 
countries, a regional trade agreement can lock-in reforms and can act as a 
positive outward signal. Therefore, revoking trade liberalisation – which in 
the case of unilateral liberalisation is possible at any time without penalty – 
carries with it the threat of counter-reaction on the part of the trading 
partner. Nevertheless, this advantage of regional trade agreements is 
subject to a number of restrictions (see section 3.5).  
Developing and emerging countries have also used bilateral 
agreements over the past years to reduce their dependence on large 
neighbouring markets. For instance, this applies to the agreements 
concluded by Chile and Mexico with some Asian countries and the EU. 
Another important motive for regional trade agreements that in 
recent times has gained prominence is the sluggish liberalisation 
negotiations within the WTO framework.5 One major disadvantage of the 
                                                      
5 This often-mentioned criticism can be connected to a contribution by Andrew 
Rose (2002 and 2004). Rose argues that it cannot be statistically proven that WTO 
members have a more liberal trade policy or significantly different trade patterns 
than non-WTO members. In response, Subramanian & Wei (2003) pin down this 
seemingly disappointing result to the history of the GATT negotiations, which up 
to the Uruguay Round involved significant trade liberalisation in merchandise 
basically by industrial countries alone and even then excluded sectors such as 
agriculture as well as textiles and clothing. While this can, of course, be seen as 
disappointing, it is obvious that industrial countries have lowered tariffs in 
industrial goods trade immensely (see chapter 4, Table 4.1). Moreover, the 
introduction of developing countries as well as agriculture, textiles and clothing 18 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
multilateral level that is often cited is that, above all, the costs of forging a 
consensus on liberalisation are very high owing to the large number of 
members. Hence it is said that the conclusions of such agreements take 
longer and are less extensive (see for example, Ethier, 1998). These 
objections can be qualified, however, if one looks at the experiences of 
earlier negotiation rounds and multilateral achievements to date:  
•  The argument concerning the large number of members can be called 
into question, because in the end, it depends on the number of 
politically active members. Up to the last (Uruguay) trade round, 
progress in the WTO negotiations depended on a few decisive actors 
(among others the US, the EU, exporters of agricultural goods and 
important emerging countries).6 A large number of developing 
countries have behaved passively and accepted the agreements 
negotiated among the large partners.  
•  A wide range of new subjects has opened up for discussion within 
the WTO framework, such as services, intellectual property and 
subsidies as well as rudimentary rules for investments relevant to 
trade. These new topics complicate negotiations but make them more 
important in economic terms. 
•  Further, it was the EU that delayed progress in negotiations during 
the Uruguay Round because it refused to reduce the protectionism of 
its agricultural sector – which is not necessarily the fault of the 
multilateral system.  
•  In past rounds, negotiations took place in short, but mostly intensive 
stages. Long periods with seemingly no progress in negotiations are 
not new. 
•  The argument that with regional trade agreements one is pursuing a 
faster and easier path than within the WTO framework does not 
generally apply, because regional trade agreements have in some 
                                                                                                                                       
and services into the international trading order in the course of the Uruguay 
Round can be seen as a significant step forward. Although the liberalisation in 
services and to some extent in agricultural trade has not been very pronounced (on 
which more will hopefully be achieved in the Doha Round), the elimination of the 
quota system for textiles and clothing represents a major success.  
6 There is, however, a positive correlation between the number of WTO members 
and the duration of the negotiation rounds (Neary, 2004), which of course still says 
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cases also taken a long time to negotiate, as seen in the process of 
European integration or the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 
which initially entered discussions at the beginning of the 1990s. The 
tough negotiations between the EU and MERCOSUR, which have 
been hampered by setbacks, are another current example. 
The question still arises as to whether the current problems of the 
Doha Round are comparable with the problems of earlier rounds. For 
instance, the number of members has grown considerably since the end of 
the Uruguay Round – up to 148 states. The numeric dominance of the 
developing countries has therefore grown substantially (Figure 3.1).  
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Note: Until 1994, these were the contracting parties to the GATT. 
Sources: WTO (retrieved from http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ 
org6_e.htm, 23 November 2004) and authors’ calculations. 
Above all, however, the developing countries – including the poorest 
among them – have become far more active. Indeed, in Cancun in 2003 they 
united to form various groups, a tactic that reduces the costs of negotiation 
and conclusion. Yet the heterogeneity of interests is significant, so that the 
chances of reaching agreements have rather diminished. For instance, a 
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liberalisation critically because up to now they have been enjoying 
preferential access to the markets of important industrialised countries – a 
benefit that would depreciate in value by an overall reduction of barriers to 
trade (erosion of preferences).  
Another motive for concluding or threatening to conclude regional 
trade agreements can be to exert pressure on the negotiating partners at the 
multilateral level. For instance, the establishment of NAFTA or APEC in 
the early 1990s is also seen in this context.7 In the aftermath of the failed 
Cancun conference, threats by the US and the EU to enter into associations 
with selected countries (which would not take into account many 
underdeveloped countries) belong in this category.  
3.2  Welfare analysis  
Theoretical analysis 
These and other rather political motives for regional trade agreements raise 
the question of how sensible such a strategy really is from an economic 
point of view when considered in greater detail. Such behaviour should be 
compared with liberalisation, which leads to free trade without 
discrimination. Unilateral or multilateral reduction in trade barriers are the 
suitable methods for this to happen. With free trade, the efficiency of the 
international division of labour is maximised, since every country 
specialises in accordance with its comparative cost advantages. Additional 
advantages arise from a broader choice of goods, a higher competitive 
intensity, the use of economies of scale in production and possible 
technological spillover effects conducive to growth. Therefore, from the 
point of view of an individual country, it is in theory advantageous to 
unilaterally liberalise markets.8 Tariffs and other barriers to trade mean that 
                                                      
7 This strategy is discussed in greater detail in section 3.4. 
8 For a detailed theoretical and empirical analysis of the gains-from-trade 
proposition as well as for some theoretically derivable exceptions see Matthes 
(2004). Nevertheless, politically, unilateral liberalisation is often hard to enforce 
because the usually well-organised import-substitution industry opposes this step 
in the political process, while on the other hand, the interests of the consumers are 
difficult to organise. With multilateral liberalisation, there is the promise of 
improved access to export markets, so that the export industry can form a 
counterbalance to the interests of the import-substitution industry (see also chapter 
4, section 4.2). If the national labour market is not sufficiently adaptable to create MULTILATERALISM OR REGIONALISM? | 21 
 
consumers pay prices that are too high and efficiency losses occur because 
the advantages in the form of customs revenue (or import quota rent) and 
higher profits for the import-substitution industry do not offset the losses 
suffered by the consumers. Further, increasing competitive pressure leads 
domestic companies to produce more efficiently, to become more 
innovative and to focus more on customer’s needs.  
With regional trade agreements, the theoretical analysis from the 
perspective of an individual country is considerably more differentiated 
and will therefore be summarised in the following discussion.9 Most 
studies only assume – within the scope of a partial equilibrium analysis – 
the market of an economically small country A. Initially, country A levies 
identical duties with respect to two countries, B and C and on a good that is 
produced under perfectly competitive conditions and with constant returns 
to scale, so that costs increase in proportion to output quantity. This leads 
to a rising supply function for A (SA) (Figure 3.2). The countries B and C 
are, however, large countries in comparison to A. Hence, the export 
quantities on the market in A (or the demand by A) are not of great 
significance to B or C. Costs do not increase, and their supply functions are 
horizontal with respect to the market in A (without duties SB,  SC, with 
duties SBt, SCt). The shape of the cost curves in Figure 3.2 is chosen such that 
at low output quantities A can export at a lower price than B and C. But at 
higher output quantities, A becomes more expensive than B and C. By 
assumption, B offers a higher price than C, whereby the cost difference is 
smaller than the duty levied by country A. In addition, even including 
duties, country C is cheaper than A at higher output quantities.10  
                                                                                                                                       
new employment opportunities for employees who are released in the course of 
the structural change that is induced by liberalisation, it may be sensible to lower 
trade barriers not in one go, but rather gradually. 
9 Early studies about this question primarily comprise the fundamental work of 
Viner (1950) as well as extensions of the analysis by for instance Meade (1955), 
Lipsey (1960) and Corden (1972). More current overviews of the underlying theory 
are presented for example by Baldwin & Venables (1995), Siebert (1997, p. 202 et 
seq.), Rose & Sauernheimer (1999, p. 627 et seq.), Panagariya (2000) as well as in 
Zimmermann (1999, p. 8 et seq.), von Carlowitz (2003, p. 26 et seq. and p. 100 et 
seq.) Kaiser (2003, p. 72 et seq.) and Baldwin & Wyplosz (2004, Part II). 
10 The following reflections are also valid for appropriate characteristics of the 
supply function if in comparison with A, countries B and C are not economically 
large countries, and thus the supply functions of B and C likewise increase. 22 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
Figure 3.2 Consequences of a customs union between countries A and B 
 
Sources: Author’s illustration in accordance with Siebert (1997, p. 202) and Rose & 
Sauernheimer (1999, p. 629). 
 
Initially, A levies an equally high tariff rate t on exports from B and C 
amounting to the difference between p1 and p0. Country A produces the 
amount of 0-M1 itself and imports from C the amount of M1M2 at price p1. 
In doing so, customs revenue is incurred in the amount of M1M2 multiplied 
with tariff rate t (rectangle DEFG).  
If A eliminates tariffs with respect to B and enters into a customs 
union with B, then B can offer its goods at an ‘artificially’ lower price than 
C. Supply function SB now applies to B. As a result, within A, the price of 
the good falls from p1 to p2. Two effects can be distinguished:  
•  On the one hand, trade is created because a share of A’s production is 
substituted with cheaper production from B (M3M1) and also, on 
account of the lower price, demand increases (M2M4). Thus total 
imports from A rise by M3M1 + M2M4. These effects raise A’s welfare.  MULTILATERALISM OR REGIONALISM? | 23 
 
•  On the other hand, trade is diverted in the amount of M1M2 because 
A is no longer importing this amount from the cheapest country C, 
but from the relatively more expensive country B. This effect 
decreases A’s welfare.  
Both effects must be netted against each other in order to determine 
whether the customs union improves welfare for country A. The effects on 
welfare can be graphically illustrated as follows:  
•  The consumers in A benefit from lower prices and consume more 
(M2M4). Consumer surplus (and welfare) thus increases by p1EIp2.11 
•  This is counter-balanced by two negative welfare effects –  
o  The profits of domestic producers in country A fall by p1DJp2, 
because they can sell less (by the amount represented by 
M3M1).12  
o  Further, customs revenue is entirely lost (DEFG), which also 
reduces welfare if one assumes that the government would 
originally have distributed this income as a per capita lump 
sum. 
Consequently, the net effect on welfare stems from balancing these 
effects represented by the areas mentioned. Of the consumer surplus, 
triangles DKJ and EIL in Figure 3.2 represent the increase in welfare – and 
the area KLFG represents the welfare loss as a result of reduced customs 
revenue. The latter area reflects diversion of trade, because A must now 
make purchases more expensively in B than it could otherwise have made 
in C (without tariffs). If in this simple illustration the negative effects of 
trade diversion outbalance the positive effects of the generation of trade, a 
customs union reduces welfare in country A. Otherwise, welfare increases.  
                                                      
11 This effect can be split: On the one hand, those consumers for which the good is 
worth less than p1 (but more than p2) will now also buy the good, represented by 
the triangle EIL. On the other hand, the remaining consumers now pay less than 
before (rectangle p1ELp2). 
12 Regarding the output quantity M1, this effect can also be interpreted as follows: 
as now only p2 must be paid for the same amount instead of p1, the consumer 
surplus increases by p1DKp2. Producers’ profits decline, however, by the amount 
of p1DJp2. The balance of welfare is positive, in the amount of DKJ. This result 
reflects that this share of production in country A was previously inefficient and 
therefore wasted resources. 24 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
Because effects on welfare can barely be measured in practice, one 
could assume that one might offset the increased import amount in A with 
displaced exports coming from C. If the balance is positive – according to 
this train of thought – the balance of creation and diversion of trade would 
also have to be positive. Yet, it is not sufficient to only balance trade 
volumes, since differences in costs also play a role. Thus, the positive effect 
of trade creation is greater, the larger the cost difference is between A and 
B; the magnitude of the negative effect depends on the cost differences 
between B and C. A priori, no unequivocal statement is possible.  
To be sure, there is still a whole range of additional aspects to be 
considered if the effects on welfare are to be extensively analysed. It 
becomes clear that even with a negative balance of the previous effects, a 
positive effect on welfare is possible, but not certain: 
•  If several goods are taken into account, a customs union also leads to 
shifts in consumption patterns by changing relative prices. This effect 
can diminish or reinforce distortions in the consumption structure 
that are detrimental to welfare. The direction of the effect depends on 
many factors and cannot be determined unambiguously in advance.  
•  If A is a large country, its supply and demand influence prices 
abroad. The lowering of tariffs with respect to B increases demand in 
country A for goods imported from B, and also increases A’s import 
prices relative to A’s export prices. Therefore, country A must export 
more to be able to afford the same amount of imports – this means 
the so-called (internal) ‘terms of trade’ have become worse. But at the 
same time, B also lowers its tariffs. If B is large enough and this has 
an effect on prices in country A, in turn A identically benefits from 
this step because its terms of trade improve. Generally, in the case of 
countries of more or less equal size, ceteris paribus the country with 
previously higher tariffs should tend to experience a welfare loss.  
•  If the customs union is large with respect to country C and can 
therefore affect prices there, the welfare of the customs union will 
increase. Since the (external) terms of trade vis-à-vis C improve 
,because by diversion of trade there, the demand for goods exported 
from C decreases, C’s export prices fall in relation to its import prices. 
This effect is even reinforced if, in addition, exports from A or B to C 
are diverted towards the customs union, because then the imported 
amounts are reduced in country C and C’s import prices increase in 
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If the assumption of perfect competition is given up, and increasing 
returns to scale are permitted (falling average costs for instance owing to 
high fixed costs), additional effects on welfare arise.  
•  By the abolition of tariffs, the manufacturers that benefit (from the 
creation and diversion of trade) in the customs union can serve a 
larger market. Their production quantity increases and average costs 
fall. Consequently, fewer resources must be employed per unit of 
production, which increases welfare.13 Positive effects can be elevated 
further. As far as A’s imported good is now produced in country B at 
a better price than in C (without tariffs) through advantages of scale, 
from A’s perspective this no longer results in a diversion of trade, 
because the good is now purchased from B, the most cost-efficient 
supplier.14 In this case, the previous import of this good by B from 
country C is also curbed, additionally increasing production in B. An 
identical effect is achieved by a probable, total displacement of 
suppliers in A by suppliers in B – thus, trade creation is increased.  
•  Liberalisation further results in an expanded range of goods, which in 
turn augments welfare.  
•  The competitive intensity grows with respect to the partner country 
because of liberalisation.15 This outcome has several welfare-
increasing effects. On the one hand, in formerly narrow markets, 
there is a reduction in the monopoly or oligopoly profits that 
originated from the fact that output was lower and prices higher than 
in the case of perfect competition. Additionally, the companies have 
greater incentives to produce more cost-effectively and to develop 
innovations. Moreover, industrial restructuring leads to fewer, but 
larger firms, which implies a larger production scale. All these effects 
reduce costs and tend to diminish trade-diverting effects.  
                                                      
13 As an  in d ir ect  effect  o f t h e p rice reduct io n , dem a n d sli gh t ly i n creas es a ga i n . 
Subsequently, production increases once more and average costs continue to fall. 
14 Yet this only applies if countries B and C exhibit the same conditions of 
production. Should C have comparative cost advantages and hence (at the same 
production level) can produce at a better price, diversion of trade will occur. 
15 Strictly speaking, this applies only to the import-substitution industry, because 
for A’s export industry the conditions of access in country B improve and thus 
competitive pressure tends to be reduced. Until now, this aspect has hardly been 
addressed in the academic literature (Baldwin & Venables, 1995). 26 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
•  Owing to increased innovation and the possible technological 
spillover effects that can originate from trade or increased foreign 
direct investment, growth can rise within the customs union, thereby 
additionally increasing welfare (see Matthes, 2004, chapter 3.2).  
Most of these additional effects of regional integration tend to 
enhance welfare beyond the results of simply comparing the creation and 
diversion of trade. From the theoretical perspective, however, a positive net 
effect is not guaranteed.  
Against this background, it is interesting to examine which economic 
factors influence regional trade agreements. The results of an econometric 
analysis (Baier & Bergstrand, 2004) show that trade agreements between 
two countries are more likely to lead to welfare gains for the countries 
involved and thus become more likely, 16  
•  the lower the geographical distance is between both trading partners 
and the greater the distance is to the non-members; 
•  the larger and the more similar the countries are economically, 
reinforcing the exploitation of advantages of scale in producing 
differentiated products and favouring the creation of intra-industrial 
trade; 
•  the greater the differences are in the comparative advantages 
between both countries, so that strong opportunities for specialisation 
and trade exist and thereby a large potential for inter-industrial trade; 
and  
•  the smaller the differences are in the comparative advantages 
between the pair of countries and the non-members, limiting the 
magnitude of trade diversion. 
Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that from the 
perspective of an individual country, a situation with tariffs has been 
compared with a situation involving a discriminatory dismantling of tariffs. 
If unilateral or multilateral liberalisation is considered, some of the positive 
welfare effects indicated above are put into perspective in cases where the 
most efficient supplier is situated outside the customs union. If average 
costs fall through increasing returns to scale, welfare gains in country A are 
                                                      
16 On the basis of 1,431 country pairs from which 286 were involved in a regional 
trade agreement (in 1996), the econometric model correctly forecasts 243 (or 85%) 
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larger if the more efficient supplier in C increases production instead of the 
artificially preferred supplier in B. In this scenario, the choice of products 
might also be wider than in the case of regional liberalisation. Furthermore, 
the competitive intensity rises more strongly if the most efficient suppliers 
have equal market access. Specialisation is also prevented in sectors in 
which there are no comparative cost advantages, which would damage 
growth in the long term. 
From a global perspective, this point is of key importance since global 
resources are only used efficiently if every country is in a position to 
specialise in its comparative cost advantages and no distortion of market 
access exists among individual countries.  
In addition, not only is the welfare of the customs union to be 
considered from a global perspective, but also that of third countries, which 
one could consider to represent the rest of the world. This study has so far 
pointed out how country C suffers disadvantages in various ways by 
potentially-induced trade diversion: 
•  As far as the demand for export goods from country C decreases and 
this leads to price effects in C, producers’ profits fall in C and the 
terms of trade deteriorate.17  
•  The same applies if the supply of import goods in C from the customs 
union declines, thereby raising prices in C. The consumers there are 
also placed at a disadvantage.  
•  In addition, in the case of increasing returns to scale, a decline in the 
demand for exports represents an increase in costs, because 
production falls and average costs rise accordingly. More resources 
must be employed for the production of the goods concerned.  
•  Further, the choice of goods in country C would tend to be reduced.  
Yet these disadvantages must be viewed in contrast to possible 
advantages of the customs union from the perspective of country C. Thus, 
effects on the structure of consumption can have a positive (as well as a 
negative) effect on welfare. But above all, C should profit from higher 
macroeconomic demand by the customs union, because income and 
growth should increase as a result of the customs union. Again, the balance 
of these effects cannot be determined unambiguously.  
                                                      
17 If several third countries are taken into consideration, the possibility cannot be 
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All in all, the establishment of a customs union – as indicated earlier 
in the context of the simple model – should be more likely to result in 
positive welfare effects for the countries involved as well as for the world 
in total, the more trade is created and the less it is diverted. For these 
conditions, some general requirements can be derived:18  
The creation of trade will be larger,  
•  the higher the tariffs between countries A and B were in the 
original situation;  
•  the larger the cost differences are between country A and 
country B; and  
•  the stronger demand increases and domestic production 
decreases in reaction to the price reductions induced by the 
lowering of tariffs.  
Correspondingly, the diversion of trade will be lower,  
•  the lower the external tariffs are with respect to country C;  
•  the lower the cost differences are between B and C (if B is the 
most efficient producer, there is no resulting trade diversion); 
and  
•  the more open an association is for new members whose 
accession may be motivated by wanting to avoid trade 
diversion.  
In theory, trade diversion can be avoided completely if the third 
country’s previous import volumes are kept constant by stipulating import 
quotas or by lowering external tariffs accordingly. In this case, a customs 
union supports welfare without putting the rest of world at a disadvantage 
(the Kemp-Wan theorem).  
                                                      
18 In this context, there is also a recommendation to enter regional trade 
agreements with so-called ‘natural’ trading partners, meaning countries with 
which a large amount of trade is being conducted already. The idea is that they 
will tend to be efficient suppliers and therefore little trade diversion is to be 
expected. But this concept appears sensible only at first sight. In fact, it has been 
heavily criticised (for an overview, see Panagariya, 1999; World Bank, 2000, p. 41; 
Schiff & Winters, 2003, p. 66 et seq.). Among others, Panagariya points out that 
from country A’s perspective, B might be a natural trading partner, but that does 
not have to be the case vice versa; further, A and B as well as B and C might be 
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In the case of a free trade area, the analysis becomes even more 
complicated (Panagariya, 2000; Zimmermann, 1999, p. 17 et seq.). Here, 
countries A and B levy different tariff rates vis-à-vis country C and rules of 
origin are agreed (e.g. provisions for minimum value creation within the 
customs union are stipulated). These are intended to keep imports with a 
lower tariff rate by B from C from simply being transported across the 
duty-free border from B to A, thereby circumventing A’s higher tariff vis-à-
vis C. In the end, the net welfare effects remain uncertain in this case. 
Individual examples can be identified in which free trade areas have more 
positive effects than customs unions (Zimmermann, 1999, p. 18). These are 
counterbalanced, however, by the fact that rules of origin increase 
transaction costs and may have a protectionist effect (see section 3.3).  
Welfare effects with non-tariff barriers  
In a world in which the tariffs of industrial countries are already rather 
low, non-tariff trade barriers become more and more important. Thus, the 
question arises as to whether regional trade agreements become more or 
less attractive from the perspective of an individual country. The analytical 
concept applied above to tariffs can also be applied to important non-tariff 
trade barriers. In this situation it turns out that the welfare effects are 
generally somewhat more favourable (Zimmermann, 1999, p. 33 et seq.).19  
•  With country-specific import quotas and an initial position as seen in 
Figure 3.2 (where country B is more expensive than C), trade is 
merely created and not diverted, because imports from C remain the 
same. If partner country B (with an increasing supply function) is the 
most favourable supplier at least for a proportion of imports, and if 
the import quota limited partner country B in its ability to export 
prior to regional integration, trade diversion can occur – which, 
however, is positive. Yet, import quotas no longer play a significant 
role in trade in industrial goods.  
•  When considering barriers to trade in services, which can be reduced 
in a discriminating fashion with regard to third countries (for 
example, rights of establishment), a similar concept applies as in the 
                                                      
19 In addition, there is an area of literature – initiated by Krugman (1991) – that 
deals with the question of the effects on global welfare by the division of the world 
into a number of trade blocs. Nevertheless, such strongly simplifying assumptions 
are required that the results are barely relevant to decision-making (Winters, 1999). 30 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
context of tariffs concerning the possible creation and diversion of 
trade (and in this case also of investments). In addition, in certain 
cases liberalisation measures can lead to an increase in competition 
among domestic companies – thus raising competitive intensity not 
only through growing competition from abroad. The resulting 
additional welfare gain would be realised if, for instance, general 
market entry barriers were removed. 
•  If within the scope of a regional trade agreement measures are 
implemented that facilitate overall trade (for example, by simplifying 
customs procedures or by accelerating customs clearing in ports), this 
can in general be assumed to have a positive effect if it does not solely 
apply to the partner countries (as should be the norm).  
Technical and other domestic regulations represent a trade barrier of 
particular importance. Where regulations differ among countries, 
transaction costs rise for exporting companies as they have to gather 
information about the regulatory requirements and may have to adapt their 
product and prove its conformity. These costs are real resource costs in 
comparison to the rents created by tariffs or quotas.  
This difference renders a particular analytical focus on this issue 
worthwhile. Drawing further on Figure 3.2, country C is again assumed to 
be more efficient and can thus produce at lower costs than B. The 
regulatory requirements cause transaction costs amounting to t – which 
shifts SB and SC to SBt,  SCt.. As in the case of tariffs, initially country A 
produces the amount of 0-M1 itself and imports from C the amount of M1M2 
at price p1. In this scenario, however, no customs revenue is incurred by the 
government in A.  
If in a regional trade agreement between countries A and B the 
integration partner’s product-market regulations are mutually accepted 
(country of origin principle), producers in B can offer their products 
unchanged and uncontrolled in A. Thus SB becomes relevant again and the 
price is reduced to p2. Country A hence produces the 0-M3 itself and 
imports from B the amount of M3M4.  
As in the case of tariffs, two effects can be distinguished:  
•  On the one hand, trade is created because a share of A’s production is 
substituted with cheaper production from B (M3M1) and also, on 
account of the lower price, demand rises (M2M4). Consequently, total 
imports from A increase by M3M1 + M2M4. These effects increase A’s 
welfare.  MULTILATERALISM OR REGIONALISM? | 31 
 
•  On the other hand, trade is redirected in the amount of M1M2 because 
A is no longer importing this amount from C. Yet this trade diversion 
does not undermine A’s welfare as in this scenario country B is not 
artificially cheaper than it was in the case of tariffs, but there is a real 
decrease in resource costs.  
The effects on welfare can be graphically illustrated as follows:  
•  The consumers in country A benefit from lower prices and consume 
more (M2M4). Consumer surplus (and welfare) thereby increases by 
p1EIp2. 
•  This gain is counterbalanced by only one (not two) negative welfare 
effect: the profits of domestic producers in A fall by p1DJp2, because 
they sell less (by the amount represented by M3M1). With regulations, 
no customs revenue is lost.  
•  The net effect on welfare is JIED.  
Thus, from A’s point of view a regional trade agreement is much 
more attractive in the case of regulations compared with tariffs. In 
summary, this is related to a reduction of real resource costs that renders 
trade diversion from A’s perspective not negative. Moving from the initial 
position to a regional trade agreement is thus clearly welfare-enhancing for 
A. The possibility of a welfare decline as in the case of tariffs does not exist.  
Country A would benefit more from a multilateral approach, 
however, as C would be able to offer its products at lower costs than B. 
Moreover, it should be mentioned that the third country is placed at a 
disadvantage by diversion of demand. 
This difference between regulations and tariffs can be significant as a 
brief ‘back-of-the-envelope’ calculation suggests. Based on a study on the 
bilateral trade agreement between the EU and South Africa (Lewis et al., 
1999) the amount of lost tariff revenue is used as a proxy for the welfare 
difference between an agreement involving tariffs and a potential one 
involving domestic regulations. While the agreement seen from the 
perspective of the EU contributes less than 1/1000 of a percentage point to 
GDP – rendering a calculation of lost tariff revenue almost irrelevant, the 
effect for South Africa is calculated to be about 0.44% of GDP. A rough 
calculation for South Africa’s lost tariff revenue results in roughly the same 
amount. Thus, in this case the welfare benefits from a bilateral agreement 
covering mutual recognition of regulations would be roughly twice as large 
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Empirical results 
As theory does not lead to unequivocal results about the welfare effects of 
regional trade agreements, the question arises as to whether empirical 
studies can help.20 Primarily, one can distinguish two different approaches: 
On the one hand, trade effects of regional associations are considered. On 
the other hand, the focus lies on estimating welfare and growth effects.  
When studying trade effects, the relevant data are usually examined in 
retrospect (ex post). Sometimes, general equilibrium models are used that 
approach this question from a theory-based ex ante angle. With ex post 
studies, an initial approach could be to observe the development of trade 
among the partners (or similar indicators) over time. Nevertheless, it is not 
necessarily the association that causes a possible increase of this indicator 
after the regional trade agreement has been implemented, because other 
factors also could play a role. In the end, the basic problem lies in the fact 
that one cannot observe how trade would have developed without the 
association.  
The majority of studies attempt to overcome this problem with the 
help of so-called ‘gravity’ models of trade. These models are based on 
historic data and try to determine the most important factors that influence 
one country’s trade with another (considering among other things the size 
and income of the countries, geographical or cultural proximity and 
transportation costs). If these factors are included, with the help of 
regression analyses one can examine whether establishing a regional trade 
agreement (as a so-called ‘dummy’ variable) has a statistically significant 
effect on the development of trade. This approach also has its weaknesses, 
however, because the question of whether one has really recorded all the 
relevant factors of influence always remains unanswered and these results 
must be interpreted with a certain degree of caution. Consequently, it is not 
unsurprising that different studies sometimes arrive at different 
conclusions concerning the magnitude of the calculated trade creation and 
diversion.  
 
                                                      
20 For an overview of relevant literature, see Baldwin & Venables (1995), OECD 
(2001a), Soloaga & Winters (2001), Schiff & Winters (2003, ch. 2), Kaiser (2003, p. 97 
et seq.), Lloyd & MacLaren (2003), Croce et al. (2004) and World Bank (2004, p. 57 
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All in all, no generally accepted conclusions can be drawn from the 
results that are available. As a rule, but by no means in all cases, a regional 
trade agreement contributes to creating internal trade. Further, concerning 
several associations, there are indications of appreciable trade diversion to 
the disadvantage of non-members, as is evident from the intensified 
European integration since the 1980s. The net effect of trade creation and 
trade diversion varies widely and can even be negative. Moreover, in the 
case of an association with a positive net effect is it not certain that the net 
effect is positive from the perspective of every country involved (World 
Bank, 2004, p. 62).  
Effects on welfare can only be determined with general equilibrium 
models. These consist of a large number of mutually dependent equations 
that describe for instance the behaviour of enterprises and consumers, as 
well as illustrate the integration between domestic and foreign countries 
and between different sectors of the economy in a stylised form. Thereby, 
the functioning of a national economy should be roughly retraced and the 
effects of policy measures estimated as well. In reference to theory, three 
types of models can be generally distinguished – models involving perfect 
competition, models involving imperfect competition and increasing 
returns to scale and models that in addition map growth effects. Although 
this approach has its charms, it also has disadvantages. Some important 
elements in the model whose effects on the result can be significant must be 
determined more or less arbitrarily, because the required, empirically 
ascertained, precise data are missing. Hence, Baldwin & Venables (1995, p. 
1633) call this approach “theory with numbers”. Schiff & Winters (2003, p. 
48 et seq.) also highlight the fact that deficiencies in the model can lead to 
an overestimation of welfare effects, for instance because the balance 
between trade creation and diversion is estimated as being too favourable 
(Lloyd & MacLaren, 2003). Therefore, again, the following results must be 
interpreted with caution, particularly as they represent only a very rough 
summary.  
Increases in welfare can be shown for almost all members of regional 
trade agreements. Depending on the models used (types 1, 2 or 3), the 
increases are in the range of a fraction of 1% of GDP, of between 2 and 3% 
of GDP or of about 5% of GDP (World Bank, 2000, p. 50; Schiff & Winters, 
2003, p. 48). As a rule, non-members are affected only to a small degree, but 
partially suffer losses of welfare as is to be expected. These losses are higher 
the greater the economic size of the association. Global welfare effects are 
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To summarise, it is important to note the following conclusion: as a 
general rule, increases in welfare are greatest in the case of multilateral 
liberalisation for the majority of countries examined.  
3.3   Other welfare dimensions 
Transaction costs as a barrier to trade 
In comparison with the highly complex welfare effects, substantially clearer 
statements about the pros and cons of regionalism can be made if 
transaction costs are considered, brought about by the latest wave of 
bilateral and often overlapping agreements.  
This tangle can be reminiscent of a ‘spaghetti bowl’ – a term coined 
by the economist Jagdish Bhagwati.21 The problem lies in the fact that 
companies in countries that are a member of more than one regional 
agreement must observe different export regulations according to the 
country to which they are exporting. Consequently, the costs of 
information and of trade administration increase in comparison with an 
ideal situation of unilateral or multilateral liberalisation, in which the same 
(import) conditions apply to all foreign countries. Especially for smaller 
companies (as well as for those in developing countries) this situation is 
associated with relatively high costs and can have a trade-reducing effect. 
This is all the more important as with increasing trade in intermediate 
goods, today one product might cross borders not only once but several 
times at different stages of production.  
With different regulations applying to different export countries, the 
key issue relates to the cost-increasing effects of preferential rules of 
origin.22 These are needed in order to decide whether a good that is traded 
within a regional agreement by countries with different external tariff rates 
should enjoy the preferential treatment provided by the regional agreement 
or is classified as a third-country product.23 
                                                      
21 The World Bank (2004, p. 39 et seq.) provides an illustration of the tangle of 
bilateral associations for different regions.  
22 See Krueger (1999), Panagariya (1999), Estevadeordal & Suominen (2003), Moïsé 
(2003, pp. 159-69) and Dieter (2004). 
23 Rules of origin are necessary in those associations that have no common external 
tariff (preference agreements, free trade zones or as yet uncompleted customs 
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Rules of origin are often very complicated,24 because in the course of 
globalisation production processes are increasingly divided and distributed 
across different countries. Hence, it becomes more difficult to decide where 
a good was produced and when it qualifies for preferential treatment. As a 
rule, a substantial transformation of the good must have taken place within 
the exporting member country of an association – although of course to 
determine this in an individual case can often be very challenging.  
Another factor that raises costs relates to the fact that rules of origin 
can create additional trade-diverting effects in the case of a free trade area. 
This result should be explained in greater detail: if for instance it is 
required that a minimum share of value-added must be created or a certain 
production process must take place within the association, then more 
efficient suppliers of intermediate products and services from third 
countries can potentially be excluded. In this case, at the level of the 
intermediate product or service, trade is diverted (even if no external tariff 
is levied on the third country’s preliminary product).25 The more restrictive 
and more complicated the rules of origin become, the greater these effects 
are. Rules of origin can thus represent another gateway for a very subtle 
kind of protectionism. Therefore, these issues – which appear to be only 
technical details – are in practice often starting points for political interest 
groups to exert their influence. As a matter of fact, there are indications that 
preferential rules of origin are abused for protectionist purposes, primarily 
by the industrial countries (the US and the EU) in sectors that are 
                                                                                                                                       
preferential treatment, it would be possible for third-country goods to be imported 
into the preferential trade zone via the country with the lowest external tariff rate, 
and then to a country with a tariff that is higher vis-à-vis the third country. In such 
a case this higher external tariff would be pointless, and the association would 
have the effect of a customs union on the basis of the lowest tariff (see section 3.2). 
24 Decision criteria in this context are a certain minimum share of value creation in 
the relevant country (for example, 50%), a prescribed production process, a 
transformation of the good that leads to a change in the classification of goods (for 
example, from fabric to clothing) or a combination of these. For example, for 
clothing to qualify for preferential treatment under NAFTA it must be made of 
yarn spun within NAFTA. Another complication consists of so-called ‘cumulation 
rules’, which regulate, among other things, whether input materials imported from 
third countries may be ‘credited’ in determining the preference of origin. 
25 Yet at the level of the end product, trade diversion decreases if more expensive 
input goods are used, and therefore the cost disadvantage compared with 
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considered to be vulnerable, for example in order to support the domestic 
textile industry at the supply level (Estevadeordal & Suominen, 2003). To 
the extent that this occurs, complexity of the rules of origin, and thereby 
also transaction costs, often increase further (as for example, with the 
NAFTA and clothing – see World Bank, 2004, p. 71).  
Owing to preferential rules of origin, the transaction costs of trade 
can be estimated to rise in the mid-single-digit percentage range. On this 
point, however, only older studies from the 1980s are available 
(Estevadeordal & Suominen, 2003). These results are further aggravated if 
the rules of origin are not sufficiently transparent and potentially allow 
arbitrary decisions by the customs administration. The web of regional 
agreements and the international fragmentation of the production process 
further increase the cost-raising effect of rules of origin significantly.  
In summary, the spaghetti bowl phenomenon as well as complex 
rules of origin hamper trade, and at the same time make the use of trade 
preferences appear less attractive. In fact, as the frequency of applying 
these preferences diminishes the more restrictive and complex the rules of 
origin become (Estevadeordal & Suominen, 2003).  
Therefore, it would be of great practical importance for the WTO to 
harmonise the rules of origin, however; this ambitious project is unlikely to 
happen within the scope of the Doha Round. Even the politically and 
economically far less controversial issue of harmonising the non-
preferential rules of origin (which is important for the definition of origin 
required for implementing anti-dumping measures) has come to a 
standstill. 
A race for markets boosts bilateral agreements  
As shown above, the global effects of regional trade agreements on welfare 
are unclear, and non-members to the agreements tend to be put at a 
disadvantage to a more or less strong degree. The rise in transaction costs 
as a result of a large number of overlapping associations makes matters 
worse. The continually growing number of bilateral associations at present 
therefore leads to some concern, even more so as the members of regional 
agreements do not sufficiently consider the negative effects on third parties 
or the higher costs associated with an increasingly dense network of 
associations. This situation basically implies a negative external effect, 
which, according to welfare theory, leads to excessive activity.  
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Game theory also predicts excessive and self-reinforcing regionalism. 
Because if regional trade agreements present advantages to an individual 
country, from its point of view it is the best (dominant) strategy to conclude 
these associations – regardless of what the trading partners do: 
•  If the trading partners pursue only the strategy of multilateralism, the 
individual country will receive better conditions of access to selected 
markets than the rest of the world.  
•  If, however, the trading partners pursue the more dynamic regional 
strategy in parallel with the slow multilateral progress, the country’s 
own access to the markets of interest would deteriorate if it were to 
forego regional associations. Consequently, the country will try to re-
establish a ‘level playing field’ with similar access conditions.  
This insight especially applies to the large industrial countries, which 
– as experience shows – can exclude particularly vulnerable sectors from 
liberalisation when concluding regional agreements with developing and 
emerging countries.26 Thus in the political process the resistance on the part 
of the import-substitution industry should be rather low and the interests 
of the export industry should tend to dominate, resulting in high levels of 
political pressure to conclude new regional agreements.  
Because concluding bilateral trade agreements represents a dominant 
strategy for all countries, an unchecked race for markets can be triggered, 
as soon as some major players engage in this strategy and others feel forced 
to follow. In fact, this is exactly what seems to have happened with regard 
to the recent wave of regionalism. The race–for-markets view appears to be 
particularly relevant regarding the market interest of the EU, the US and 
partly Japan with respect to the larger Latin American countries (Mexico, 
Chile and MERCOSUR) and the emerging countries in the Asian region.  
If the growth of regional trade agreements is getting out of hand and 
in turn really has negative global welfare effects, this race for markets 
would constitute the start of a self-reinforcing and increasingly detrimental 
process. In this case, relying on individual countries’ incentives will lead to 
a damaging outcome from a global perspective. The best solution from a 
global perspective would be if all partners were to largely refrain from 
regional agreements. But this runs counter to individual incentives, and 
                                                      
26 Certain trade sectors can be entirely excluded to a certain extent; liberalisation 
can be stretched over time or also be limited de facto by restrictive rules of origin. 
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there is the danger that certain countries could choose a free-rider option. 
Bringing the race for markets to a halt could thus be viewed as a global 
public good. This action would require the intervention of a supra-national 
institution endowed with the right to intervene. Yet such a body does not 
exist in the global context.  
Coordination and arrangements among the involved trading partners 
with the objective of limiting this race for markets can provide a certain 
way out of this situation. For this strategy, the WTO offers the suitable 
framework. And within this framework, the large global trading partners – 
above all, the EU and the US – bear a particular responsibility.  
3.4  Regionalism and the WTO  
Regional trade agreements and WTO law 
As the welfare-theoretical analysis has shown, regional trade agreements 
discriminate against third countries that are not part of the agreement, 
owing to the preferential treatment of the partners. On the other hand, the 
principle of the most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment is an elementary 
one of the WTO.27 Accordingly, all foreign products of all trading partners 
should be treated equally at a country’s border. This principle prevents 
trade distortion among countries. MFN treatment as a fundamental 
principle makes sure that from the perspective of an individual country, 
imports come from the most efficient supplier. 
At the same time, at the multilateral level political realities must be 
accepted. Right from the start of the GATT, it was considered undesirable 
to renounce the instrument of free trade agreements. Accordingly, 
exceptions were created in the rules for regional associations.  
Regional trade agreements lead to a reduction of trade barriers – and 
thus to a liberalisation of international trade – in line with a fundamental 
WTO intention. The WTO recognises this basically positive impact of 
regional associations and determines criteria that are supposed to limit 
trade-distorting effects. Art. XXIV of the GATT states:28 
                                                      
27 For an overview of the core principles on which the world trading system is 
based, see Hauser & Schanz (1995). 
28 A similar provision is found in the GATS service agreement. Art. V requires that 
within the context of economic integration (for example, within the scope of a free 
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5.  Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as 
between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a 
customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim 
agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a 
free-trade area; [p]rovided that: 
(a)  with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement 
leading to a formation of a customs union, the duties and 
other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of 
any such union or interim agreement in respect of trade with 
contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement 
shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the 
general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce 
applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation 
of such union or the adoption of such interim agreement, as 
the case may be;   
7.  (a)  Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union 
or free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the 
formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available to them 
such information regarding the proposed union or area as will 
enable them to make such reports and recommendations to 
contracting parties as they may deem appropriate. 
8.  For the purposes of this Agreement: 
(a)  A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution 
of a single customs territory for two or more customs 
territories, so that 
(i)  duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, 
where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, 
XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially 
all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or 
at least with respect to substantially all the trade in products 
originating in such territories. 
The conclusion of free trade agreements should proceed in a 
transparent manner. WTO members should already be informed at the 
time when such negotiations are initiated. Thereby, the WTO members that 
                                                                                                                                       
liberalisation includes essential sectors (and trade volumes, number of sectors and 
supply procedures). This wording is much weaker than that contained in Art. 
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are not included are supposed to be given the opportunity to exert an 
influence on the creation of regional trade agreements. This consultation 
process is non-binding, however, and not used in general. The WTO’s 
notification mechanism increases transparency, which can lead to 
reductions in transaction costs. Through the provision of timely 
information, manufacturers and traders can be spared unpleasant surprises 
and they are given opportunity to adapt to the new trade conditions.  
The rule specifying that barriers to trade may not be raised with 
respect to third countries in the course of the creation of a regional trade 
agreement is more binding. Although this provision cannot avoid the 
trade-diverting effects of regional trade agreements, it can at least prevent 
them from becoming exacerbated by the construction of higher barriers to 
trade with respect to third countries. The rule is intended to prevent the 
establishment of ‘trade fortresses’. The regulation expressly refers to the 
status of liberalisation in total (“general incidence of the duties and 
regulations of commerce”). This problem is especially relevant regarding 
the establishment and enlargement of customs unions. For political 
reasons, the partners of a customs union will not necessarily commit 
themselves to the partner countries’ lower tariff rates. Thus the tariff rates 
of the EU were not negotiated, neither for example during establishment of 
the customs union between the EU and Turkey, nor during its eastern 
enlargement, but rather were taken over from the partner countries. In 
individual cases, this leads to increases in tariff rates with respect to third 
countries, which they are not obliged to accept without compensation. 
They can enter into negotiations with the partners and demand trade 
concessions (for example, general reductions in tariffs for certain products). 
If necessary, the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism can be used.  
Also of great importance is also the GATT requirement that regional 
trade agreements must include “substantially all the trade” between the 
partners. This precaution serves to prevent sector- or product-specific 
‘cherry-picking’ and is important to limit trade-diversion effects. Tailoring 
regional trade agreements specifically for certain products would open the 
floodgates to sector-specific associations that could put third countries at an 
extreme disadvantage. Assume that country A produces cars and no 
tropical fruit, country B grows tropical fruit, but produces no cars, and 
country C grows tropical fruit as well as produces cars. The temptation on 
the part of countries A and B is great to introduce between them free trade 
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and the tropical fruit industry in country B could selectively be promoted 
with respect to competition in country C. In principle, Art. XXIV bars such 
product-specific agreements. By requiring that the agreement cover almost 
the entire trade, targeted measures against competition from third 
countries can be largely avoided.  
Admittedly, the GATT does not determine precisely what is meant by 
“substantially all the trade”. Whether it is supposed to mean more than 
99% of all trade or only more than 90% is subject to interpretation.29 There 
is  de facto the possibility to exclude ‘sensitive’ products and sectors 
(meaning in general agricultural products as well as textiles and clothing) 
from the trade agreements. This possibility facilitates negotiation because 
the resistance from the import-substitution industries will be less 
pronounced than in the case of a multilateral round in which 
predominantly developing countries are pushing for opening sensitive 
sectors in the industrial countries. 
As a rule, trade among the partners of a regional trade agreement is 
not liberalised overnight, but on the basis of a liberalisation schedule. This 
way, tariffs are reduced quickly for unproblematic products but slowly for 
sensitive products. The WTO rules stipulate that a period of 10 years may 
be exceeded only in special circumstances. This rule is intended to make 
sure that cherry-picking does not have a chance to occur by way of 
disproportionately long liberalisation periods.  
Trade among developing countries represents a significant exception. 
According to the Enabling Clause – a special clause for developing 
countries – such countries may grant each other trade preferences. In 
addition, this can be done specifically for certain products. The GATT 
requirement contained in Art. XXIV to include “substantially all the trade” 
does not apply to developing countries. Within the scope of the Global 
System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP), a 
number of developing countries make use of this possibility. Yet compared 
with the bilateral and regional trade agreements among developing 
countries, the system is fairly insignificant.30 
                                                      
29 For instance, the EU assumes a 90% threshold (Lamy, 2002). 
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The WTO rules concerning regional agreements are intended to 
minimise trade-diverting effects and in this respect are in principle very 
useful. They are not aimed at preventing regional associations, but rather 
specify criteria that should guide such trade agreements.  
Unfortunately, regarding some important points, the WTO rules are 
too vague. Although in specific cases such points could be legally 
interpreted by WTO dispute settlement and enforced by retaliatory 
measures, this has not happened in any case of significance to date (Schiff 
& Winters, 2003, p. 255). In practice, with regional trade agreements 
proliferating globally, WTO members tacitly agree to tolerate such 
associations – employing the principle of not throwing stones at others 
when living in a glass house.  
All in all, the WTO rules remain relatively blurred and complicate the 
WTO review process that is supposed to monitor regional trade agreements 
for compliance. The overall weakness of this mechanism and of rule 
enforcement can be traced back to the precedent of the Treaty of Rome (by 
the European Economic Community), which represented an offence against 
the rules for regional trade agreements and remained unpunished (Schiff & 
Winters, 2003, p. 249).  
Regionalism and multilateralism – Building or stumbling blocks? 
In order to analyse how regionalism and multilateral liberalisation are 
interconnected within the WTO framework, the discussion has so far 
focused on welfare effects. There are, however, other effects of regionalism 
– namely on the status and the development of multilateral liberalisation.31 
In this context, it is of particular interest whether regional trade agreements 
favour or impede the creation of worldwide free trade – the long-term 
WTO objective (Bhagwati, 1992). Regionalism may lead to incentives for 
raising or lowering trade barriers with respect to rest of the world. Above 
all, analysis should focus on whether the willingness for multilateral 
liberalisation is discouraged or promoted. In this section, arguments that 
the effects of regionalism are supportive of free trade are initially reviewed, 
which must nevertheless be put into perspective.  
                                                      
31 For articles that provide an overview, see Krueger (1999), Panagariya (1999), 
Winters (1999), Zimmermann (1999, ch. C), Panagariya (2000), World Bank (2000, 
ch. 5), von Carlowitz (2003, p. 120 et seq. and p. 151 et seq.), WTO (2003b, p. 62 et 
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Regional trade agreements serve to gather experience that is helpful 
for later multilateral liberalisation, for reasons that include:  
•  There is the potential that new issues of trade policy are initially 
tested in regional associations. The multilateral level might 
subsequently benefit from experiences with possibly different 
approaches and select the methods that have accordingly proven to 
be the best (see section 3.6). If, however, regional agreements create 
rules that prove unacceptable at the multilateral level and if these 
rules are not easily reversible, regional initiatives could be stumbling 
blocks.   
•  Especially in developing countries, governments can improve their 
negotiating skills and bureaucracies their competence for 
administering the obligations arising from the association. The 
administrative capacities can, however, turn out to be limited. This 
means that there is a danger that negotiations concerning additional 
regional agreements bind too many resources and therefore 
complicate multilateral liberalisations that are taking place in parallel. 
This could well be the case with the large numbers of bilateral 
agreements currently under negotiation. It is also possible that owing 
to a different range of issues at the regional and multilateral levels, 
the insights gained cannot be used within the WTO context.  
•  Consumers may recognise the advantages of cheaper imports and 
wider choice, and in future, as voters, may be more open-minded 
with respect to multilateral liberalisation. 
Liberalisation with respect to the rest of the world could also be more 
readily enforceable politically if the import-substitution industry step by 
step becomes used to higher competitive pressure. So long as the rest of the 
world produces more efficiently than the partner country, and the partner 
country produces more economically than the domestic economy, 
regionalisation can represent a preliminary stage for multilateral 
liberalisation and bring about this familiarisation. To the extent that the 
import-substitution industry has already been shrinking in this manner, it 
may not be able to so effectively resist further liberalisation in future. 
Additionally, this sector will become more efficient, so that later adaptation 
to fiercer competition from the rest of the world will become easier. If, 
however, the representatives of the import-substitution industry recognise 
that multilateral liberalisation will follow regional liberalisation, they are 
likely to oppose the first step fiercely.  44 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
Likewise, this argument can be reversed in the case of an import-
substitution industry that has strong protectionist tendencies. It is 
conceivable that the industry will grant its approval to a regional trade 
agreement only if at the same time it is assured that in the near future this 
will not lead to multilateral liberalisation, or even that – as compensation 
for increased competitive pressure – protection is increased with respect to 
non-members (for instance by means of anti-dumping-measures).  
In theory it is conceivable under certain assumptions that the 
establishment of a regional trade agreement exerts such a strong pull on 
non-members that the end result is one single, large trade bloc – meaning 
free trade worldwide. Richard E. Baldwin has shown this in the context of 
his domino effect mentioned in section 3.1. Yet this line of thought does not 
take into consideration that existing members can refuse additional 
accessions. In fact, it is mainly the argument of market power that speaks 
for the fact that a trade bloc will not be global, but will end its expansion 
before this happens, because by increasing tariffs the own terms of trade 
can be improved at the expense of non-members. If the number of non-
members continues to be reduced, this welfare effect is also diminished for 
the trade bloc. Looking at present-day reality, it would rather appear that a 
few large continent-centred trade blocs are likely to be established. 
Experience has also shown that membership applications are actually 
refused now and again, for instance by the NAFTA with regard to some 
Latin-American countries or for a long time by the EU with respect to 
Turkey.  
This stage is where Lloyd (2002) sets in and demonstrates that 
bilateral associations can lead to crumbling opposition. In his studies, he 
assumes a trade bloc with several members, some of which refuse to grant 
accession to a third country. If an individual member country now 
concludes a bilateral agreement with the third country, the incentive for the 
others to likewise conclude a bilateral agreement with the third country 
increases, owing to the discrimination of the other members regarding 
market access to the third country. This incentive rises for the other 
countries in correlation with the number of member countries that enter 
into an association with the third country. In the end, it can happen that all 
the members eventually conclude bilateral agreements with the third 
country. From there on, it is only a small step to integrate the third country 
into the trade bloc. This process could even lead to the merger of different 
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free trade. But it is uncertain how realistic this thinking is. To the extent 
that a member country with a dismissive attitude exports only a small 
amount to the third country, or expects, as it sees is the case with other 
member countries’ existing agreements, that it must open up sensitive 
sectors, it will probably continue to refuse to enter into any agreement with 
the third country.  
To the extent that developing and emerging countries use regional 
agreements to politically secure (lock-in) their basic intentions of trade 
liberalisation, it is evident that regionalism and multilateralism go hand in 
hand. For instance, Foroutan (1998) points out that in Latin America, 
countries have likewise lowered their external tariffs in regional trade 
agreements.  
Progress in multilateral liberalisation is probably barely affected by 
bilateral agreements with respect to important facets of agricultural 
protectionism in the industrial countries. The reason is that although in the 
context of tariffs preferential treatment can be granted, this is not possible 
with subsidies for domestic production or for exports that are widespread 
in the agricultural sector. If subsidies are cut, all exporting trading partners 
benefit evenly. Consequently, the industrial countries and especially the EU 
will hardly become involved in giving up this ‘internal’ protectionism in 
bilateral agreements, because that would mean that a quid pro quo could 
only be offered by few countries, while at the multilateral level, the EU can 
count on much more comprehensive liberalisation concessions on the part 
of the developing and emerging countries.  
A number of arguments support the concept that regionalism can 
have the effect of promoting negotiations within the WTO framework:  
•  For instance, it is occasionally pointed out that the establishment and 
the enlargements of the European Communities induced the US to 
push for dismantling tariffs in the context of the multilateral 
negotiation rounds of the 1960s and 1970s to decrease the trade 
diversion resulting from European integration (for references, see 
World Bank, 2000, p. 102). Conversely, it is said that it was the US 
that tried to exert negotiating pressure on the EU by establishing the 
NAFTA and the APEC during the Uruguay Round (1986 to 1993).32 
                                                      
32 The World Bank (2000, p. 103) refers to an article by Fred Bergsten in which a 
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This assertion is countered by the argument that other factors would 
have played a bigger role in the negotiations. Another reason often 
used to explain the lack of progress in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations is the restrictiveness of the EU’s agricultural policy, 
which was presumably reinforced by the association’s bigger 
negotiating power. In addition, the threat of regional trade activities 
runs the risk that the trading partner one wants to influence also 
adopts this strategy. In the end, it is very difficult to estimate the 
relevance of these influences in comparison with many other factors 
that have an effect on multilateral negotiations.  
•  The establishment of regional blocs can simplify multilateral 
negotiations because the number of the participants is reduced. 
Nevertheless, this argument is mainly of a theoretical nature, because 
only customs unions (can) have a common customs policy, and not, 
however, free trade areas that form the majority of the existing 
regional associations. In fact, it is mainly the EU that at the WTO level 
speaks with one voice. But this requires that prior consensus must be 
achieved among the EU countries. In the narrow EU context 
protectionist interests might succeed more easily than in the 
multilateral framework. In addition, a look at the WTO negotiations 
shows that different interest groups have formed (CAIRNS, G-20, G-
90, etc.) which are independent of regional associations.  
Along with the factors that tend to promote worldwide free trade, 
there are, of course, a number of arguments that support the hypothesis 
that regional trade agreements have an impeding effect. Multilateral 
liberalisation could then become more difficult to implement politically for 
the reasons below.33 
•  Interest in new markets by the export industry of any country could 
already be partially satisfied by a regional association, especially if 
important trading partners are already or are expected to become 
partners. Thus, the political pressure for more extensive multilateral 
                                                                                                                                       
been the APEC meeting that eventually caused the EU to yield in the course of the 
Uruguay Round. 
33 There is a series of theoretical studies that pose the question of whether 
multilateral liberalisation is prevented by regional agreements. According to model 
assumptions this hypothesis can be either confirmed or rejected (for an overview of 
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liberalisation might fall. It could well be argued that this is currently 
the case in the Doha negotiations, where – according to the European 
Commission – the protectionist agricultural interests within the EU 
are only partially countered by offensive liberalisation interests of the 
export-oriented industries.  
•  The export industry may even oppose multilateral liberalisation. Such 
opposition is to be expected where the export industry is in a position 
to quasi-artificially increase sales on the markets of the partner 
countries, because of trade-diverting effects and its preferential 
treatment when compared with competitors from non-member 
countries that are actually more efficient,. It will want to defend this 
status quo, which will be threatened by multilateral liberalisation. 
The greater the diversion of trade is, the stronger the opposition of 
the preferred industrial sectors will be. Because in the political 
process as a general rule it is above all the export industry that 
supports (multilateral) opening to trade, the dynamics of 
liberalisation would be severely curtailed.  
•  The same tendency applies in principle to poor developing countries 
to which preferential access to the markets of industrial countries has 
been granted. Their trade preferences are reduced by multilateral 
liberalisation as their advantages decrease with respect to the 
remaining trading partners (preference erosion). Hence, it is 
understandable that they view such a step sceptically. But because at 
the WTO level unanimity is required, progress in liberalisation will 
tend to be slowed down. Thus, the questions being asked are those of 
whether and how the individual, poor developing countries that are 
especially affected can be compensated for their disadvantages.34 This 
has become a central topic in current negotiations in Geneva. 
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appreciable effect. In fact, studies show that the majority of developing countries 
with middle and low incomes will not be greatly affected by multilateral 
liberalisation, and that the more serious consequences affect a rather small number 
of countries (Alexandraki & Lankes, 2004). As a rule, trade preferences for 
developing countries work only if in addition to preferential market access other 
developing countries are simultaneously discouraged from entering the market by 
high tariffs or quotas. An example of this is the former EU regulation of the banana 
market, which secured a relatively high market share for bananas from ACP 
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•  From the perspective of the industrial countries – above all, the EU 
and the US – which act as hubs in a hub-and-spoke system, bilateral 
agreements with a large number of developing countries and, above 
all, with the major emerging countries may be of more use than 
multilateral liberalisation (World Bank, 2004, p. 128 et seq.). A key 
reason for this is that the industrial countries must fear competition 
by other competing developing countries in the partner markets less 
than in the case of a multilateral agreement, in which the partners 
would lower their trade barriers with respect to all WTO members. 
Moreover, in bilateral agreements, the industrial countries can act 
from a position of power and enforce environmental and social 
standards for example (see section 3.5), something that they are not 
currently able to do at the multilateral level. Further, an incentive 
could consist of making slighter concessions at the multilateral level, 
so that the preference margins for bilateral associations remain 
attractive (Hilaire & Yang, 2004). Taken together, a certain danger 
exists that owing to these factors the major actors such as the EU and 
the US are less active at the WTO level and merely pay political ‘lip 
service’ to multilateralism. Nevertheless, in the Doha Round this does 
not seem to be the case, since both of these actors have contributed 
decisively to bringing the negotiations back on track after the setback 
in Cancun. Still, it is difficult to assess whether without their interests 
in bilateral agreements they would have displayed even more 
commitment, such that the Doha Round would have possibly made 
more progress.  
Regional trade agreements can not only delay multilateral 
liberalisation, it is also conceivable that after establishing a regional trade 
agreement the trade barriers vis-à-vis non-members can even be raised. In 
developing countries this can occur without violation of WTO rules when 
the applied tariffs are lower than the upper limit agreed within the WTO 
framework (tariff binding). In industrial countries where this margin 
generally does not exist, anti-dumping measures represent an option for 
increasing the level of protection.  
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•  This action can occur (as noted above) as compensation for the 
import-substitution industry in exchange for increased competitive 
pressure arising from the regional association. There are signs that in 
the course of stronger internal liberalisation the EU has intensified its 
anti-dumping stance vis-à-vis non-member states (Panagariya, 1999).  
•  In the case of a balance-of-payments crisis during which too much is 
imported and not enough exported, there is an incentive to increase 
tariffs in order to reduce imports. To the extent that stronger 
consideration is given to regional trading partners, the tariffs are 
increased merely with respect to non-members. This strategy can be 
seen, for instance, in the case of Mexico in the course of the peso 
currency crisis during the middle of the 1990s, when tariffs applied at 
more than 500 tariff lines were nearly doubled vis-à-vis many 
countries outside NAFTA; it also applies to MERCOSUR in the 
course of the Brazil crisis, when tariffs were only moderately 
increased vis-à-vis third countries.  
•  In developing countries in which the tax systems are often ineffective 
and custom revenues represent an important share of state revenue, 
reduced customs income as a result of the regional trade agreement 
may lead to an increase in tariffs with respect to the rest of the world. 
•  In theory, an increase in tariffs could also occur in customs unions in 
order to improve their own terms of trade with respect to third 
countries – domestic demand for their goods is reduced owing to 
higher tariffs and thereby the prices of the imported goods from third 
countries reduce in relation to export prices. The danger of 
countermeasures must be taken into consideration, however. 
Regarding the incentive to raise tariffs as a result of increased market 
power, theoretical models arrive at different outcomes (Winters, 1999; 
Panagariya, 2000).  
In the end, no definite final conclusion can be drawn, either 
theoretically or empirically, as to whether regionalism represents an 
obstacle to global free trade. Although a number of arguments speak 
against this hypothesis, there are many indications that point in this 
direction. Once more, it depends on the individual case. The concluding 
summary below of the most important considerations underlines this.  
•  A bilateral or plurilateral association that from the start is motivated 
by protectionism (with strong diversion effects and possibly 
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will probably complicate global free trade. On the other hand, an 
agreement among countries that have as a basic principle decided to 
liberalise trade should not substantially impair the dynamics of 
multilateral liberalisation. 
•  Also, one must differentiate among the relatively few agreements that 
involve several members and the numerous bilateral associations.  
o  European integration and the majority of other, earlier regional 
trade agreements with several members have up to now 
probably not led to a serious impediment of multilateral 
progress because, in the end, substantial liberalisation steps 
were achieved by previous world trade rounds, particularly the 
Uruguay Round.  
o  When looking at bilateral agreements one must take into 
account that progress at the multilateral level depends 
decisively on reducing the ‘internal’ agricultural protectionism 
of the industrial countries and in particular that of the EU. Since 
in this key area, as explained, bilateral agreements barely serve 
as a substitute, they should not substantially impede 
multilateral progress. That being said, compelling arguments 
also support the hypothesis that multilateral liberalisation is 
being impeded, including:  
−  To a great extent, bilateral associations in important 
countries may have already satisfied those export 
interests that are pushing for liberalisation, so that the 
political pressure for liberalising one’s own market 
diminishes and the multilateral process is slowed down. 
Above all, this applies to agreements between industrial 
and developing or emerging countries, with which the 
large countries can for the most part achieve rather 
extensive concessions in bilateral negotiations and make 
more use of their economic power than at the multilateral 
level.  
−  With the large volume of bilateral trade activities and the 
race for markets with which they are partially associated, 
it is to be feared that the attention of politicians (and 
administrative resources in developing and emerging 
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−  Along with these concerns, it is evident within the scope 
of the Doha negotiations that a large number of poor 
developing countries that benefit strongly from 
preferential access to markets of the industrial countries 
view multilateral liberalisation very sceptically, and may 
possibly block it.  
Reform of WTO rules for regional trade agreements  
All in all, therefore, a certain degree of scepticism is justified, in particular 
with respect to the large number of bilateral associations. This view focuses 
attention on the question of to what extent the WTO is generally able to 
sufficiently channel the latest trend towards regionalism. As indicated at 
the start of this chapter, the key WTO rules that are intended to ensure 
discipline in the context of regional trade agreements are so vague that they 
can hardly be implemented in the course of the WTO review process.  
In the current global trade round, the rules for regional trade 
agreements are a component of the negotiations agenda.35 In particular, the 
issues concerning the individual wording of Art. XXIV of the GATT should 
be spelled out in a legally clear manner, especially what is precisely meant 
by “substantially all the trade”. In order for this to have a chance of being 
implemented, the consequences of these rule specifications might possibly 
have to refer only to new associations and exclude existing agreements.  
In addition, while a certain tightening of the rules is needed, it is only 
partly realistic.36 For instance, economically it would be extremely desirable 
to replace the basic rule stating that barriers to trade may not be raised for 
third countries in the context of regional associations with a requirement to 
also lower barriers to trade with respect to third countries.37 Yet, in the 
                                                      
35 For an overview of individual aspects of the negotiations agenda, see World 
Bank (2004, p. 141 et seq.). 
36 For an overview of different demands for reform, see Schiff & Winters (2003, p. 
251 et seq.). 
37 A central WTO concept is to guarantee to WTO members a balance of rights and 
obligations. It is assumed that the conclusion of multilateral agreements brings 
about this balance. If a member’s rights are violated because another member has 
breached WTO rules, the balance is upset and must be restored (for example, by 
retaliatory measures). According to this concept, one would have to assume that 
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WTO system this would represent a true paradigm shift of the kind that 
can hardly be expected within the scope of the current negotiations. It 
would have to be recognised within the WTO that owing to trade-diverting 
effects, regional trade agreements tend to place third countries at a 
disadvantage and compensating measures are thus a general necessity. 
3.5  The developing countries’ perspective 
Developing countries are in a specific position as regards the advantages 
and disadvantages of regionalism (Kennes, 2000, ch. 4 and ch. 6; Schiff & 
Winters, 2002; Schiff & Winters, 2003, p. 73 et seq.; World Bank, 2004). In 
this context, a distinction must be drawn between agreements among 
developing countries (South-South integration) and associations of 
industrial and developing countries (North-South integration). 
South-South integration 
With South-South regionalism, the static welfare effects can be more 
unfavourable than in the general case (see section 3.2), since the balance of 
trade creation and diversion should be more negative, especially in poorer 
and smaller developing countries. This result at least applies to similar 
goods, for example to agricultural products or to some simple industrial 
goods that are nearly identical at home and abroad and which play an 
important role in developing countries.  
The object of consideration is a developing country A that concludes 
a regional agreement with another, relatively small, developing country B 
(Panagariya, 2000; Schiff & Winters, 2003, p. 35). Partner country B will not 
be able to produce enough in order to displace the relatively large third 
country C out of A’s market. Then, however, the price of the good does not 
decrease in A, because third-country products are still being sold at the 
world market price plus customs. Owing to the lack of price reduction in A, 
trade is not created, because neither consumption nor imports increase. 
Instead, trade is only diverted to the detriment of the third country and in 
favour of the partner country. Integration country A loses customs revenue 
without profiting from trade creation, while partner country B benefits 
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from higher sales prices in A and therefore from higher profits. Within the 
association in total, welfare decreases, as can be shown in a model. Because 
both countries mutually open their markets, and consequently the 
described effects are relevant in both countries depending on the product 
market in question, the disadvantages of trade diversion and customs 
losses are distributed over both countries. In this case, a country will be in a 
worse position if it has an appreciable balance of trade deficit with respect 
to its partner and/or if in the initial state it demanded much higher 
customs than its partner and thus loses more customs revenue.  
In addition, the question arises as to how large the potential is for the 
creation of trade in the case of South-South agreements between two (or 
more) poor and small developing countries. It must be borne in mind that 
in such a constellation the differences in the comparative advantages may 
be rather small (when compared with the case of a North-South 
agreement). In these cases, trade creation in the intra-industrial segment is 
also low, because industrial structures are usually still not well developed. 
A certain potential for trade could arise if the countries are endowed with 
raw materials to different extents or specialise in different agricultural 
goods. A larger potential for trade – with which different comparative 
advantages also come into play – may arise when developing countries of 
different income levels conclude a trade agreement with each other.  
With a view to the use of economies of scale, smaller developing 
countries can benefit from regional trade agreements to a relatively 
stronger degree because their domestic market is comparatively small, and 
considering the low levels of sales, the average costs of production are 
high. Additional export opportunities amount to an appreciable 
enlargement of the market. As a result of a (usually small) number of 
companies in individual markets, market expansion can also be expected to 
lead to a rather sharp increase in competitive intensity, which will make the 
companies more productive and more innovative. Both effects can serve to 
make companies in developing countries so competitive that they are able 
to compete in the world market. In this regard, regional South-South 
integration can be an instrument of development policy.  
In these cases, however, there is also the danger of distortion of 
comparative advantages and of misled specialisation if relatively inefficient 
manufacturers in developing countries that are protected by the 
association’s high barriers to trade benefit from trade diversion. In the past, 
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registered a strong increase in imports of overpriced capital goods such as 
machinery from its slightly more-developed partner country, resulting in 
considerable distribution effects to the disadvantage of the poorer 
developing country. In two cases it led in the end to the collapse of the 
association (in Kenya and Tanzania and in El Salvador and Honduras) 
(Schiff & Winters, 2002). 
If with South-South integration these negative effects are to be 
reduced or avoided, an appreciable lowering of trade barriers is essential 
with respect to the rest of the world, because this results in trade creation, 
and diversion declines owing to the improved access of the third country. 
But the question arises as to whether unilateral or multilateral liberalisation 
is not fundamentally more sensible. Indeed, an evaluation conducted by 
the World Bank (2004) shows that more than two-thirds of tariff reductions 
in developing countries between 1983 and 2003 were related to unilateral 
steps and about one-quarter to multilateral liberalisation (Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3 Developing countries – Share of tariff reductions between 1983 and  
 2003, unilaterally, multilaterally and regionally (in %) 
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Notes: For instance, 66% of the reduction in tariffs in developing countries in the period 
specified are the result of unilateral liberalisation. Figures do not add up to 100% 
because of rounding differences. 
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Meanwhile, regional trade agreements (South-South and North-South) only 
contributed about a tenth. Certainly, another influential factor is that South-
South agreements were not infrequently implemented either slowly or 
incompletely.  
North-South integration 
More positive welfare effects than in the case of South-South integration 
can be expected from North-South agreements, which at present more than 
40 developing countries are making use of (World Bank, 2004, p. 30). 
Barriers to trade in developing countries are higher than in industrial 
countries, so that the danger of trade diversion is greater than in the case of 
North-North integration; thus a lowering of trade barriers is advisable here 
as well. Nevertheless, this is counterbalanced by a series of positive aspects, 
such as:  
•  From the perspective of the developing country, there is not 
necessarily a danger that the supply of the partner country avoids 
displacing a third country’s production because of the larger size of 
the industrial country. Therefore, and as a result of the relatively high 
efficiency on the part of the industrial country’s suppliers, price 
decreases and trade creation are more likely and should also be 
larger.38  
•  Further, the potential for trade creation is relatively substantial, 
because the differences in the comparative advantages between 
industrial countries and developing countries are generally rather 
sizable.  
 
                                                      
38 Even if the third country’s supply is not completely displaced, the prices of the 
products concerned will tend to decrease because the industrial country has a more 
differentiated supply of goods. Therefore, a price that is more or less uniform 
across the world does not result, but rather the industrial country’s suppliers will 
have a margin of manoeuvre in setting their prices. If tariffs decrease for such 
goods, as a consequence their price would also tend to decrease in the developing 
country. Yet if the market power of the industrial country’s supplier is very large, 
the company could also choose to retain or to barely decrease its prices and pocket 
the tariff reduction as profit. Intermediaries could exhibit the same behaviour in 
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•  To a greater extent than with a South-South association, the 
developing country benefits from economies of scale in production as 
well as from a higher competitive intensity on account of the 
considerable market expansion.  
•  Also, the growth-stimulating transfer of knowledge concerning 
traded intermediate and capital goods is more beneficial because of 
the industrial country’s technological edge. 
Further, developing countries can also look forward to an added 
range of advantages with North-South agreements (see section 3.1). They 
can secure access to a market that is important to them and more reliably 
solidify (lock-in) trade reforms, for example. But a number of conditions 
must be met: 
•  The rise in the developing countries’ credibility depends on the 
likelihood of the trading partner imposing sanctions if the developing 
country fails to abide by the trade agreement. For instance, in the case 
of Mexico, the US has an interest in preventing the high levels of 
immigration that could be triggered by a cessation of reforms in 
Mexico with the expected negative economic consequences.  
•  Moreover, the question arises as to whether a multilateral reduction 
of trade barriers does not have the same effect.39 The creation of 
multilateral investment and competition rules could also have an 
impact in the same direction.  
•  Other reforms, for example those combating inflation, deregulation, 
institutional reform or democratisation, are only secured if they are 
written down in the agreement or represent an implied condition for 
membership in the association. Although this occurs relatively rarely, 
it was relevant for instance with the Europe Agreements of the EU 
with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, regarding 
democratisation within MERCOSUR as well as concerning the EU 
accessions of Greece, Portugal and Spain.  
                                                      
39 Although regional trading partners are affected more strongly by a rescindment 
of trade concessions than the rest of the trading partners, and therefore the 
likelihood is higher that this behaviour will be punished, this is likewise possible 
within the WTO through its dispute settlement mechanism. Under the WTO 
mechanism, less-affected countries can join a lead plaintiff and thereby on account 
of their larger number would be expected to have greater potential for imposing 
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In addition, foreign direct investment from the industrial country 
(and the associated transfer of technology) can be expected in the case of a 
sufficiently stable economic policy, particularly if the developing country is 
to be used as an ‘extended workbench’ for outsourced labour-intensive 
stages of production. All these advantages can in principle also be achieved 
by multilateral liberalisation within the WTO framework; however, with 
suitable conditions, regional trade agreements may offer slightly greater 
advantages.  
When compared with multilateral liberalisation, regional associations 
also have some disadvantages. Industrial countries certainly have an 
incomparably larger leverage in bilateral negotiations than at the 
multilateral level because of their larger market and are dependent only to 
a limited extent on the developing country’s smaller market.  
Hence it is not surprising if developing countries as a rule make 
larger trade concessions than the industrial countries (Freund, 2003) and 
the principle of reciprocity that applies to the multilateral level is 
consequently not applied here. Thus, the industrial countries as a rule 
lower their protective barriers for products from the developing countries 
only partially. Especially in areas such as agriculture as well as textiles and 
clothing, the trade barriers are substantially higher in the industrial 
countries than in other industry sectors. In regional agreements, these 
sensitive products are often excluded from liberalisation. Or, if they are 
included de jure, the rules of origin are often restrictive. If, for instance, a 
high degree of added value is required in the developing country as a 
condition for the country to be able to make use of preferential tariffs, this 
might possibly restrict its ability to export because the developing country 
– owing to its lower productivity and lower capital endowment – will 
produce with less value added than an industrial country.  
By contrast with the multilateral level, particularly the US, but also 
the EU manages to secure labour and social standards in regional North-
South agreements. At the WTO level, the developing countries are 
massively opposed to this because they fear such standards represent a 
gateway for new protectionism on the part of the industrial countries. If 
standards are prescribed that exceed the productivity level of the 
developing countries, their ability to compete would dwindle. In addition, 
where trade sanctions in the case of violation of these standards are   
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possible, the threat exists that lobby interests will exploit this instrument in 
order to limit imports of competing products from developing countries 
more or less arbitrarily.  
In the context of the NAFTA and some of the later bilateral free trade 
agreements, the US has pushed through rather extensive labour standards 
whose non-observance can partially be punished with sanctions (fines), 
which has not happened in the first years in spite of some complaints 
(Stern, 2003; Elliot & Freeman, 2003, p. 84 et seq.). In addition, the US has in 
bilateral agreements with Chile and Singapore implemented a ban on 
certain restrictions on the movement of capital, a breach of which is 
punishable by sanctions. This stipulation is cause for concern as capital 
controls can be important for preventing financial crises. 
EU Association Agreements, for instance with Morocco in 2000, call 
for democratic principles and basic human rights, but are not supported by 
the possibility of sanctions (Stern, 2003) except for a complete 
discontinuation of trade cooperation in extreme cases, which is not very 
likely to happen. For a fairly long time the EU has been linking trade policy 
with environmental and socio-political objectives, as for example within the 
scope of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Preferred countries 
can receive additional preferences upon request if they satisfy the EU’s 
environmental and socio-political requirements. The partner countries, 
however, have only accepted this offer hesitantly. In view of this 
experience and the relatively low EU tariff rates, the effectiveness of these 
environmental and socio-political mechanisms must be strongly 
questioned. At the same time, these mechanisms contribute to making 
trade rules more complicated and engender legal uncertainty, meaning that 
transaction costs rise. In addition, further disadvantages must be 
mentioned:  
•  Regional, and in particular bilateral, trade agreements do not as a rule 
have effective dispute settlement procedures that are comparable to 
those of the WTO. Consequently, the developing countries are less 
protected against breaches of contracts on the part of the industrial 
countries.  
•  As far as a developing country is one of several among an industrial 
country’s partners that have not concluded regional agreements with 
one another, investments may be diverted to the industrial country 
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•  Regional trade agreements do not offer as secure a basis as 
multilateral contracts do, because trade liberalisations can be more 
easily rescinded (although up to now this has rarely occurred). 
Moreover, withdrawing from the WTO is conceivable in extreme 
cases.  
•  In addition, it is a serious concern that with North-South regionalism, 
some smaller and poorer developing countries threaten to fall by the 
wayside, because industrial countries tend to select those countries 
that are of interest to them as sales markets or as extended 
workbenches. While the least-developed countries according to the 
UN classification enjoy free access to the EU market and in part also 
to other industrial countries, it is only those poor developing 
countries that are slightly better off that would stand to lose in a race 
for markets.40  
•  From the perspective of an individual developing or emerging 
country, the advantages of a North-South agreement diminish of 
course in line with the number of other countries that also conclude 
agreements with the industrial country in question. The World Bank 
(2004, p. 126 et seq.) has shown that for developing countries, 
negative welfare effects can be expected if all countries in this group 
conclude agreements with the large industrial countries. In the end, 
market access can be viewed as a positional good whose quality 
decreases as the number of users rises.  
3.6  Is regionalism an opportunity for the ‘new trade issues’? 
Since the Second World War there has been an impressive reduction of 
tariffs. Although the worldwide average tariff level for industrial goods at 
that time stood at more than 40%, it is currently about 4 to 7%. In important 
industrial sectors in OECD countries, tariffs only exist in the amount of a 
                                                      
40 Yet it must be borne in mind that many poorer countries in particular benefit 
from preference arrangements granted unilaterally by the EU and the US within 
the scope of the GSP, in addition to the EU’s preference agreements with ACP 
countries and the preferential treatment given by the US to the Caribbean and 
ANDEAN countries. In the majority of cases, these arrangements exclude a large 
number of labour-intensive products for which the developing countries’ export 
potential is particularly large (Schiff & Winters, 2002; World Bank, 2003a, p. 209 et 
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few percentage points. An entire elimination of tariffs is by no means 
utopian, even if in the current WTO round this objective will in all 
probability not be achieved. In view of this development, various ‘non-
tariff trade barriers’ are increasingly in the spotlight.  
Non-tariff trade barriers refer to all those barriers to market access 
that are not based on classical duties. They are very multifaceted and along 
with quantitative restrictions (import quotas) include for instance technical 
standards, anti-competitive practices, investment restrictions, the lack of 
protection of intellectual property and problems with customs handling. A 
large number of these non-tariff trade barriers make up the so-called ‘new 
trade issues’ for which (substantive) multilateral regulations must still be 
found. The issues are very diverse, so specific approaches are required. In 
this section, some of these important subject areas are discussed. 
For quite a few of these barriers, the WTO already offers adequate 
basic rules; in the case of other barriers, these can be carved out in the near 
future. Yet there are also issues that cannot be appropriately addressed at 
the WTO for the time being, owing to the large WTO membership and the 
heterogeneity of the WTO’s members. Do regional trade agreements 
represent opportunities to make progress with these issues?41 
Government regulations often have different effects on domestic and 
foreign companies. Certain conditions can be relatively easy to tolerate for 
domestic companies, while for companies abroad they are associated with 
disproportionately high costs. Thus, for example, paying value added tax 
for companies established in the domestic market is a matter of course. For 
a company that offers its downloadable digital products worldwide 
through the Internet, this, however, is quite problematic. Even if national 
regulations are applied in a non-discriminatory fashion, they can have 
import-limiting effects. Government regulations are based on political 
processes and participation by the legislator. How can solutions be found 
in the legislative procedures that do not needlessly limit international 
trade? Here, regional cooperation can help, such as early cross-border 
information and consultation processes. Above all, it is important to make 
the legislator aware of the consequences of legislative activity on trade and 
to integrate the legislator into trade committees. Such cooperation with the 
legislature (and also the executive branch) of a partner country is most 
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easily achieved by bilateral cooperation. For this purpose, suitable 
mechanisms should increasingly be established within regional trade 
agreements. Unfortunately, up to now these are only developed to a small 
extent. For instance, the EU and Canada agreed to negotiate an agreement 
(the Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement) that focuses on this 
type of collaboration in the regulatory area, but which, with respect to the 
EU moratorium on new regional agreements, does not include tariff 
reductions. 
For many companies, it is primarily national technical product 
standards and product regulations that represent a big export obstacle. If they 
want to sell their product on the market in question, they must tailor it to 
meet the specific standards of this market or have its conformity verified. 
The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade stipulates that 
technical standards and regulations should not be abused for obstructing 
imports. As a basic rule, the agreement prefers international standards to 
isolated regulations at the national level. But because exceptions exist, in 
practice a large number of national standards and technical regulations 
persist. Regional agreements normally do not include reciprocal 
recognition of technical standards and regulations. The EU domestic 
market, in which as a rule conformity in one country guarantees the 
simultaneous conformity in all other member countries, is in this respect a 
significant exception.  
What could be arranged bilaterally is that the applicable standards of 
the contractual partner are considered as equivalent. This step would come 
close to the EU concept. It would also represent progress if certification 
procedures were recognised mutually. Such recognition means that 
companies could have conformity with the export country’s standards or 
technical regulations certified in their own country (the mutual recognition 
agreements). The more countries give up national standards in favour of 
bilateral or plurilateral standards, or recognise equivalence, the less trade 
will be limited. Yet these solutions appear only second best, because 
international standards – meaning uniform regulations worldwide – 
should be preferred. In this respect, bilateral regulations can be regarded 
merely as a step in the right direction.42 
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A lack of protection of intellectual property impedes the export of 
knowledge-intensive products protected by copyright. On the one hand, a 
company may be deterred from exporting its innovative products to 
markets if it fears that these will be copied without it being able to take 
legal action. On the other hand, the export of products worth protecting 
(e.g. clothes, movies and music) suffers in markets in which copied 
products are commonplace. Thus, the lack of protection of intellectual 
property can represent an important obstacle to international trade. In 
addition, it reduces the incentive to conduct research and development, 
thereby handicapping an important growth engine.  
The multilateral agreement under the umbrella of the WTO 
concerning trade-related aspects of intellectual property (TRIPS) is a fully-
fledged agreement for the protection of intellectual property. It regulates 
the scope and the duration of protection rights as well as questions of legal 
enforcement. The area of intellectual p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  c a n  b e  s e e n  a s  a  
satisfactory example of a multilaterally-regulated new trade issue, which 
renders bilateral regulations largely unnecessary. For example, the bilateral 
trade agreement between Vietnam (not yet a WTO member) and the US 
refers to compliance with the TRIPS agreement.  
In many countries, sluggish, bureaucratic or arbitrary customs 
procedures inhibit the international exchange of goods. The more 
complicated and arbitrary the customs procedures are, the stronger the 
threat of corruption is. Regional cooperation can provide considerable relief 
in the area of customs handling. Thus, for example, the uniform EU 
customs code leads to a major simplification of customs handling for third-
country imports as well. With customs unions, transit systems between the 
countries involved are unnecessary. In particular, customs unions can 
considerably accelerate and simplify the traffic of goods for third-country 
imports. Regional cooperation can further lead, for example, to the 
establishment of an electronic exchange of data among national customs 
administrations. Provided that access to these clearing systems is 
guaranteed to be transparent and non-discriminatory, third countries also 
benefit. 
In spite of this, a multilateral approach that additionally leads to the 
worldwide modernisation and acceleration of customs handling should be 
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viewed favourably, as it again represents the optimum solution. Within the 
scope of the Doha Round, negotiations are underway for the creation of 
such an agreement. Of course it remains to be seen whether these 
negotiations will in the end be successful.  
Through regional, plurilateral as well as multilateral approaches, 
trade facilitation has great potential to lead to considerable welfare gains. 
Although in this area a discriminatory application of facilitation procedures 
is conceivable, overall trade-diverting effects should play a comparatively 
minor role. Even determined followers of a critical view of liberalising 
international trade have little to criticise with trade facilitation, because it 
goes hand in hand with the fight against corruption and is an important 
instrument for enhancing export competitiveness. Practical solutions in 
regional trade can serve as a ‘research laboratory’ to identify examples of 
best practice and to derive rules for multilateral agreements (see for 
instance Moïsé, 2003, pp. 87-96).  
There is a close interrelation between international trade and 
competition policy. Both have the objective of increasing the efficient use of 
resources, either by intensifying international competition through a 
reduction of trade barriers or by means of competition policy, for instance 
by taking action against a company’s dominating position on the domestic 
market. Therefore, it is not surprising that at the time of creating the GATT, 
rules of competition were already provided for (Chapter V of the Havana 
Charter for the creation of an International Trade Organisation (ITO)). The 
project of creating the ITO was shelved, however, owing to resistance in the 
US Congress.43 
Examples of competition problems relevant to trade include:  
•  By price dumping, a powerful company could ward off foreign 
competition on the domestic market.  
•  By exerting influence on marketing channels, such a company can 
also hinder competition from abroad.  
•  Several companies in one country can fix prices in export markets (an 
export cartel) in order to charge higher prices there.  
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From the point of view of economics, these practices should be 
countered by means of competition policy. Yet in many developing and 
emerging countries, the establishment of functioning competition 
regulations is only in its initial phases (Graham, 2000). Even if appropriate 
institutions exist, in many cases they do not have sufficient enforcement 
rights. This situation is unsatisfactory as a functioning competition policy is 
in every country’s self-interest. 
Currently, issues of competition policy are only rudimentarily 
regulated by the WTO (rules concerning measures against dumped imports 
and against trade-distorting subsidies and provisions in the GATS 
agreement concerning basic telecommunications and financial services). Of 
course, it would be desirable to create multilaterally binding, fundamental 
rules for trade-related issues of competition policy. But at present no 
consensus can be achieved in this regard among WTO members.  
It is particularly important that competition rules are applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner, meaning that, for example, companies from 
third countries also have the opportunity to bring forward complaints 
against anti-competitive behaviour on the part of domestic companies. In 
addition, it would represent an important step to be able to punish the 
export cartels that are not forbidden in many countries. The fact that such 
export cartels are legal indicates that competition law in many countries 
limits itself merely to the effects in the domestic market, but ignores anti-
competitive behaviour, which affects exports. This deficiency could 
gradually be overcome by bilateral cooperation, for example, in the shape 
of a trade agreement.  
An important problem can arise in the case of mergers of large, 
internationally operating companies. Such mergers entail consequences for 
numerous countries, and in all affected countries, objections referring to 
anti-competitive law may be raised against the merger, as happened for 
instance in the case of the merger of the US companies General Electric and 
Honeywell, to which the European Commission objected. A multilateral 
regulation that provides for a worldwide notification system and for 
specifying a period for raising objections could serve to increase legal 
certainty for the companies (Davison & Johnson, 2002; Woolcock, 2003).  
This brief introduction to the problem areas has already shown that 
depending on the type of question concerning the area of competition 
policy, it is partly a unilateral issue (e.g. regarding a ban of export cartels), 
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and partly an exclusively multilateral issue (e.g. with respect to a 
worldwide system of periods and registration requirements for merger 
control) (see for instance Petersmann, 1996; OECD, 2001b; Davison & 
Johnson, 2002).44 If transaction costs are considered and the objective of 
creating legal certainty for the involved companies and market participants 
is taken into account, however, the multilateral approach as the optimum 
solution should be used wherever it appears feasible as an alternative to 
unilateral or bilateral solutions.  
All across the world, a series of bilateral competition agreements 
regulates questions of cooperation among anti-trust authorities. Among 
these, the agreement between the US and the EU is certainly the most 
relevant. Admittedly, these agreements do not lead to substantially 
harmonised procedures. For instance, in individual cases they do not 
prevent national anti-trust authorities charged with assessing a given case 
from arriving at different results. The International Competition Network 
and the Global Competition Forum initiated by the OECD are approaches 
that are supposed to lead – on a voluntary basis – to an improved exchange 
of information between national anti-trust authorities and create the basis 
for improved cooperation. The UN’s Set of Mutually Agreed Equitable 
Principles and Rules for Control of Restrictive Business Practises offers 
international guidelines for principles of competition policy. It would be 
important to bring together these various approaches for cooperation and 
regulation and to develop a coordinated system, for which the WTO 
provides a suitable framework. 
In discussions, the demand for a WTO competition agreement is 
occasionally equated with the creation of a global anti-trust authority. 
These two approaches must nevertheless be distinguished from one 
another. The advocates of a WTO competition agreement generally support 
the development of binding fundamental rules of competition policy, but 
not the establishment of a WTO authority for assessing individual cases.  
In the sphere of cross-border investments, multilateral rules exist only 
in certain areas. The service agreement GATS regulates the possibility to set 
up companies for the provision of services. Among other things, the WTO 
                                                      
44 Numerous practitioners of competition policy see a solution involving 
international issues rather in a closer collaboration between national authorities. 
The International Competition Network created in 2001 represents such a platform 
with this objective (see http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.com). 66 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
agreement about trade-related investment measures (TRIMS) bans local 
content provisions that require that a certain share of the intermediate 
products must originate from the country concerned. Other items that are 
banned for instance are conditions that require a minimum export share of 
the total production. But there are no WTO regulations concerning the right 
of establishment for foreign industrial companies, the prevention of 
discrimination against foreign companies or questions of investment 
protection.  
Particularly investment protection is to a great extent governed by a 
large number of special bilateral investment agreements. Naturally, the 
web of many bilateral agreements between investors of differing 
nationalities causes lack of transparency and de jure or de facto 
discrimination.  
Uniform rules for all WTO members would solve this problem. But it 
is apparently politically not possible at the moment to negotiate a 
multilateral investment agreement. Hopes for negotiations in this area were 
disappointed during the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun. In this 
context, regional and particularly plurilateral agreements are nowadays the 
only way to strengthen investment protection and to further liberalisation 
of cross-border investments. Provided that liberalisation and protection are 
also granted to non-members in a non-discriminatory fashion, third 
countries do not suffer competitive disadvantages. That being said, the 
rights that are created by the agreements are up to now de facto limited to 
companies in the respective member countries.  
International trade in services is in principle covered by the WTO. Since 
setting up the WTO, a multilateral service agreement (the GATS) is one of 
three pillars of the world trade system. The GATS system is based, 
however, on the principle of a positive list. Thus, every country defines the 
individual sectors that it wants to open to international competition (a 
bottom-up approach). An overall and sector-spanning obligation to 
liberalise, as is the case in the trade of industrial goods, does not exist. 
Therefore, up to now there has been only an initial, very modest step 
towards liberalisation. We are still a long way from comprehensively 
opening international trade in services, and the negotiations within the 
scope of the Doha Round are proceeding very sluggishly.  
As a rule, bilateral agreements also liberalise some parts of trade in 
services. Of course, the concessions exceed the degree of liberalisation 
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countries in a worse position. Hence, in this area, as with tariffs, 
discriminatory as well as trade-creating and -diverting effects may result. 
But there is no diversion of trade with a negative impact on the liberalising 
country if previously no foreign services were offered on the domestic 
market, which might occur in quite a few cases. Yet unlike tariffs, the WTO 
rules for regional trade agreements for trade in services do permit cherry-
picking. There is agreement, specifically for each sector, as to which areas 
of trade in services are bilaterally opened. While in Art. V of the GATS 
there is a general requirement to liberalise as much as possible, a general 
requirement for opening markets as stipulated for the trade in goods (the 
requirement to integrate substantially all the trade) does not exist. 
Although the demand would be obvious to liberalise the entire trade in 
services in order to counteract the threat of trade diversion at the expense 
of third countries, it would hardly be enforceable politically, because 
service markets are regulated very strongly at the national level (for 
example, by proof of professional qualifications and laws governing the 
profession) and are partially associated with the physical movement of 
natural persons.  
To summarise, it can be concluded that regional cooperation can 
make sense in the area of non-tariff barriers to trade. Nevertheless, it can 
also have trade-diverting effects. That is why attention should always be 
given to third countries having the opportunity to participate in the results 
of the cooperation in a manner that is as non-discriminatory as possible 
(through competition rules, for example,). Bilateral and plurilateral 
solutions represent an alternative especially in areas in which no consensus 
could be achieved within the WTO concerning the establishment of new 
sets of rules (governing rules of competition and investment). Further, such 
solutions can possibly serve to support WTO negotiations by developing 
blueprints for the new trade issues that can also be applied to the 
multilateral level.   
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4.  Options for EU Trade Policy 
Up to this point the study has highlighted the basic effects of regional and 
multilateral trade agreements. Now the angle shifts, and the trade policy 
options that the EU is facing are discussed from the EU’s perspective. 
Indeed, the EU is an important actor on the trade policy stage; however, it 
cannot reverse fundamental trends. Therefore, the question arises as to how 
the EU will adapt to the present trade policy situation, in which manner it 
will be able to benefit and in which areas it should exert its leverage for the 
purposes of multilateral liberalisation.  
4.1  Multilateral liberalisation  
Comprehensive and far-reaching liberalisation within the scope of the 
WTO round initiated in Doha would be – as indicated in the foregoing 
theoretical analysis – the optimum route from the point of the EU. Only in 
this case is an essential reduction of EU agricultural protectionism 
conceivable, which would substantially contribute to welfare gains in the 
EU that are consistently higher than in partial approaches.1 
Problems at the WTO level 
More recently, however, since the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun 
the question of the WTO’s political limits has emerged. In which areas is 
the organisation able to ensure liberalisation and what magnitude of 
liberalisation can be achieved in the short and medium term within the 
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scope of the WTO? Is the organisation in fact suffering from its own success 
in the sense that WTO membership is continually growing?  
I t  h a s  b e c o m e  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  c o n s t a n t l y  r i s i n g  W T O  
membership to achieve the required consensus (see section 3.4). In this 
context, some observers speak of the UN syndrome having possibly 
afflicted the WTO. Critics claim that breakthroughs in substance or 
institutional reforms can no longer be expected from the WTO.2 Even the 
agreement achieved in summer 2004 on the framework for the negotiations 
does not constitute an exception. In view of these developments, some 
observers consider the WTO to be in an institutional crisis. 
An added complication is that media interest in the WTO, especially 
during its ministerial conferences can entice some members to exploit the 
media for their political agendas. Ministerial conferences can be election 
campaign platforms, where governments can declare to have protected 
their country by vetoing the interests of the large industrial nations or from 
globalisation. This politicisation of the WTO carries a large inherent risk. 
In principle, a solution to these institutional shortcomings could be to 
bring about a reform of the decision-making and consultation mechanisms. 
For instance, majority decisions could be conceivable. Yet such a reform 
would require unanimity. The also question arises as to whether majority 
decisions in view of today’s understanding of the sovereignty of countries 
would be politically enforceable (see for instance Glania, 2004). For this to 
happen, a paradigm shift in international politics would be required.  
Despite all these political problems, it should be kept in mind that the 
WTO legal system remains the backbone of global trade. Further, in the 
course of the regional agreements, difficult disputes are still settled by the 
WTO. Thus, for instance, to date the NAFTA does not prevent disputes 
between Canada, the US and Mexico from being carried out before the 
WTO; and, of course, these disputes are judged in accordance with 
multilateral rules. In the final analysis, however, the WTO legal system is 
also dependent on political intent, meaning the willingness to respect WTO 
rules and judgments. A WTO that is politically incapable of action exposes 
itself at least to the danger that doubts are nourished about its relevance. In 
the end, this could curtail the eagerness to implement WTO rules.  
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Revised agenda of the Doha Round 
In this context, it cause for concern that of the last three ministerial 
conferences, two have failed (Seattle and Cancun). The Doha conference in 
2001 represents a creditable exception, although the success of the global 
trade round may in some way be attributed to the shock emanating from 
the 11 September terrorist attacks. Yet, the compromises that were found in 
Doha have turned out to be fragile, so that from today’s view this 
conference was only a partial success. How feeble the compromises of 
Doha are has become most apparent with the ‘Singapore issues’ 
(investment, competition, transparency in government procurement and 
trade facilitation). While the EU originally assumed that in Doha a 
consensus had been achieved for entering into negotiations about these 
issues in Cancun 2003, some developing countries interpreted the wording 
differently – they insist that they have reserved for themselves the right to 
refuse negotiations. For the EU, there was virtually no other option than to 
postpone ambitions for new multilateral agreements on investment, 
competition questions and transparency in public procurement and the 
WTO round will no longer pursue these issues. Trade facilitation remains 
on the negotiations agenda, but it is not yet clear if an agreement can be 
achieved that is binding for all WTO members.  
As attractive as the multilateral framework may seem in principle, it 
is not able – at least at the moment – to create multilateral rules in those 
areas in which it would be desirable (Table 4.1). Yet in the traditional area 
of tariff reduction, tight limits are also emerging. The high ambitions of 
industrial countries to substantially cut worldwide tariffs face scepticism or 
rejection by the developing and emerging countries. For example, in 2002 
the US suggested abolishing all customs duties worldwide on industrial 
goods by 2015 (USTR, 2002). To date it is unclear, in view of opposition by 
some developing countries against a further opening of markets, whether a 
significant share of WTO members will engage at all in a reduction of 
tariffs. Some developing countries interpret the ‘Development Round’ 
concept as exempting them from having to make concessions, and merely 
the industrial countries should continue to open their markets. But this is 
what the least-developed countries fear since they currently enjoy duty-free 
access to the markets of the industrial countries owing to preference rules. 
The situation among WTO members appears to be highly complex. Even if 
negotiations only proceed in small steps, as they most likely will, the hope 
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Table 4.1 Global trade rounds to date 
Year(s)  Place / name  Topics of negotiations  Achieved 
tariff 
reduction 
 (in %) 
Number of 
countries 
involved 
1947  Geneva  Tariffs  19  23 
1949  Annecy  Tariffs  2  13 
1951  Torquay  Tariffs  3  38 
1956  Geneva  Tariffs  2  26 
1960-61  Geneva/Dillon 
Round 
Tariffs  7  26 
1964-67  Geneva/Kennedy 
Round 
Tariffs and anti-
dumping measures 
35  62 
1973-79  Geneva/Tokyo 
Round 
Tariffs, non-tariff 
obstacles to trade, 
framework agreements 
34  102 
1986-94  Geneva/Uruguay 
Round 
Tariffs, non-tariff 
obstacles to trade, rules, 
services, intellectual 
property rights, 
arbitration, textiles, 
agriculture, WTO 
establishment, etc. 
40  123 
Sources: Authors’ compilation, based on WTO data (retrieved from http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm) and Hauser & Schanz (1995, p. 42). 
Such an outcome is conceivable given that by linking different areas 
of negotiation it is possible to achieve results that exceed the involved 
parties’ smallest common denominator. The logic behind negotiating 
‘package deals’ is that countries can obtain compromises beyond individual 
areas of negotiation. The possibility of discussing various topics in parallel 
means that countries may be prepared to make concessions that, 
considered in isolation, would be a disadvantage for them. It is important 
that from an individual WTO member’s perspective the entire package 
represents an overall benefit. For example, such connections are made 
between negotiations dealing with agriculture on the one hand and services 
on the other. Some agricultural exporters have offered to carry out 
liberalisation in international trade in services in exchange for an opening  
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of the European agricultural commodities market. Appreciable progress in 
these two areas in which the barriers to trade are still very high would 
represent a major success of the Doha Round.  
In this context there are discussions about whether a round with a 
narrowly defined agenda might be more promising than a round with a 
broader scope. Fundamentally, finding consensus becomes more difficult if 
the possibility no longer exists to conclude compromises spanning several 
areas of negotiation. On the other hand, issues should not be placed on the 
negotiating agenda against which there is great political opposition among 
WTO members. The bogus compromise on the Singapore issues achieved 
in Doha and the resulting controversies considerably hampered the 
negotiations process for two and a half years. In view of this tense relation, 
it may be possible to derive an optimum scope for negotiations. The round 
should be large enough to allow package deals, but not be burdened 
needlessly by issues of negotiation in which consensus cannot be achieved. 
After largely abandoning the Singapore issues, the Doha Round appears to 
have approached a feasible scope of negotiations. As a result of this 
reduced negotiation agenda there is again a realistic chance of achieving 
progress and a conclusion of the round in the foreseeable future.  
In view of the inner logic of package deals and of the only still 
remaining Singapore issue (trade facilitation) it must be borne in mind that 
one cannot negotiate this along the classical lines of concession and 
counter-concession. If a country modernises its customs handling, for 
example, that can hardly be considered to be a concession, since it also 
serves to improve its ability to export. Therefore, it would be absurd to 
demand concessions of other countries regarding the dismantling of tariffs 
in exchange for ‘giving in’ with respect to trade facilitation.  
The EU perspective 
In view of the difficult position the WTO is in, it is right for the EU to give 
priority to multilateral liberalisation as it says it would. This view is also 
heard from many other countries. Yet one must ask whether in part this 
only represents ‘lip service’, because emphasising the multilateral approach 
is certainly the politically correct view to take internationally. But in the 
political reality, doubts arise as to whether any real effort is being invested 
into progress on the multilateral front. The high level of activities as 
regards regional trade agreements indicate that many countries 
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abstain – not even temporarily – from bilateral deals. For the EU, this 
political-economic rationale possibly plays less of a role, because classical 
foreign policy involving diplomacy still lies to a great extent in the hands of 
the member states, while the EU itself governs WTO-related matters. Thus 
it is not surprising that the EU gives top priority to the multilateral process.  
The complex situation surrounding negotiations by no means implies 
that the EU must accept the state of the WTO as a given. It can contribute 
substantially to politically stimulating the Doha Round, in particular by 
being willing to offer a forceful and comprehensive liberalisation of the 
agricultural sector. The EU already took some steps in this direction, 
concerning the proposals to completely eliminate export subsidies, to 
substantially reduce trade-distorting domestic subsidies and to cut 
agricultural tariffs. It seems appropriate that the EU now waits particularly 
for emerging countries to table significant offers concerning a reduction of 
their relatively high industrial tariffs and concerning the more open service 
markets. But given this progress, in the following months more rigour in 
reducing agricultural protectionism will be required from the EU. In this 
context a French veto would effectively terminate the Doha Round and 
must thus be rigorously rejected by more liberal EU-members. 
To sum up, from a theoretical approach, liberalisation through the 
WTO appears to be the superior solution. Substantial progress within the 
WTO framework leads to by far the largest welfare gains worldwide. In 
practice, however, multilateral negotiations are a tough, long-term project 
that can only be influenced by the EU within limits. Therefore, the EU must 
thoroughly analyse all trade options at its disposal and pursue a 
differentiated strategy.  
4.2  Unilateral reduction of tariffs 
In discussions on trade policy, quite often the importance of unilateral tariff 
reductions is underestimated considerably. Figure 3.3 in the previous 
chapter shows that in the period 1983-2003, the unilateral (autonomous) 
dismantling of tariffs by developing countries represented 66% of all tariff 
reductions, while multilateral liberalisation represented 25% and regional 
agreements a mere 10%. 
According to international trade theory, tariffs have several effects 
(see chapter 3, section 3.2). They increase domestic prices and displace 
domestic consumption, which is detrimental to welfare. On the other hand, 
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gainfully protect the domestic economy against foreign competition, and in 
certain circumstances permit the development of promising industrial 
sectors in the context of a strategic trade policy. If one takes the example of 
the EU, however, the question arises as to whether tariffs can or should in 
general still fulfil these functions today.3  
About 130,000 customs officers of the EU-15 realise customs revenue 
of about €11 billion. Thus, each customs officer statistically generates 
€85,000 in customs revenue. According to the EU, the weighted average of 
the applied non-agricultural tariffs to which third-country imports are 
subject amounts to about 1.6%. If expenses for staff, material and other 
items of customs administration are added, the costs involved will be 
found to exceed income.4  
In many industries, tariff rates are at levels that no longer possess any 
recognisable protective function. Those products for which extensive 
efforts at marketing and after-sales service are pursued and products 
whose production costs in third countries are considerably below the EU 
level are not noticeably protected from foreign competition by tariff rates of 
between 3 and 5%. Many products of industrial countries are aimed at the 
high quality end of the market and consumers (or industrial end users) are 
prepared to pay a higher price for them. Hence, small price differences do 
not have any real significance, particularly in the case of branded products. 
Consequently, low tariff rates do not play an appreciable role on these 
markets. In addition, exchange rates are able to vary widely within a rather 
short period, even in a double-digit range, thus exerting much greater 
influence on the international price structure.  
Admittedly, there are also areas in which even low tariffs can have a 
relatively strong protective effect. With commodities5 (e.g. crude oil, metals 
                                                      
3 Regarding arguments in favour of an elimination of industrial tariffs see also 
Slaughter (2003). 
4 In this context, it must of course be borne in mind that the task of the customs 
officers transcends the generation of revenue, and includes for instance the fight 
against brand piracy and preventing the import of prohibited objects (for example 
by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and 
Fauna). 
5 Commodities are characterised by the fact that they exhibit no unique 
characteristic, meaning they are interchangeable. The manufacturing country is 
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and agricultural products) and industries that exhibit a large input of raw 
materials there is a high degree of transparency regarding prices and price 
competition; and even small cost differences (as with tariffs, in the range of 
a few percentage points) can decisively influence the ability to compete. 
The same applies if the proportion of value added for any domestically 
manufactured product is very low (high effective protection).  
The argument of strategic trade policy has been controversial for a 
long time. It concerns the question of whether tariffs (or subsidies) can 
serve to initially provide benefits to infant industries or to increase 
domestic companies’ profits at the expense of those firms situated abroad 
(Matthes, 2004, p. 25). The key issue in this criticism are strong doubts 
about whether governments are able to recognise the promising industrial 
sectors. The problematic aspect is that they can be influenced in their choice 
by interest groups that have strong incentives to show that their industry is 
suitable. Strategic trade policy can also provoke counter-reactions on the 
part of the trading partner, which can even lead to trade wars.  
That being said, consideration must be given to whether the EU 
would not do itself a favour by abolishing tariffs completely – or at least in 
many sectors. This step would facilitate the reduction of companies’ and 
consumers’ cost burdens, without causing markedly increased adjustment 
costs for companies competing with imports. Reduced budgetary income 
would be compensated by reductions in the cost of customs administration. 
A unilateral reduction of tariffs would nevertheless be problematic in 
the negotiating process, because international negotiations about a further 
reduction of tariffs follow a mercantilist blueprint. According to this 
concept, the dismantling of one’s own trade barriers is seen as a concession. 
By unilaterally reducing tariffs, the EU would therefore be seen to be 
needlessly spending its bargaining chips.  
In this context it must be borne in mind that – as mentioned earlier – 
a reduction of tariffs is also achievable outside WTO tariff negotiations. For 
developing and emerging countries it is not a matter of abolishing the 
remaining tariffs because of administrative expenses, but rather of 
promoting their integration into the global economy by lowering their tariff 
rates to a tolerable level. Here it is also being realised that excessive tariff 
rates harm a country’s own economy. The reduction of almost prohibitively 
high tariffs can often lead to increased tariff revenues through higher 
imports and reduced corruption. The trend towards unilaterally reducing 
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evident not only from statistics, but for instance by recent developments in 
India. There, in the course of economic reform, peak tariffs and the overall 
tariff levels saw repeated and significant reductions. 
4.3  Bilateral agreements  
In chapter 3, section 3.2, the welfare effects of regional (and bilateral) trade 
agreements are shown to be theoretically ambivalent from an individual 
country’s perspective. Empirically, positive welfare effects of various 
degrees are the rule. Focusing on the EU, empirical studies of different 
bilateral agreements such as those with Turkey (De Santis, 1998), South 
Africa (Lewis et al., 1999) and Mexico (Slootmaekers, 2004) find almost no 
trade-diverting effects of these agreements, so the welfare impact is 
revealed (or if not explicitly calculated in the respective study it can be 
assumed) to be positive. Yet, as trade volumes with these countries are 
small in relation to total EU trade, the welfare contribution is only minimal. 
Nevertheless, the EU has a certain incentive to conclude bilateral 
agreements on tariffs. As also discussed in section 3.2, the welfare-driven 
incentive would be even greater if non-tariff trade barriers were to be put 
on the agenda. An important case in point is found in domestic regulations, 
where trade diversion would not occur, but instead a reduction in real 
resource costs would take place. Moreover, negotiations about trade 
liberalisation with regard to domestic regulation are very complex. Thus, 
the advantage of lower transaction costs in bilateral agreements is all the 
more significant with this topic.  
The incentives for bilateral agreements are even larger when trade-
diverting effects are to be expected owing to the trade agreements of other 
countries (such as that of the US with Mexico) and to the political pressure 
exerted by the exporting industry to conclude bilateral agreements to re-
establish a level playing field.  
A political-economy argument also discards the case for a 
multilateral agreement to a certain degree. The largest welfare gains for the 
EU would result from a lowering (or elimination) of tariffs and subsidies in 
agriculture. Realistically, a cut in subsidies can only be expected in a 
multilateral framework, as all countries exporting to the EU would benefit 
from such a step (see chapter 3, section 3.4). Thus, the EU will not be 
prepared to cut subsidies in a bilateral or regional trade agreement since it 
will not be able to obtain as large a quid pro quo as in a multilateral 
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the WTO. Yet in the mercantilist approach with which multilateral trade 
negotiations are conducted, the positive welfare contribution of lowering 
one’s own protectionism does not count much. What counts more are the 
trade liberalisation measures of other countries that can be expected from 
the Doha Round. These, however, might not be very relevant with regard 
to emerging countries, which are the particular focus of the EU’s interest. 
As tariff reduction formulas refer to bound tariff rates and as many 
emerging countries’ bound tariffs far exceed applied tariffs, the de facto 
liberalisation agreed upon in the Doha Round might not be substantial. 
Thus the negotiating value of agricultural subsidies might not be worth as 
much as suggested in the multilateral context. 
Overall, the EU has relatively strong incentives to conclude bilateral 
agreements, especially with regard to non-tariff barriers such as domestic 
regulation issues, where the welfare effects are clearly positive and the 
WTO process lags far behind.  
In this respect, the EU perspective therefore does not necessarily 
correspond to the perspective of global economic welfare. As the analysis 
in chapters 2 and 3 revealed, the trend towards bilateral agreements 
currently seems to be gaining ground and, in part, bears the hallmarks of a 
race for markets. The transaction costs of global trade increase as a result of 
the large number of overlapping agreements (the ‘spaghetti bowl 
phenomenon’) along with the associated and sometimes very complicated 
rules of origin, thereby particularly affecting smaller companies and those 
in developing countries. The resulting global welfare effects need not be 
positive. Nevertheless, the EU must accept this trend towards bilateralism 
to a certain degree as a given. 
Thus, from the selfish EU perspective, the question is with which 
trading partners bilateral trade agreements are most promising (see Table 
4.2). In this context, the US first comes to mind, which in 2003 received 
more than one-quarter of the EU’s exports outside the EU. Yet a tacit 
agreement exists between leading OECD countries to abstain from regional 
trade agreements among industrial countries in different regions of the 
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Table 4.2 The markets of the EU-25 countries 
  Share of extra EU-25 
exports in 2003 (in %) 
Change in the share 
between 1999 and 
2003, (in %) 
Europe without the  
EU-25, incl. 
24.8  2.3 
Switzerland 8.1  -1.2 
Norway 3.1  -0.3 
Turkey 3.3  0.3 
Bulgaria, Romania  2.3  0.8 
America, incl.   34.0  -3.2 
NAFTA 29.7  -1.3 
the US  25.7  -1.4 
Canada 2.4  0.0 
Latin America  5.0  -1.7 
Asia, incl.  29.4  1.3 
Japan 4.6  -0.5 
China 4.7  1.8 
ASEAN 4.4  -0.2 
Dynamic Asian 
Economies (DAE) 
8.5  -0.7 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States, incl. the 
6.0  2.4 
Russian Federation  4.2  1.8 
Oceania 2.5  0.0 
Africa 8.0  -0.4 
Not recorded  1.3  0.0 
For information only      
ACP countries  4.8  0.0 
Mediterranean area  11.4  -0.3 
Notes:  NAFTA – the US, Canada, Mexico 
ASEAN – Brunei, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
DAE – Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand 
Oceania – including Australia, New Zealand, polar areas 
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Transatlantic free trade zone 
Admittedly, over the course of many years there have been repeated 
attempts by business and certain political factions to create a transatlantic 
free trade zone.6 So far, governments have unequivocally rejected such 
attempts. Instead, various cooperation forums are used to reduce non-tariff 
trade barriers (for example, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue).  
On average, the tariff rates in transatlantic trade are relatively low. 
Transatlantic trade is impaired much more strongly by a large number of 
non-tariff barriers. These barriers mostly concern questions of collaboration 
by authorities and legislatures. Issues of negotiations include, for instance, 
mutual recognition of standards and certifications, high bureaucratic 
expenses in the context of delegating staff, problems in customs handling 
(for example, different application of EU customs regulations depending on 
the country involved) and divergent legal standards. Various business fora 
have repeatedly pointed out the specific obstacles over recent years. The 
politically responsible bodies were called upon to initiate steps for 
overcoming these trade barriers. Because as a rule this would require the 
consultation and active participation of parliaments and authorities, the 
results of these efforts have been rather modest.  
While until now a transatlantic free trade agreement was considered 
taboo, agreements within the world’s geographical regions (for example, by 
the US and Canada or the EU itself) were on the other hand seen as 
legitimate. The reason for the strong restraint exercised by the industrial 
countries in creating region-spanning associations among themselves is the 
view that these would have significant trade-creating and -diverting effects 
among certain important industrial countries, putting third countries at a 
considerable disadvantage. If the EU and the US regulated their trade 
bilaterally, so the argument goes, the relevance of the multilateral trade 
order would diminish considerably. Therefore, with respect to the 
multilateral system, non-tariff trade barriers should be removed by, for 
example, the reciprocal recognition of certification procedures (mutual 
recognition agreements), but by no means by tariffs. Thus, the industrial 
countries have taken consideration of less-developed countries at their own 
expense. 
                                                      
6 For details concerning the relevant academic literature, Langhammer et al. (2002) 
presents a short overview of the activities within the scope of the annual EU-US 
summits since 1995 as well as a current analysis of the topic. 80 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
The paradigm according to which the ‘elephants’ of world trade 
should refrain from concluding comprehensive bilateral agreements with 
each other that include tariffs can be questioned using various arguments: 
•  The WTO legal system would not necessarily be called into question 
by bilateral agreements. Often, in bilateral agreements, arbitration is 
rather non-binding and regulated in more traditional diplomatic, 
consultative ways. Independent dispute settlement with judicial 
functions is usually not provided for. As a result, in the case of 
bilateral agreements there are often no retorsion measures with 
which to efficiently sanction rule violations. Thus, despite the 
NAFTA, Canada and the US often still carry out their trade disputes 
through the WTO. The EU may serve as a counter-example because it 
regulates trade disputes among its members internally. The EU legal 
system (with the European Court of Justice), however, represents a 
unique case worldwide that became possible only on the back of deep 
integration and the transfer of sovereignty to a supranational level.  
•  To a large extent trade among industrial countries consists of similar 
products. Between the EU and the US, the reciprocal exchange of 
goods concentrates on higher-value industrial products (see Figure 
4.1). Cars coming from the EU are sold in the US and vice versa. 
Accordingly, trade hardly takes place on the basis of comparative 
cost advantages. Rather, companies use rising returns to scale and the 
chance to serve several markets from one production base. In 
addition, consumers appreciate a wide choice and international trade 
expands the range of options from which they can choose. The reason 
for strong trade among industrial countries is often the progressive, 
company-driven integration of the markets. International economic 
relations are characterised by a close integration of foreign direct 
investment and intra-company trade. Multinational companies invest 
internationally and trade takes place in different countries among the 
companies belonging to the same group. This situation particularly 
applies to the EU and the US. About 57% of EU exports to the US in 
2002 consisted of trade among affiliated companies. For Germany, 
this proportion was even higher, at about 67% (Hamilton & Quinlan, 
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Figure 4.1 Structure of transatlantic trade according to product categories –   
  Share of EU-25 extra trade with the US (in %) 
8.2 9.8
18.3 20.3
51.7 45.1
21.8 24.7
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Imports Exports
Other processed goods (SITC-Nos. 6,8,9)
Machinery and transport equipment (SITC-No. 7)
Chemical products (SITC-No. 5)
Food, beverages, tobacco products, basic materials (SITC-Nos. 0 to 4)
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€157 billion 
Exports: 
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Note:  Status as of 2003. 
Sources:  Eurostat (New Cronos Database) and authors’ calculations. 
The transatlantic dismantling of tariffs for industrial goods is less 
problematic in this context,7 because bilateral agreements concerning 
tariffs do not essentially change these determinants for trade among 
industrial countries. This argument applies, above all, to the intensive 
integration of multinational companies. In addition, modern 
manufactured products, for which marketing and after-sales service 
play an important role for instance, are hardly protected by low 
tariffs (see section 4.2).  
Nevertheless, trade-diverting effects on third industrial countries 
cannot be completely ruled out, although here the argument also 
applies that tariff rates are relatively low. On the other hand, similar 
                                                      
7 The rationale stated here does not apply to agricultural products, for which trade 
barriers in the EU and the US are still substantially higher. Therefore, it must be 
reckoned that the agricultural sector will continue to be largely excluded from a 
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products (for example, cars and machinery) are traded among 
industrial countries for which a country’s respective competitive 
advantage is substantially lower than for instance in the trade of 
different products with developing countries (for example, clothing 
and machinery). Accordingly, a free trade agreement between the US 
and the EU could primarily affect other OECD countries, such as 
Japan. Any such impact would be enhanced if important areas 
relevant to trade that go beyond tariffs and in which the trade 
barriers are still more prominent are liberalised. These resulting 
discriminations could be counteracted in different ways: by the 
opportunity for other countries to join the association (on open 
regionalism, see Langhammer et al., 2002), by parallel conclusion of 
different agreements or preferabl y  b y  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  o n e  
agreement that from the start includes the leading exporting nations 
(see section 4.4). 
•  At the same time, with respect to the poorer developing countries, no 
major distortion of trade should result from an abolition of tariffs 
between the EU and the US.8 Thus, for instance, neither the American 
nor the European clothing industries will considerably increase their 
ability to compete in the case of a bilateral agreement between the EU 
and the US in comparison with their Chinese competitors, because 
the Chinese cost advantages are significantly greater than the level of 
tariffs on most clothing products. During recent years, exchange rate 
fluctuations have led to much stronger cost movements than would 
have resulted from the abolition of tariffs, without having had any 
serious impact on the basic structure of trade. In other words, the 
markets are relatively strongly segmented between the products of 
industrial countries and imports from developing countries, so that 
the discontinuation of customs-related cost burdens in the amount of 
a few percentage points should have no significant consequences on 
the direction of the trade flow. A key trigger for trade between 
                                                      
8 Of course, there are individual, mostly labour-intensive, manufactured products 
for which the EU and the US still levy tariffs in the lower double-digit range. The 
US for instance currently charges a tariff rate of more than 30% on certain woollen 
fabrics, glass and ceramic products. Here trade diversion at the expense of 
developing countries cannot be excluded. Yet tariffs on the prevailing majority of 
manufactured products are so low that they offer no appreciable protection from 
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industrial and developing countries – the different endowments of 
production factors – would remain unaffected by regional trade 
agreements among industrial countries. To the extent that (albeit 
limited) trade-distorting effects may appear with respect to 
developing and emerging countries, these could be reduced by the 
growth benefits stemming from the discussed agreement and by the 
associated rise in incomes and higher demand for imports by 
partners. Also, when concluding such an association, one could at the 
same time autonomously reduce tariff rates vis-à-vis third countries. 
On more careful inspection, the paradigm according to which a 
transatlantic free trade zone that includes tariffs would cause great 
economic harm to global trade must be revisited. Anyhow, such a step is 
not necessarily advisable for other reasons.  
Macroeconomically, one should not expect too much from such a free 
trade zone, because bilateral trade is already quite strongly liberalised 
owing to the low levels of tariffs (Langhammer et al., 2002). Also, with 
regard to non-tariff barriers to trade, the problems from an overall 
economic point of view lie rather in the area of ‘fine tuning’. By contrast, 
multilateral liberalisation is far more significant. Thus, for example, 
Baldwin & Francois (1996) conclude that with the creation of a transatlantic 
economic area, GDP in the EU as well as in the NAFTA could be expected 
to grow by about $20 billion each (at 1992 US prices), while a worldwide 
liberalisation would mean that approximately $220 billion would be 
attainable for the EU-15 and about $90 billion for the NAFTA. In addition, a 
plurilateral approach of similar scope would also be conceivable within the 
OECD framework, which would likewise lead to much higher gains in 
welfare than an association between the EU and the US (see section 4.4).  
Further, a transatlantic free trade agreement must not only be 
assessed economically, but also politically. The EU and the US represent 
the political pillars of the multilateral system. In spite of the relatively 
modest effects in economic terms, by establishing a bilateral free trade 
agreement they would be sending out a political signal that would 
probably tend to weaken the WTO.  
Transatlantic trade and investment agreements 
Therefore, an approach that takes into account the special transatlantic 
economic relationship as well as the overall political responsibility of both 
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•  A bilateral trade and investment agreement that excludes tariffs in 
consideration of multilateral tariff reductions would represent one 
element that could facilitate movement towards the objective of a 
transatlantic economic area. Such an agreement (sometimes called a 
partnership or friendship treaty)9 would in particular address the 
special issues of the bilateral trade in services and technical 
regulation as well as those of investment and competition. It would 
follow the approach used for the Trade and Investment Enhancement 
Agreement that is to be negotiated between the EU and Canada. Such 
an agreement would provide a legal framework to improve the 
collaboration between authorities and legislatures, and to stipulate 
appropriate provisions for transatlantic economic relations. With 
respect to third countries, discriminating effects from this kind of 
regulatory fine-tuning could not be ruled out completely; however, 
these would remain limited.10 Admittedly, such an agreement would 
face the challenge of going beyond the declarations of good intentions 
and of really finding regulations and mechanisms that remove the 
existing obstacles. Hence, it remains to be seen whether these high 
expectations can actually be fulfilled.  
•  In the area of tariffs, in consideration of the joint political 
responsibility for the multilateral system one would continue to bank 
on solutions under the umbrella of the WTO (concerning the general 
                                                      
9 This idea has already been introduced in the discussions concerning the creation 
of the transatlantic marketplace. For instance, the umbrella organisation of the 
European federations of industries and employers’ associations, UNICE (Union des 
Industries de la Communauté Européenne), is demanding such a transatlantic 
‘friendship agreement’. 
10 Trade-diverting effects are not to be expected if the temporary delegation of 
employees by multinational companies from the EU to the US, which is currently 
often arranged rather informally, is formally made easier by improved US visa 
regulations. Other countries in addition to the EU that also prefer international 
product standards would benefit if within the scope of such an agreement the US 
abandons national standards. Admittedly, a certain threat of trade diversion with 
respect to developing countries exists in the case of harmonisation of product 
standards, primarily because standards would be raised in either the US or the EU. 
Thus, it would be preferable to mutually recognise standards and to refrain from 
implementing restrictive origin rules (Langhammer et al., 2002; Chen & Mattoo, 
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tariff-reduction formula and plurilateral sector-specific initiatives, see 
section 4.4). The objective would be to render a large part of 
transatlantic trade duty-free by an ambitious, multilateral abolition of 
tariffs. This element would be the second part of the transatlantic 
strategy. 
Agreements with developing and emerging countries 
If one merely considers the EU’s self-interest, the issue is once more the 
identification of especially important trading partners among the emerging 
countries (for example, China), which, owing to their high growth in the 
long term, offer excellent prospects for an expansion of trade relations.  
Yet in comparison with the agreements among industrial countries, 
the typical free trade agreements between industrial and developing 
countries are possibly more problematic because they lead to 
discrimination among developing countries with similar export products. 
Another point that should be viewed very critically is trade 
agreements that are primarily motivated by politics or history.11 Thus, for 
example, the EU discriminates between the ex-colonies of its member states 
in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and those developing 
countries without a European colonial past. Even from the EU’s own 
perspective, this strategy must be questioned. The trade-off between 
resources that are invested in negotiations and the additional transaction 
costs (the regulation jungle) on the one hand and the volume of trade on 
the other often does not appear reasonable.12  
                                                      
11 Also within the scope of the European tariff preference system, tariffs are 
charged for example on coffee imported from Brazil while Columbian coffee can be 
imported duty-free to the EU. 
12 With the European Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that form part of its 
development policy, the EU has initiated a new wave of a different kind of regional 
free trade agreement. By 2008, the ACP countries of the respective regions should 
jointly come to an agreement with respect to the EU regarding a free trade 
agreement. In doing so, the EU and the ACP countries are fulfilling a requirement 
by the WTO, which considers the current one-sided EU preferences that are only 
based on historical circumstances to represent a violation of WTO rules and is 
tolerated only temporarily by means of exceptions (waivers). With the EPAs, the 
EU is securing significantly improved market access in the relevant markets. 
Because the markets of the ACP countries are small, however, the consequences of 
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In order to guard against distortions of competition among the 
developing countries to at least a certain degree, but above all to avoid 
increasing transaction costs excessively, it would appear sensible for the EU 
to negotiate with existing regional associations that include several 
participants. An example of such negotiations is the talks between the EU 
and MERCOSUR. The beauty of such negotiations lies in the fact that 
several countries can be included ‘in one go’ and the same rules apply to all 
countries (for instance, the same rules of origin). Moreover, distortion of 
competition among the participating countries is avoided from the start. 
Admittedly, it is a problem that many developing countries have not 
established stable free trade agreements or customs unions, but are rather 
still in the process of setting them up. For example, the stability of 
MERCOSUR was considerably impaired by Argentina’s financial crisis, and 
the ASEAN countries have not yet completed the ASEAN Free Trade Area. 
Negotiations with a region that is itself not yet stable are protracted. Often 
proposals to reduce tariffs take place based on the participating countries’ 
smallest common denominator. So, negotiations with a group of countries 
are more difficult than with an individual country.  
Other countries’ agreements with developing countries 
From the EU’s perspective, a view must be taken of regional trade 
agreements that differentiates between developing and emerging countries. 
These countries are increasingly making use of the opportunities for 
stronger South-South cooperation. Thus, the ASEAN countries in the 
longer-term will not only introduce duty-free trade among each other, but 
also with India and China. In Africa, regional cooperation is also growing 
stronger. Nevertheless, region-spanning South-South initiatives hardly 
exist.13 
                                                                                                                                       
there are certainly risks associated with regional cooperation among developing 
countries; however, it may partially result in a diversion of trade in favour of the 
EU and at the expense of other industrial and emerging countries (which can also 
represent a disadvantage from the perspective of the ACP countries). 
13 An incidental aspect is the Generalised System of Trade Preferences among 
developing countries initiated by UNCTAD. This system has been set up as a 
supplement to the traditional preferences of the industrial countries in favour of 
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Free trade agreements among the rapidly growing emerging countries – in 
particular China and regional neighbours – are rightly a cause for great 
concern in Europe, as given the fast pace of their technological progress the 
emerging countries, and above all China, are penetrating markets and 
sectors that up to now were reserved to the industrial countries (Figure 
4.2). This economic and technological catching-up process coupled with the 
integration of regional trade can seriously impair the competitive position 
of the industrial countries that remain outside this process.  
Figure 4.2 China’s rising market share of modern manufactured products – Share 
of global exports (in %) 
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From the EU’s perspective, trade-diverting effects at its expense may 
yet become considerably larger, because major industrial countries such as 
Japan and the US are engaged in securing better access to the rapidly 
growing markets in Asia by means of bilateral agreements.  
Consequently, EU trade policy is faced with the challenge of 
investigating the feasibility of bilateral agreements with the new non-
European integration areas, especially in Asia. With the Trans-Regional 88 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative, the first attempts in this regard have been 
made. Also, in recent times calls for the conclusion of a free trade 
agreement with ASEAN and other important Asian countries can more 
frequently be heard from German political and industrial circles.14 
All in all, the EU must accept as a given the trend towards 
increasingly strong regionalisation of global trade – it cannot reverse it 
politically. Such acceptance is particularly pertinent in view of the fact that 
the EU itself is the classic example of a deep and successful regional 
integration process, and for decades has been managing its trade relations 
with third countries by means of a large number of bilateral agreements. 
Certainly, the argument is appropriate that regionalisation curtails the 
pressure on the WTO process to achieve results in negotiations and can 
reduce the willingness of WTO members to compromise. 
Still, in its own economic interest the EU should in future bear in 
mind the possibilities of bilateral and regional agreements.15 If the EU 
decides to engage in new bilateral agreements, it should make good use of 
the manifold opportunities that go beyond dismantling tariffs (such as the 
reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade and progress with issues such as 
services and standards, along with questions of investment and 
competition). Agreements are only sensible with economically-relevant 
trading partners. This rationale means that bilateral agreements are called 
for that lead to profound and economically relevant integration – and, as 
far as possible, these agreements should be concluded with existing 
regional organisations.  
4.4  Plurilateral variants 
Plurilateral variants refer to approaches in which a larger number of 
participating countries – but by no means all WTO members – join an 
association. Organisationally, plurilateral agreements can be secured 
independently or under the umbrella of the WTO.  
From its fundamental approach, the WTO is a multilateral 
organisation based on the tenet of the ‘same rules for all’ and its central 
legal pillars (the GATT, the GATS and the agreement concerning 
                                                      
14 In response to this challenge, from the entrepreneur’s perspective foreign direct 
investment would appear an attractive option for bypassing trade barriers. 
15 For a relativisation of this self-serving perspective, see section 4.5. MULTILATERALISM OR REGIONALISM? | 89 
 
intellectual property, the TRIPS) are binding for all WTO members. In 
principle, a country that joins the WTO cannot be exempt from individual 
agreements (for example, by applying the GATT, but not the TRIPS). Still, 
there are some agreements that are optional for WTO members, for 
example the Government Procurement Agreement, which only 28 WTO 
members have joined. The rights and duties arising from these agreements 
only apply to members. In other words, only parties to the agreement grant 
each other non-discriminatory access to their government procurement 
markets. This agreement is an exception to the principle of most-favoured 
nation (MFN) treatment. At the same, all WTO members have the option to 
join the agreement. It is therefore not a private club, but rather an open 
entity. This feature satisfies an important requirement that was derived 
from the theoretical analysis (see chapter 3, section 3.2). A key advantage of 
a plurilateral agreement under the umbrella of the WTO lies in the fact that 
during negotiations there is already a high degree of transparency, and all 
members have the opportunity to take part. Further, all WTO members 
must approve the agreement – even those that do not wish to join. This 
stipulation ensures that the agreement does not put countries that are not 
involved at a disadvantage against their will.  
The large advantage of such negotiations is that plurilateral 
agreements can be concluded even if some WTO members assert 
reservations against specific regulatory areas. This flexibility applies, for 
example, to the issues of investment and competition. A range of 
developing countries oppose multilateral rules for these issues because 
they would not like to restrict their policy space and do not see any 
immediate benefits of such rules for themselves.  
From the point of view of the negotiations, the borders between 
plurilateral and multilateral approaches are fluid, because within the scope 
of multilateral negotiations not all (by far) WTO members actively take 
part. Rather, four groups of WTO members can generally be distinguished: 
First are those members that have independent positions and actively take 
part in negotiations. Second are those members that assume the role of 
representative for a group of countries. Third is the group that consists of 
countries that during negotiations let themselves largely be represented by 
another country. Fourth is the group that consists of countries that take 
part in the negotiations not by having an independent position, but by 
judging the final result of the negotiations (and, in the absence of any own 
particular interests, generally agree). In this regard, multilateral 
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‘plurilateral negotiations’ is used in cases in which some countries that 
normally actively participate in the multilateral process of negotiations do 
not take part for political reasons.  
Another major advantage is that these agreements can be made 
subject to WTO dispute settlement, which is an effective system of 
enforcement. This link ensures that the agreements do not contain simple 
recommendations, but binding rules.  
Tariffs  
Plurilateral sector initiatives for the entire removal of tariffs in important 
sectors are very attractive from the perspective of economics. Nevertheless, 
a key tactical aspect is to avoid weakening negotiations regarding 
multilateral tariff reductions by conducting parallel activities.  
The modalities of the WTO round for dismantling tariffs have as a 
basis a general tariff-reduction formula that should be applied to all non-
agricultural sectors. In addition, sector-specific options are permitted that 
exceed the general formula’s extent of tariff reduction. In this regard, the 
modalities contain a plurilateral component that should be used. 
Plurilateral initiatives for the abolition of industrial tariffs in individual 
sectors are therefore compatible with the Doha Round. There are models 
for this already: the 1996 Information Technology Agreement (ITA) is a 
plurilateral agreement that specifies duty-free trade in information 
technology (IT) products. In the context of this agreement, the realisation 
that nearly the entire trade in IT products is conducted by a relatively small 
number of WTO members, and that trade with this innovative sector 
should not be restricted by tariffs, played a crucial role. The agreement 
came into force after it was signed by countries that in total represent more 
than 90% of the international trade in IT products. The Medical Agreement, 
which stipulates duty-free entry for medical products, coincided with the 
establishment of the WTO. The background to this agreement is related to 
development policy (no restriction of trade in products of vital 
importance). Both agreements have a plurilateral group of members that 
grant exemption from duties on pertinent products for all WTO members, 
making this approach particularly attractive.16 
                                                      
16 Within the scope of the WTO round, the objective is to negotiate with a view to 
removing tariffs on environmental goods. Such an agreement could also be 
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Along the lines of the ITA, for example, the OECD countries in 
particular could agree to completely dismantle tariffs in those industries in 
which the countries involved dominate global trade. These tariff reductions 
would be ‘given’ to the remaining WTO members by way of MFN 
treatment. For every segment of industry one could determine a specific 
threshold value from which the agreement becomes effective (a critical 
mass of participants). If, for instance, the participating countries do not 
represent 80, 85 or 90% of global trade (such as is the case with the ITA), 
tariffs would not be reduced. This threshold would prevent important 
actors in the respective markets from taking a free-rider position as 
exporters by profiting from tariff reductions in the partner countries 
without providing anything in exchange.  
The potential for these solutions is substantial. Figure 4.3 shows that 
the OECD countries (including EU-25 countries that are not OECD 
members) have a share in world exports with many modern manufactured 
products exceeding 85% (at times even by a significant margin).17 This level 
also applies, for instance, to chemical products, different types of 
machinery, as well as (above all) road vehicles and other transport 
equipment.  
This approach mainly concerns industrial sectors that exhibit 
intensive intra-industrial trade in which tariffs play only a minor role (see 
section 4.2). Admittedly, a plurilateral reduction of tariffs would lead to a 
competitive disadvantage for those industries and commodities that exhibit 
a high input of raw materials and in which OECD countries likewise have a 
very large market share. From the industrial countries’ perspective, these 
effects might be impossible to absorb (section 4.2). Consequently, a sector-
wide dismantling of tariffs is improbable.  
                                                      
17 Since the export interests of the countries concerned are the main driving forces 
of trade agreements and foreclosure vis-à-vis imports by means of tariffs as 
discussed earlier, it does not make sense in the case of modern manufactured 
products; thus only exports and not the entire trade are considered here. In 
addition, it is noteworthy that about 80% of exports from the OECD countries are 
exported to other OECD countries; consequently, internal trade within the OECD 
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Figure 4.3 Share of OECD countries in world exports of modern manufactured 
products in 2003 (in %) 
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With a view to the countries that are not included and which could 
adopt a free-rider position, one must consider that in the EU, the least-
developed countries enjoy exemption from duties and more advanced 
countries enjoy a partial exemption from duties. These ‘gifts’ that are 
granted to free-riding developing countries do not amount to the tariff for 
MFNs, but to the preferential tariff. At the same time, importers and 
customs administrations are freed of bureaucratic expenses (determination 
of the country of origin).  
In addition, as argued in section 4.2, one can expect those countries 
that are not included at least in the medium and long term to continue to 
liberalise unilaterally. Therefore, a plurilateral initiative on the part of the 
industrial countries would not fix into perpetuity the tariffs of the non-
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At first glance, achieving a minimum threshold value of (for instance) 
90% of the market share of the countries involved would represent a key 
difficulty with this liberalisation approach, because this group of countries 
would in some sectors include some larger emerging countries that as a 
rule charge higher tariff rates on the products concerned. Here, one could 
assume that these countries might refuse to entirely dismantle tariffs 
because they would not be receiving any corresponding quid pro quo from 
the OECD countries in which tariff rates are substantially lower. This 
argument can be qualified, however. Provided that the OECD area 
represents the main market of the emerging countries concerned, in their 
own interest they should contribute to achieving critical mass. In addition, 
tariffs should in the medium term be dispensable as a protection against 
competition for the country’s own industry (strategic trade policy tariff) – 
at least where the country has such a high global market share that it 
belongs to the group of larger exporters. But of course, in the end, the 
decision about participating in a sector-specific plurilateral agreement from 
the point of view of the larger emerging countries remains an individual 
choice that will be examined in each particular case.  
It is problematic that sector initiatives could dilute ambitions for a 
general tariff reduction at the WTO level by way of a formula. For these 
reasons, sector initiatives should be substantiated only when the Doha 
Round has led to an agreement about a general tariff-reduction formula.  
‘New’ trade issues 
Some of the new WTO issues concern rules that do not fit into the classical 
trade policy pattern of concession and counter-concession. Thus, for 
example, the modernisation of customs procedures leads to benefits for all 
countries involved in international trade. The creation of a functioning 
competition policy is an essential component of a working market 
economy. In this respect, it is tolerable if not all WTO members go along 
with these issues in negotiations – the leading countries’ negotiating 
position for the remaining issues is not weakened (for example, regarding 
tariffs).  
Admittedly, plurilateral agreements are also possible outside the 
WTO framework. They can be concluded independently of international 
organisations or be integrated into existing organisational frameworks. One 
example of such an agreement that some countries were trying to achieve 
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(MAI). In comparison with the group of WTO members, the OECD 
countries are economically and politically homogeneous, so that it should 
be relatively easier to bring about joint rules. At the same time, the example 
of the MAI points out the drawbacks of rule-setting outside the WTO 
context (Box 4.1). The non-participating countries are excluded to a much 
greater extent from the negotiations and cannot veto the establishment of 
the agreement. These aspects can quickly lead to distrust and suspicions 
that rules might be agreed that would put third countries at a 
disadvantage.  
Box 4.1 The failed negotiations concerning an MAI under the umbrella of the 
OECD 
The negotiations about a multilateral investment agreement began within the 
OECD framework in September 1995. The MAI was to provide for legal security 
for the initial investment phase as well as the operating phase of investments (post- 
establishment). This attempt was far-reaching in its effort to introduce a top-down 
approach according to which participating countries would have assured 
compliance with basic principles such as the non-discrimination of investors and 
would have only explicitly stipulated exceptions to this basic rule. Additionally, an 
investor–state dispute settlement system was envisaged. The negotiations that 
were managed by experts and at first went unnoticed were increasingly criticised 
in the course of 1997 by non-governmental organisations and parliamentarians 
from OECD countries. The main allegation was that the MAI talks were being 
conducted as secret negotiations without any democratic legitimacy and 
threatened to undermine the sovereignty of the states. Also, public resistance on 
the part of the parliaments of some countries grew so strong that the governments 
agreed in early 1998 to discontinue the negotiations. At the end of 1998, France 
declared that it would not take part in resuming the talks. Thus, the MAI finally 
failed (Böhmer, 1998). 
 
This side effect leads to the question of whether a plurilateral 
initiative concerning investment rules, which has not made headway in the 
WTO round, might not lead to considerable political resistance and 
endanger the entire round. It must be also taken into account that the 
discussions concerning a WTO investment agreement were characterised 
by irrational, polemic disputes. These had little to do with the actual 
contents of a possible agreement and did not deal with the concrete EU 
proposals, but employed threatening scenarios and even conspiracy 
theories. With this in mind, one can assume that similar opposition would 
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under the WTO umbrella, consequences for the WTO round would be 
conceivable. As to negotiations within the OECD framework, one would 
have to reckon with opposition. Therefore, after a careful consideration of 
the advantages and disadvantages of such an agreement, one can arrive at 
the conclusion that for current political reasons it would be inopportune to 
take up negotiations. In addition, there are already many bilateral 
investment agreements (as previously mentioned, see chapter 3, section 3.6) 
that at least regulate questions of investment protection.  
Such strong political opposition is not to be expected in the case of a 
competition agreement. The markets of many WTO members are too small to 
play an important international role in competition policy. Therefore, for 
economic reasons it is not necessarily required to include all WTO 
members in a competition agreement. Moreover, positive effects on third 
countries can arise from competition rules that are agreed among certain 
countries if for instance export cartels are dissolved. As a basic principle, 
for reasons of efficiency the agreed competition rules should be of benefit 
not only to the members but also to all third countries.  
Under these conditions there is no reason not to conclude a 
plurilateral competition agreement in which predominantly the OECD 
countries participate. Of course, the parallel objective would have to be to 
get the most important emerging countries to accede. In order for this to 
happen, however, a lot of countries – especially the emerging Asian 
countries – must still be convinced of the advantages of improved rules of 
competition within the scope of a plurilateral agreement.  
By contrast, there is little reason to conclude a plurilateral 
transparency agreement regarding government procurement. The agreement 
that was originally intended to be multilateral had the objective of bringing 
countries closer to joining the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) 
by way of fundamental rules of transparency. Since plurilateral 
membership would largely be limited to the countries that are participating 
in the GPA – and these countries have already entered more far-reaching 
obligations – such an agreement is superfluous.  
Plurilateral agreements only with industrial countries?  
The question arises as to whether the EU should follow up these new issues 
plurilaterally within the WTO framework with a large number of members 
or mainly with industrial countries within OECD. A key issue is whether 
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of whether a plurilateral agreement is sensible requires a thorough analysis 
of the relations between partner countries. Thus, for example, protection of 
investments and liberalisation for foreign direct investment are by far less 
pressing problems in OECD countries than in developing and emerging 
countries. A multilateral investment agreement with the latter would 
presumably not entail much more than certain basic rules (transparency 
and non-discrimination). For a plurilateral agreement among OECD 
countries, this would be a very modest objective. Although a plurilateral 
competition agreement that included many members from the group of 
developing countries as well might merely determine the establishment of 
competition authorities and certain basic rules, a plurilateral agreement 
among the industrial countries could contain much more detailed 
definitions that take into account the stage of development of the countries 
involved. Within the OECD, such an agreement would primarily concern 
harmonisation of the provisions of competition law, common notification 
mechanisms, time limits and strengthened cooperation.  
In this respect, plurilateral agreements do not have to represent the 
second-best solution in the sense that parties try to assert their objectives – 
which were originally multilateral – in a smaller group. Rather, they can 
offer an opportunity to reconsider the objective and to enhance their 
ambitions. Of course, thereby one tends to curtail the probability that non-
members become parties to the agreement at a later date. But the 
enlargement of plurilateral agreements – as shown by the example of the 
GPA – is in any case a political process that is difficult to assess.  
Depending on the issue that is to be advanced in such plurilateral 
agreements, pros and cons must be weighed:  
•  A far-reaching agreement among OECD countries makes sense if 
there still is an appreciable need for liberalisation, and with a view to 
emerging and developing countries, in the nearer future a 
comprehensive WTO agreement cannot be expected. In this case, it 
would not be reasonable to downgrade objectives concerning 
plurilateral agreements in view of their ability to be extended.  
•  Yet to the extent that among OECD countries extensive liberalisation 
has already taken place, and deficits merely exist in emerging and 
developing countries, it makes more sense to conclude a less far-
reaching agreement that at least some of these countries can join.  
•  Moreover, in the final analysis, the question arises as to whether for 
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agreement – a far-reaching one and a rather rudimentary one. But 
this approach has so far not been successful with respect to the issue 
of governmental procurement because of opposition on the part of 
the developing countries against even a rudimentary agreement.  
A ‘WTO of two speeds’ is possibly the only chance for making 
headway in negotiations on important new issues (on competition and in 
the longer term also investment and other issues). In this respect, the 
paradigm that has been upheld since the founding of the WTO should be 
reviewed, according to which all agreements should be basically binding 
for all WTO members.  
4.5  Recommendations for EU trade policy 
Despite the difficulties of the WTO process described above, the 
multilateral trade order rightly enjoys priority. From the EU perspective, 
this should continue to be the case, since substantial liberalisation within 
the WTO framework results in significantly larger welfare gains than 
regional agreements. Simultaneously, with the help of further multilateral 
liberalisation, the EU can reduce the trade diversion it suffers because of 
regional trade agreements among other countries. For the same reason, the 
EU should work towards strengthening the WTO rules for regional trade 
agreements (as discussed in chapter 3, section 3.4 and chapter 5).  
Taking into account the view that the removal of tariffs is 
fundamentally in the EU’s self-interest, but that a unilateral liberalisation 
would be politically disadvantageous with regard to the mercantilist quid-
pro-quo approach of the WTO negotiations, a plurilateral approach would 
be best suited to strongly reduce the EU’s tariffs. The EU should pioneer 
the sectoral elimination of tariffs. This approach exceeds the general tariff 
reduction (formula) within the WTO framework and is compatible with the 
modalities of the Doha Round. In doing so, a critical mass of participating 
countries should be specified on a sector-by-sector basis, which taken 
together represents a very high proportion of global trade. Tariff reduction 
on the basis of MFN treatment would be ‘given’ to the remaining countries 
(as was the case with the ITA).  
Given the large number of bilateral agreements that have been 
concluded in the recent past, chapter 3 shows that this might constitute a 
problem for the WTO and for the smooth functioning of global trade. The 
EU’s self-serving ambition for more bilateral associations may conflict with 
the multilateral solution. Thus the question arises as to how far the EU, as 98 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
one of the largest actors in the global economy, should subordinate its 
interests to the higher objective of the world trading order and assume a 
model function to motivate other countries to show stronger discipline 
concerning regionalism.  
This argument - in conjunction with the one about transaction costs 
and the fact that the limited capacities for negotiations must be used as 
effectively as possible - results in the demand for restraint with regard to 
further bilateral trade agreements. As far as the EU is pondering whether to 
start new negotiations (as otherwise its interests would suffer too severely), 
it should take into account a range of criteria:  
•  The trading partner(s) concerned should be economically significant 
and exhibit dynamic economic development.  
•  To the extent possible, negotiations should be conducted with a 
group of countries that have already agreed free trade among 
themselves. That way, trade distortions among these countries are 
avoided.  
•  The objective of the agreement should be deep economic integration. 
In addition to tariffs and import quotas, this concerns the 
liberalisation of trade in services, which should be as comprehensive 
as possible, as well as the incorporation of new trade issues 
(investment, competition, trade facilitation, government procurement 
and improved regulatory collaboration).  
•  In the transatlantic relationship, owing to the close investment 
relations there are very specific problems that to a great extent relate 
to the issue of regulatory collaboration (cooperation between 
authorities and legislatures). At the same time, the EU and the US 
bear a large political responsibility for the multilateral trade system. 
Thus, it appears sensible to regulate technical questions of the 
bilateral economic relationship within the scope of a transatlantic 
trade and investment agreement, and to continue to pursue the 
reduction of tariffs under the auspices of the WTO.  
Regarding new trade issues, it is reasonable for the EU to pursue 
plurilateral solutions, and to decide on a case-by-case basis whether deep 
integration among OECD countries or a rather rudimentary integration 
that includes a number of emerging countries (or both) is considered 
appropriate.   
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5.  Conclusions  
The slow pace of the WTO negotiations and the rapid increase of regional 
trade agreements since the mid-1990s raise the question of which 
approaches the EU should choose from among the range of available trade 
policy options (unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral, or a 
combination of these). Is the Lamy doctrine – which gives highest priority 
to the WTO process while imposing a moratorium on entering into new 
negotiations on bilateral deals – the best solution?  
A survey of the development of regional trade agreements shows that 
since the 1990s and especially since the turn of the millennium a new phase 
has emerged with a hitherto unknown dynamism. According to the WTO, 
in 2005 about half of global trade has occurred within such associations. 
This finding underlines the point that EU trade policy is faced with a 
substantial worldwide trend that must not be ignored. 
The strong dominance of bilateral agreements between two countries 
is remarkable and new. These constitute about 90% of the agreements 
concluded since 1995 and reported to the WTO up to May 2004.1 The 
agreements often involve countries that develop to become a ‘hub’ with 
numerous ‘spokes’. This model can be seen to apply to a number of 
countries such as the US, Mexico, Chile and some Asian countries, which in 
the past exclusively or to a very large extent subscribed only to the 
multilateral negotiating process. Yet recently, these countries have been 
actively turning to bilateral or regional trade agreements and emulating the 
pioneer of this approach – the EU. 
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Additional dimensions of this new phase of regionalism are the 
greater scope of a series of agreements that more often than previously go 
beyond the pure dismantling of tariffs and include issues such as services 
and investment, but without aiming at deeper integration such as economic 
and monetary unions as was partly the case with earlier associations. In 
addition, there are indications that in the long term, continent-spanning 
regional trade zones could develop in Europe (including the Mediterranean 
region), America, Asia and Africa, which could become interconnected by 
way of some trade agreements among individual countries or country 
groups.  
The rising momentum to conclude regional trade agreements is 
partly related to political motives (for example, peacekeeping or political 
stability), but often a whole range of important economic reasons as well. 
Primarily, this includes the hope for increases in welfare through a stronger 
international division of labour. From a mercantilist perspective, what is 
also associated with this trend is that regional trade agreements facilitate or 
protect access to foreign markets for a country’s own export industry. In 
this respect, there are signs of a certain degree of competition between the 
EU and the US (and partly Japan) over emerging countries that represent 
attractive markets – for instance with respect to Chile, Mexico and 
MERCOSUR as well as the East-Asian region. Especially from the view of 
developing and emerging countries, market access and market protection is 
likewise a main motive for the frequent agreements with industrial nations 
in their region. Moreover, in regionalisation these countries see an 
opportunity to underpin (lock-in) the credibility of their structural reforms 
and to attract foreign investors.2 In the age of globalisation, regional trade 
agreements provide the opportunity for the industrial nations to turn 
countries in their neighbourhood into ‘extended workbenches’ for 
outsourcing labour-intensive production steps and then re-importing the 
processed goods duty-free, instead of producing them in their own country 
as before. The stagnating WTO process is certainly another cause for the 
dynamism of regionalisation, but is by no means decisive by itself. 
 
                                                      
2 This trend also means that developing countries as a rule no longer use regional 
trade agreements as they often did in the 1960s and 1970s, with the purpose of 
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Regarding the welfare effects of regional trade agreements, two basic 
effects must be weighed against one another from the perspective of an 
individual country. The positive effect of trade creation stems from the fact 
that by reducing barriers to trade with respect to the partner country, 
domestic products are substituted by cheaper goods from the partner 
country. The negative effect of trade diversion is caused by the fact that 
possibly more efficient suppliers from non-member countries that are 
discriminated against by the association are replaced by competitors from 
the partner country who are more expensive and can only ‘artificially’ offer 
goods and services at a lower price owing to the agreement. Seen from a 
global perspective, this situation can lead to ineffective specialisation and a 
questionable allocation of resources. The net welfare effect of regional trade 
agreements remains ambiguous – even when new developments of 
international trade theory are considered. This point applies to an 
individual country’s perspective as well as to a global view that takes the 
disadvantages to third countries into account. 
The picture looks somewhat brighter for those trade agreements that 
cover domestic regulations. Here it has been shown that the theoretical 
welfare effects from an individual country’s perspective are clearly 
positive, as a diversion of trade does not occur; instead a reduction of real 
resource costs takes place, which empirically tends to be non-negligible. 
From a global perspective, however, third countries are again put at a 
disadvantage and an agreement can therefore easily lead to a misallocation 
of resources.  
Empirical studies of traditional regional trade agreements do not 
offer ultimate clarity either. Therein, most regional agreements increase the 
welfare of the countries involved to a limited degree, but partly lead to 
trade-diverting effects at the expense of third countries. Generalisations are 
hardly possible; in the end, it depends on the individual case. The total 
global welfare effects are disclosed in virtually none of the studies and 
therefore continue to remain largely unclear. Nevertheless, the associations 
are usually not characterised by foreclosure with respect to third countries. 
Nor is the establishment of trade blocs that are motivated by protectionism 
(trade fortresses) on the horizon. External protection is not systematically 
increased in the course of regionalisation – not least because of the GATT 
rules – and at times it is even diminished.  
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In the final analysis, however, some general statements can be 
derived about how trade creation can be augmented, how trade diversion 
can be reduced and thus how the likelihood for positive welfare effects can 
be increased. For instance, this is more likely to be the case: 
•  the greater the cost differences are between the partner countries and 
the lower these are between members and non-members; 
•  the higher the tariffs initially were among the partner countries and 
the lower they are determined to be after concluding the agreement 
with respect to non-members; and 
•  the more open an association is for accession by those third countries 
that possibly feel disadvantaged. 
Further, it must be borne in mind that the large number of 
overlapping trade agreements (the ‘spaghetti bowl phenomenon’) raises the 
transaction costs of global trade and has the effect of ‘sand in the wheels’. 
This outcome is considerably reinforced by complicated rules of origin.  
In addition, individual countries have a strong incentive to react to 
agreements on the part of their trading partners by concluding their own 
agreements in order to minimise trade-diverting effects at their expense. 
This response can easily result in a self-reinforcing process, which we call ‘a 
race for markets’. Theoretically, this process is associated with negative 
external effects, so one can assume that the trend towards regionalisation is 
too pronounced for the global economy overall. From a game-theoretical 
point of view, bilateralism is a dominant strategy and leads to a kind of 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’. More specifically, for the individual actors it is 
always rational to conclude bilateral agreements – independent of the 
behaviour of the remaining trading partners. If the competitors do not 
conclude an agreement with an interesting country it is best for the 
individual country to do so and thus to gain a competitive advantage. If, 
however, the competing countries themselves go ahead with this strategy, 
the individual country is forced to follow in order to achieve a level playing 
field again. Individual and collective rationality therefore diverge because 
individual countries do not take global welfare into account.  
The proliferation of bilateral agreements in the course of an 
exaggerated race for markets entails the possibility that global welfare is 
impaired for the following reasons:  
•  In line with an increasingly complex network of bilateral agreements, 
the transaction costs of global trade inexorably continue to rise.  MULTILATERALISM OR REGIONALISM? | 103 
 
•  Some of the new bilateral trade agreements that have been concluded 
in the race for markets could on their own lead to negative global 
welfare effects.  
•  The more often developing countries conclude a North-South 
agreement with a particular industrial country, the more the danger 
grows that the developing countries cannot achieve the expected 
welfare gains. Rather, welfare losses can occur because in the end, 
access to the industrial country’s market is a positional good whose 
value decreases as the number of participants increases.  
In order to prevent such a scenario, multilateral cooperation would 
be necessary, in which all countries would have to agree to abstain from a 
race for markets. Such cooperation is problematic, however, because an 
agreement in favour of global welfare is, in the end, a global public good. 
Even if the incentives for the individual countries are hardly compelling, 
the WTO is nevertheless the suitable forum for such coordination.3  
Regionalisation does not necessarily mean that the WTO must accept 
a loss of significance. Despite regionalisation, the WTO’s rules and dispute 
settlement mechanism remain a backbone of global trade. There are also 
aspects of regionalism that can be conducive to the WTO process, such as 
countries becoming accustomed to their international competition, and, in 
the case of the ‘new trade issues’, there is potential for learning (i.e. a 
laboratory phase for subsequent multilateral solutions such as elementary 
rules for competition policy). In addition, negotiations at the multilateral 
level can hardly be disturbed by bilateral trade agreements concerning a 
key area: the reduction of EU agricultural subsidies, which would benefit 
all countries that export agricultural goods. For the EU there is no incentive 
to make this concession in bilateral negotiations, because it would then 
receive substantially less in exchange in the form of improved market 
access for its export industries than in the multilateral context. 
There are nevertheless some strong indications that the WTO 
negotiations are suffering from regionalisation – meaning that regional 
                                                      
3 The WTO (and the GATT) can absolutely be seen as being such a forum, since 
basically the incentive exists for large countries to improve their own terms of 
trade by imposing (high) tariffs at the expense of the rest of the world. 
Nevertheless, the threat of a trade war exists if other large countries take 
retaliatory measures. In the context of binding global trade rules at the WTO level, 
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agreements represent stumbling blocks for multilateral agreement. For 
example, the pressure to agree falls if attractive trade policy alternatives 
exist or if important markets of the export industry have already been or 
are expected to be opened by bilateral agreements. There are some 
indications that this is already the case in the current Doha negotiations. 
Moreover, restricted negotiation capacities can be tied up by negotiating 
bilateral agreements. A further important aspect is that regional trade 
agreements establish benefits that can lead to opposition against the 
multilateral liberalisation of trade because a general tariff reduction lowers 
the ‘artificial’ advantage with respect to third countries (preference 
erosion). Generally, the more influential the politically-favoured export 
industry is, the more the multilateral process slows down. Currently, 
numerous developing countries that have preferential access to the markets 
of the industrial countries (among others, the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific or ACP countries and the least-developed countries) are currently 
delaying progress in the Doha Round because they see entire economic 
structures in their countries at stake. This situation represents a striking 
example of specific regional trade arrangements having led to a 
questionable allocation of resources. 
In the context of these diverse interests, the question arises as to how 
the WTO should in future deal with regionalism, because fundamentally, 
the WTO has the task of setting generally applicable rules for the 
regionalisation process. This matter is one of primarily limiting the 
negative impact on non-member countries (trade diversions) and curtailing 
excessive regionalisation (transaction costs). The basic rules of Art. XXIV of 
the GATT, particularly the requirements to liberalise “substantially all the 
trade” and not to increase external barriers represent a good foundation. 
Nevertheless, the WTO rules should be specified and tightened.  
•  For instance, despite foreseeable strong resistance, a requirement 
should be introduced to reduce trade barriers with respect to third 
countries when establishing regional agreements.  
•  The WTO review mechanism also needs to be strengthened to better 
supervise compliance with the rules. For this to occur, it is necessary 
to add legally unequivocal interpretations to a range of unclear 
wordings in Art. XXIV of the GATT. For example, the exact meaning 
of the requirement to include “substantially all trade” in a regional 
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•  In addition, it would be sensible to limit the sharp rise in transaction 
costs stemming from the spaghetti bowl effect in conjunction with 
highly complicated rules of origin. Hence, the preferential rules of 
origin should be harmonised under the auspices of the WTO in order 
to create more uniformity and transparency.  
The WTO is fundamentally the suitable forum for coordination and 
consultation regarding regional agreements with the objective of curbing 
an uncontrolled race for markets. But it is not a realistic framework for 
these aims without the vigorous commitment on the part of important 
actors. Another core point in the context of the WTO’s Doha Round is to 
substantially lower tariffs within the most-favoured nation (MFN) 
treatment, in order to render regional trade agreements less attractive.  
From the perspective of developing countries, South-South 
agreements in principle provide the opportunity for welfare gains, 
primarily by an increased use of economies of scale and more international 
competition. Yet when small and rather poor developing countries 
establish an association, there is a threat of a strong diversion of trade and 
an ineffective allocation of resources. To prevent the associated welfare 
losses from the view of the individual country, in these cases it is also 
necessary to lower the barriers to trade vis-à-vis third countries. From the 
vantage point of developing countries, North-South agreements offer more 
benefits than South-South ones. These benefits include access to larger 
markets and thereby also the greater use of economies of scale, increased 
competitive pressure, less diversion of trade, more transfer of technology, a 
possible lock-in of reforms as well as a rise in foreign direct investment. But 
in the case of agreements with large industrial countries, developing 
countries often have to accept that they must liberalise to a greater extent 
than their partners and agree to certain environmental and social 
standards. Furthermore, with North-South regionalism, the danger exists 
that smaller developing countries, which as markets are not so interesting 
for industrial nations, fall by the wayside. 
Regional agreements provide the opportunity to agree on regulations 
regarding trade issues, with which for political reasons no progress can be 
achieved within the scope of the WTO. For instance, the opposition among 
WTO members against a multilateral investment agreement can hardly be 
overcome. The WTO is not even capable of consensus regarding the 
objective of creating international rules for competition. The need for 
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growing importance of foreign direct investment and the proliferating 
integration among national markets. Another field for pragmatic bilateral 
and regional cooperation concerns questions of practical collaboration on 
technical regulations and politically sensitive issues concerning 
international trade in services (for example, the bilateral recognition of 
diplomas, etc.). Although with these issues the non-discriminatory 
multilateral rules under the auspices of the WTO would be ideal, one can 
also find within the scope of bilateral agreements meaningful regulations 
that limit possible diversions of trade. Therefore, regional agreements 
should aim at deepening economic integration. In the longer term, the 
opportunity exists that different models of regional associations will begin 
to compete with one another on an institutional level and that the 
arrangement that in the end appears most suitable might serve as a 
framework for future WTO rules.  
In the second part of this study, options are presented for EU trade 
policy mainly from the perspective of the EU’s self-interest. The most 
important conclusion is that for the EU, the WTO should continue to have 
the highest priority, because the EU would profit most from multilateral 
liberalisation. Without the EU’s commitment to opening markets in the 
agricultural sector, the Doha Round cannot succeed. According to this 
reasoning, the EU cannot expect a free ride from a successful multilateral 
process but must make its own substantial contribution. This point is not 
only true for the traditional negotiations on tariffs but also for the refining 
of WTO rules concerning regional agreements and antidumping, and for 
establishing a binding agreement on trade facilitation. The key role of the 
EU is particularly evident with regard to the honing of the rules that 
govern regional trade agreements. As a historical driving force of 
regionalisation, the EU could do this credibly if it issues demands that 
would represent a significant need for the EU to adapt as well. This 
approach particularly concerns the harmonisation of preferential rules of 
origin. The EU has to bear in mind that it is indeed a key player with a 
crucial impact on the negotiations.  
Within the scope of its trade strategy, the EU should consider that its 
tariffs possess no economic justification in most manufacturing sectors. 
Customs revenues are out of all proportion to the associated administrative 
expenses, while the level of tariffs is so low that they do not effectively 
protect domestic industry. Further, efforts within the scope of a strategic 
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context the costs of the customs administration must also be considered – 
the most evident one being the salaries of customs officers – along with the 
costs of customs handling procedures borne by manufacturers, merchants, 
forwarders and finally consumers. Statistically each customs officer 
generates annual revenue of only €85,000. This figure is clear evidence of 
the fact that customs revenue is disproportionate to the administrative 
costs involved. Under these circumstances tariffs are pointless.  
In view of these facts, the EU would do itself a favour for purely 
economic reasons if it were to unilaterally abolish tariffs in most industries. 
This recommendation is less starry-eyed than it may appear at first sight, 
since empirically, the unilateral dismantling of tariffs – usually as an 
element of a broader design for economic reform – represents by far the 
most important form of liberalisation that has occurred in developing 
countries during the last two decades. Admittedly, however, a unilateral 
reduction of tariffs has the key disadvantage of losing bargaining chips for 
counter-concessions during international negotiations. For that reason, the 
EU will probably prefer to adopt other strategies.  
The EU must accept the global trend towards bilateral agreements as 
a given. Moreover, as has been pointed out, bilateral agreements are 
generally in the EU’s interest, particularly with regard to domestic 
regulations, where welfare effects are more favourable than in the case of 
tariffs and where – owing to the complexity of the issue – multilateral 
progress is very slow.  
That being said, bilateral agreements are an option that the EU 
should pursue with great care. Restraint is sensible in order to limit the rise 
in the transaction costs of global trade that results from the spaghetti bowl 
phenomenon. In addition, the EU should set a good example by leading the 
way and motivating other countries to focus more fully on the WTO round 
and refrain from an excessive race for markets.  
Yet this can only be a temporary assessment. Irregardless of whether 
the WTO round fails, drags on without any palpable progress or is 
concluded successfully, the balance of the pros and cons of a moratorium 
on new bilateral deals will change substantially. Hence, as with all 
doctrines, the reasoning behind the Lamy doctrine has a limited lifespan. 
Already companies that are at risk of losing their competitive edge in 
emerging markets through growing regionalisation are increasingly urging 
the EU to strengthen bilateral economic relations, particularly with the 
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global trade system conflict too strongly with the EU’s self-interests, and 
individual bilateral agreements are essential to avoid being at a significant 
disadvantage regarding access to important markets, the EU should 
emphasise quality over quantity and go for more profound integration 
incorporating new trade issues. Owing to the rise in transaction costs 
associated with bilateral agreements, only economically significant partners 
or (where possible) groups of countries should be considered.4  
With a view to possible bilateral agreements, a transatlantic 
association with the US appears an obvious choice because of the size of its 
market. Yet for many policy-makers and academics, a bilateral deal 
between the EU and the US is considered taboo. They fear that such an 
agreement would render the multilateral system irrelevant. This 
predominately political argument can be challenged. For the largest part of 
transatlantic trade, only very low tariffs exist. Moreover, bilateral exports 
and imports are marked by intra-company trade, which has proved to be 
robust despite wide fluctuations in exchange rates. In addition, given the 
structure of transatlantic trade (mainly capital-intensive), one cannot expect 
that the products of developing countries (mainly labour-intensive) would 
lose their competitive edge. The trade-creating and -diverting effects of a 
bilateral dismantling of tariffs would therefore be rather limited. Still, such 
a deal would indeed be a strong political signal with possible repercussions 
for the WTO. In assessing a transatlantic agreement, one must also take 
account of the fact that the EU and the US bear a key political responsibility 
for the multilateral trade system.  
Problems in transatlantic trade are more persistent in the non-tariff 
area. These primarily concern the many questions of detail that play a role 
in the course of the intensive integration that is taking place between the 
EU and the US through multinational companies and often relate to the 
regulatory collaboration between authorities. From this perspective, one 
can derive a strategy for approaching the real problems – namely non-tariff 
issues (questions of investment, competition policy, services and regulatory 
cooperation) – through a trade and investment agreement and to exclude 
                                                      
4 The danger with such a strategy, being that primarily poorer developing 
countries will be sidelined, is diminished by the fact that the EU continues to focus 
on multilateral liberalisation. This focus means that EU tariff preferences will lose 
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tariffs in view of the political responsibility for the multilateral trade order. 
Hence one would leave the issue of dismantling tariffs to the WTO.  
The proposed association would be a so-called ‘friendship 
agreement’, dealing mainly with the technical questions of detail 
mentioned above. Here, trade-diverting effects can as a rule be expected to 
be rather insignificant. The basic idea of such an agreement lies in giving 
those issues that were already negotiated in the past in various committees 
without lasting success more political weight by grouping them within one 
agreement, providing them with an improved chance of being 
implemented. Of course, it remains to be seen whether this will be 
successful.  
Apart from the US, emerging markets such as China, India and the 
ASEAN countries appear to be the most attractive partners for new EU 
bilateral trade agreements. Free trade agreements with these countries 
would offer good prospects for trade creation and could be seen as a 
response to increasing regional integration – particularly in Asia. The 
advanced Asian countries are increasingly becoming competitors for the 
EU in the established high technology markets. If these countries grant 
themselves preferential access to their markets, the EU can thus be put at a 
significant disadvantage. This development requires a response on the part 
of the EU – at least in the medium term.   
Plurilateral approaches, being a middle ground between bilateral 
deals and multilateral solutions, lend themselves as a flexible and effective 
‘third way’. They allow like-minded countries to set up rules that go 
beyond the general WTO context. Plurilateral agreements should 
preferably be concluded within the WTO, thus allowing all WTO members 
to observe the negotiations and giving them the opportunity to join during 
the negotiations or after the establishment of an agreement. The EU should 
explore the viability of this approach in detail.  
A convincing area for a plurilateral approach – and an alternative to a 
transatlantic dismantling of tariffs – is an initiative for the sectoral 
elimination of tariffs. The OECD countries could offer the elimination of 
tariffs in those industries in which a large share of global trade is conducted 
by the industrial countries. A prerequisite for this move is the definition of 
a share in global trade that the signatory countries must together represent 
for the agreement to come into force (for example, 85 or 90%). In many 
industrial sectors, OECD countries account for more than 85% of world 
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would simply be ‘given’ to the non-participating countries. A crucial 
challenge of this method may be to discourage fast-growing developing 
countries from seeking a free ride and to instead take part the agreement. 
The political support of many industrial sectors in OECD countries 
probably depends on whether China and India would join the tariff-
dismantling efforts. Still, one has to keep in mind that the relevance of 
unilateral tariff elimination on the part of these emerging countries must 
not be underestimated.  
The Information Technology Agreement provides a model for this 
approach. Using this sectoral, ‘plurilateral tariff-reduction initiative’ one 
could free transatlantic trade in the key EU industries from tariffs without 
generating trade distortion with the other OECD countries and the 
developing countries – as would be the case with a transatlantic association 
between the EU and the US. In addition, inclusion in the WTO framework 
also permits a high degree of transparency and a certain say in the matter 
for third countries. Admittedly, timing is critical. Sectoral tariff-reduction 
initiatives could reduce the pressure to agree on an ambitious general 
tariff-reduction formula within the scope of the WTO round. Therefore, this 
approach should perhaps be pursued only as a second step, after a general 
tariff-reduction formula has been agreed.   
Plurilateral initiatives are also advisable for the various new trade 
issues (competition policy, standards and in the longer term, investment) 
where a multilateral approach is currently not achieving any progress. But 
again, timing will be a decisive factor. At present it is difficult to imagine 
that a plurilateral investment agreement could be negotiated in the WTO 
without stirring up fierce and highly emotional debates. A plurilateral 
competition agreement would probably face less resistance. The question 
could be posed, however, whether negotiating capacities should be tied up 
and attention distracted from the Doha Round, given the fragile state of 
these negotiations. Yet, for a fresh start on these issues the EU would have 
to rethink its objectives and plurilateral agreements offer the opportunity to 
be much more ambitious compared with a multilateral approach.  
The paradigm that was enshrined when the WTO was founded, 
whereby all agreements should be basically binding for all WTO members, 
should be reviewed. A two-tiered WTO may turn out be the only possible 
way to move the world trading system forward. The EU is well advised to 
prepare to lead the way to facilitate this development.  
| 111 
REFERENCES 
Alexandraki, Katerina and Hans Peter Lankes (2004), The Impact of Preference 
Erosion on Middle-Income Developing Countries, Working Paper No. 
WP/04/169, IMF, Washington, D.C. 
Baier, Scott L. and Jeffrey H. Bergstrand (2004), “Economic Determinants of 
Free Trade Agreements”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 64, pp. 
29-63. 
Baldwin, Richard E. (1997), “The Causes of Regionalism”, World Economy, Vol. 
20, No. 7, pp. 865-88. 
Baldwin, Richard E. and Joseph Francois (1996), “Transatlantic Free Trade: A 
Quantitative Assessment”, mimeo, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
London. 
Baldwin, Richard E. and Anthony J. Venables (1995), “Regional Economic 
Integration” in Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff (eds), Handbook 
of International Economics, Vol. III, Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 1597-
644. 
Baldwin, Richard E. and Charles Wyplosz (2004), The Economics of European 
Integration, Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1992), “Regionalism versus Multilateralism”, World 
Economy, Vol. 15, No. 5, pp. 535-55. 
Böhmer, Alexander (1998), “The Struggle for a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment: An Assessment of the Negotiation Process in the OECD” in 
the German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 41, pp. 267-98. 
Chen, Maggie Xiaoyang and Aaditya Mattoo (2004), Regionalism in Standards: 
Good or Bad for Trade?, Working Paper No. 3458, World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 
Corden, Max (1972), “Economies of Scale and Customs Union Theory”, Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 80, Heft 3, No. 1, pp. 465-75. 
Croce, Enzo, V. Hugo Juan-Ramón and Feng Zhu (2004), Performance of Western 
Hemisphere Trading Blocs: A Cost-Corrected Gravity Approach, Working 
Paper No. WP/04/109, IMF, Washington, D.C. 
Davison, Leigh and Debra Johnson (2002), “The EU’s Evolving Stance on the 
International Dimension of Competition Policy: A Critical 
Commentary”, Intereconomics, Vol. 37, Book 5, pp. 244-52. 112 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
De Santis, Roberto A. (1998), Trade policy and general equilibrium under different 
market regimes with numerical applications to Turkey, University of 
Warwick. 
Dieter, Heribert (2003), Abschied vom Multilateralismus? Der neue Regionalismus 
in der Handels- und Finanzpolitik, SWP-Studie No. 2003/S04, Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin. 
––––––––– (2004), Ursprungsregeln in Freihandelszonen: Protektionismus durch die 
Hintertür, SWP-Studie 2004/S09, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
Berlin. 
Elliott, Kimberly Ann and Richard B. Freeman (2003), Can Labour Standards 
Improve under Globalisation?, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, D.C. 
Estevadeordal, Antoni and Kati Suominen (2003), Measuring Rules of Origin in 
the World Trading System and Proposals for Multilateral Harmonisation, 
paper presented at the APEC Capacity-Building Workshop on 
Quantitative Methods for Assessing NTMs and Trade Facilitation, 
Bangkok. 
Ethier, Wilfried J. (1998), “The New Regionalism”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 
108, No. 449, pp. 1149-61. 
Feinberg, Richard E. (2003), “The Political Economy of United States’ Free 
Trade Agreements”, The World Economy, Vol. 26, No. 7, pp. 1019-40. 
Foroutan, Faezeh (1998), “Does Membership of a Regional Preferential Trade 
Agreement Make a Country More or Less Protectionist?”, The World 
Economy, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 305-36. 
Fratianni, Michele and John Pattison (2001), “International Organisations in a 
World of Regional Trade Agreements: Lessons from Club Theory”, The 
World Economy, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 333-58. 
Freund, Caroline (2003), Reciprocity in Free Trade Agreements, Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 3061, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Glania, Guido (2004), “Various Approaches for Institutional Reform within the 
WTO”, Aussenwirtschaft, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 7-30. 
Graham, Edward M. (2000), “Trade Competition, and the WTO Agenda” in 
Jeffrey J. Schott (ed.), The WTO after Seattle, Institute for International 
Economics, Washington, D.C. 
Hamilton, Daniel S. and Joseph P. Quinlan (2004), Partners in Prosperity: The 
Changing Geography of the Transatlantic Economy, Center for Transatlantic 
Relations, Washington, D.C. MULTILATERALISM OR REGIONALISM? | 113 
 
Hauser, Heinz and Kai-Uwe Schanz (1995), Das neue GATT: Die 
Welthandelsordnung  nach Abschluss der Uruguay-Runde, München: 
Oldenbourg Wiss. 
Hilaire, Alvin and Yongzheng Yang (2003), The United States and the New 
Regionalism/Bilateralism, Working Paper No. WP/03/206, IMF, 
Washington, D.C. 
Kaiser, Corinne (2003), Regionale Integration und das globale Handelssystem, DVS 
No. 38, Duisburger Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften, Berlin: Duncker and 
Humbolt. 
Kennes, Walter (2000), Small Developing Countries and Global Markets: Competing 
in the Big League, New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Krueger, Anne O. (1999), “Are Preferential Trading Arrangements Trade-
Liberalizing or Protectionist?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13, 
No. 4, pp. 105-24. 
Krugman, Paul R. (1991), “Is Bilateralism Bad?” in Elhanan Helpman and 
Assaf Razin (ed.), International Trade and Trade Policy, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, pp. 9-23. 
Krugman, Paul R. and Maurice Obstfeld (1997), International Economics: Theory 
and Policy, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Lamy, Pascal (2002), “Stepping Stones or Stumbling Blocks? The EU’s 
Approach towards the Problem of Multilateralism vs. Regionalism in 
Trade Policy”, The World Economy, Vol. 22, No. 10, pp. 1399-413. 
Langhammer, Rolf J. and Ludger Wößmann (2002), “Erscheinungsformen 
regionaler Integrationsabkommen im weltwirtschaftlichen 
Ordnungsrahmen: Defizite und Dynamik” in Alfred Schüller and 
Thieme H. Jörg (eds), Ordnungsprobleme der Weltwirtschaft, Schriften zu 
Ordnungsfragen der Wirtschaft, Bd. 71, Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius 
Verlags-GmbH,  pp. 373-97. 
Langhammer, Rolf J., Daniel Piazolo and Horst Siebert (2002), “Assessing 
Proposals for a Transatlantic Free Trade Area”, Aussenwirtschaft, Vol. 57, 
II, pp. 161-85. 
Lewis, Jeffrey, Sherman Robinson and Karen Thierfelder (1999), After the 
Negotiations: Assessing the Impact of Free Trade Agreements in Southern 
Africa, Discussion Paper No. 46, Trade and Macroeconomics Division, 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.  
Lipsey, Richard (1960), “The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey”, 
The Economic Journal, Vol. 70, pp. 496-513. 114 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
Lloyd, Peter J. (2002), “New Bilateralism in the Asia-Pacific”, The World 
Economy, Vol. 26, No. 9, pp. 1279-96. 
Lloyd, Peter J. and Donald MacLaren (2003), The Case of Free Trade and the Role 
of RTAs, paper prepared for the Seminar on Regional Trade Agreements 
and the WTO, 14 Nov. 2003, Geneva. 
Matthes, Jürgen (2001), Neuer Protektionismus? Perspektiven für eine weitere 
Liberalisierung des Welthandels, No. 267, Beiträge zur Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialpolitik, Cologne. 
–––––––––  (2004),  Entwicklungsländer: Ökonomische Performance und 
Erfolgsstrategien im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, No. 6, IW-Analysen, 
Cologne. 
Meade, James E. (1955), The Theory of Customs Unions, Amsterdam: North-
Holland. 
Moïsé, Evdokia (2003), “Rules of Origin” in OECD (ed.), Regionalism and the 
Multilateral Trading System, OECD, Paris, pp. 87-96 and pp. 159-69. 
Neary, Peter J. (2004), “Europe on the road to Doha: Towards a new global 
trade round?”, CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 319-32. 
Nottage, Hunter (2003), “Competition Policy” in OECD (ed.), Regionalism and 
the Multilateral Trading System, OECD, Paris, pp. 71-86. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2001a), 
Regional integration: Observed Trade and Other Economic Effects, OECD, 
Paris. 
––––––––– (2001b), Trade and Competition Policies, Options for a Greater Coherence, 
OECD, Paris. 
Panagariya, Arvind (1999), “The Regionalism Debate: An Overview”, The 
World Economy, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 455-76. 
–––––––––  (2000), “Preferential Trade Liberalisation: The Traditional Theory 
and New Developments”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 38, June, pp. 
287-31. 
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich (1996), “International Competition Rules for 
Governments and for Private Business: The Case for Linking Future 
WTO Negotiations on Investment, Competition and Environmental 
Rules to Reforms of Anti-Dumping Laws”, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 30, 
No. 3, pp. 5-35. 
Rose, Andrew K. (2002), Do WTO Members Have More Liberal Trade Policy?, 
Working Paper No. 9347, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, MA, and the Journal of International Economics (forthcoming). MULTILATERALISM OR REGIONALISM? | 115 
 
–––––––––  (2004), “Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 1, pp. 98-114. 
Rose, Klaus and Karlhans Sauernheimer (1999), Theorie der Aussenwirtschaft, 
13th Auflage, Munich: Verlag Vahlen. 
Sapir, André (2000), “Two Tribes”, CEPR European Economic Perspectives, No. 
27, pp. 3-4. 
Schiff, Maurice and Alan L. Winters (2002), “Regionalism and Development: 
The Implications of World Bank Research for ACP and Latin American 
Countries”, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 479-99. 
––––––––– (2003),  Regional Integration and Development, World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schott, Jeffrey J. (2003), Competitive Liberalisation: How it Affects the Multilateral 
Trading System, paper prepared for the WTO Seminar on Regional Trade 
Agreements and the WTO, 14 November 2003, Geneva. 
–––––––––  (ed.) (2004), Free Trade Agreements: US Strategies and Priorities, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C. 
Siebert, Horst (1997), Weltwirtschaft, Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius. 
Slaughter, Matthew J. (2003), Tariff Elimination for Industrial Goods: Why the 
Gains Will Far Outweigh Any Losses, background paper prepared for The 
National Foreign Trade Council, August 2003, Washington, D.C. 
Slootmaekers, Veerle (2004), Trade effects of the EU-Mexico free trade agreement, 
Working Papers No. 416, Kiel Institute of World Economics, Kiel. 
Soloaga, Isidora and Alan L. Winters (2001), Regionalism in the 1990s: What 
Effect on Trade?, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2156, World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 
Stern, Robert M. (2003), Labour Standards and Trade Agreements, Discussion 
Paper No. 496, Research Seminar in International Economics, University 
of Michigan 18 August 2003. 
Subramanian, Arvind and Shang-Jin Wei (2003), The WTO Promotes Trade, 
Strongly but Unevenly, Working Paper No. 10024, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) (2002), Trade Facts: United States 
Proposes a Tariff-Free World, USTR, Washington, D.C., 26 November 2002. 
–––––––––  (2004), Council of the Americas, Remarks of USTR Robert B. 
Zoellick (retrieved from http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/ 
USTR_Zoellick_Speeches/2004/Council_of_the_Americas,_Remarks_of_
USTR_Robert_B._Zoellick.html). 116 | GLANIA & MATTHES 
 
Viner, Jacob (1950), The Customs Union Issue, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, New York and London: Stevens & Sons. 
von Carlowitz, Philipp (2003), Regionalismus in der Weltwirtschaft, Schriftenreihe 
Volkswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse, Bd. 85, Hamburg: Verlag Dr. 
Kovač. 
Winters, L. Alan (1999), “Regionalism vs. Multilateralism” in Richard E. 
Baldwin, Daniel Cohen, Andre Sapir and Anthony J. Venables (eds), 
Market Integration, Regionalism, and the Global Economy, Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 7-52. 
Woolcock, Stephen (2003), “The Singapore Issues in Cancún: A Failed 
Negotiation Ploy or a Litmus Test for Global Governance?”, 
Intereconomics, Vol. 38, Heft 5, pp. 249-55. 
World Bank (ed.) (2000), Trade Blocs, Policy Research Report, World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 
––––––––– (2003a),  Global Economic Prospects – Trade, Regionalism, and 
Development, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
––––––––– (2003b), World Development Indicators (WDI) 2003, CD-ROM, World 
Bank, Washington, D.C. 
––––––––– (2004),  Global Economic Prospects – Trade, Regionalism, and 
Development, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) (ed.) (2003a), The Changing Landscape of 
RTAS, paper prepared for the Seminar on Regional Trade Agreements 
and the WTO, 14 November 2003, WTO, Geneva. 
––––––––– (ed.) (2003b), World Trade Report 2003, WTO, Geneva. 
–––––––––  (ed.) (2004), Regional Trade Agreements, WTO, Geneva (retrieved 
from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm). 
Zimmermann, Ralf (1999), Regionale Integration und multilaterale 
Handelsordnung, Untersuchungen zur Wirtschaftspolitik, No. 115, Institut 
für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universität zu Köln, Cologne. 